Opinion
Civil No. 04-796-AA.
September 9, 2004
ORDER
Plaintiff filed a complaint captioned "Suit for Full disclosure of applicable law or damages or orders of prohibition" against various State of Oregon and Marion County officials. No jurisdictional basis is alleged. Plaintiff alleges that "unless this court is willing to provide information on how to access an Article 3, 'District Court of the United States,' then it is obligated by law to accept this public law and common law claim and provide for Plaintiff, a due process proceeding in accordance with the common law." Complaint (#1), p. 3. Plaintiff is incorrect. It is plaintiff's obligation to allege a proper jurisdictional basis for his claims. See, Fed. R, Civ. P. 8(a) (1).
Although the precise nature of plaintiff's claims are unclear, it appears that he is challenging the State of Oregon's jurisdiction over persons residing in the state. Plaintiff also appears to challenge the procedures of Marion County relative to arrests and impounding vehicles for failure to present "corporate government identification," Complaint (#1) p. 20, and the propriety of various state officials to have jobs "where (they) felt compelled to be a party to intentional violations of the natural rights of people." Id., p. 26-27.
Plaintiff Is requests relief in the form of "proof" of certain legal and other propositions, or equitable relief and damages.
Defendants now move to dismiss.
As a preliminary matter, plaintiff has filed a "Petition: for waiver and return of court costs and filing fees that were paid under duress, or A statement of constitutional authority for compelling Petitioner to comply with the civil laws of the United States in disregard of the Public Laws of Oregon and the United States." (#2)
The procedure for requesting a waiver of court fees is to file an application to proceed in forma pauperis status prior to or contemporaneously with the filing of a complaint. Petitioner alleges that he "had to pay in court costs in advance due to the urgency of the information sought and due to the fact that no provision has been created by the court for immediate review of these matters by the court."
Indigency, not urgency is the key in forma pauperis status. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he is unable to bear the court costs associated with this matter. Plaintiff's Petition (#2) is denied.
State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (#9): Defendants the Honorable J. Dennis Graves, Marion County District Attorney Dale Penn and Marion County Deputy District Attorney Stephanie Tuttle (State Defendants) now move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 12 (b) (1) and (6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The specific nature of plaintiff's claims against defendant Graves are unclear. However, it is clear that plaintiff seeks to hold defendant Graves liable for acts taken in his official capacity as a Marion County Circuit Court Judge. See, Complaint (#1) p. 26. Therefore, defendant Graves is absolutely immune from liability to plaintiff. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978);Sherman v. Babbit, 772 F.2d 1476, 1477 (9th Cir. 1985); Mirele v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986).
Prosecutors are also absolutely immune from liability for conduct within the scope of their official duties. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Specifically, the decision of a prosecutor in the initial phase of determining whether to bring charges against an individual is protected by prosecutorial immunity. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341-343 (1986); see also, Schlegel v. Bebout, 842 F.2d 937, 943-44 (9th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff's claims against defendants Penn and Tuttle appear to be based on their decision to charge plaintiff with state law violations. Accordingly, the are absolutely immune from liability.
Defendants Graves, Penn and Tuttle are also immune from plaintiff's claims on the grounds of qualified good faith immunity, See, Harlow v. Fitgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1993), because he has failed to establish that the State Defendants violated any of plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-201 (2001). See also, Figuero v. U.S., 7 F.3d 1405, 1409-1413 (9th Cir. 1993) (ordering dismissal on qualified immunity grounds on review of Rule 12 (b) (6) motion).
Lastly, the state defendants are immune from plaintiff's claims under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the amendment reflects the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity as a limitation on the grant of judicial authority in Article III. Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 1984). Thus, despite the limited terms of the amendment, federal courts cannot entertain an action brought by a citizen against his or her own state.Id.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a state or its officials and agencies may not be sued by private individuals in federal court unless the state has unequivocally consented to that action, or Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent under the Fourteenth Amendment to waive the immunity of the States. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001); see also, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Edleman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1984); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). The Eleventh Amendment otherwise bars any such action regardless of the nature of the relief sought. Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982); Brooks v. Sulpher Springs Valley Elec. Co-Op, 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) ["The Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar covers suits naming state agencies and departments as defendants, and applies whether the relief sought is legal or equitable in nature]. In addition, a states waiver of sovereign immunity in its own courts does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts. Edleman v. Jordan, supra. Therefore, the enactment of the Oregon Tort Claims Act did not waive the State of Oregon's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, Air Transport Ass'n v. PUC of State of California, 833 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1236 (1988)
Even if plaintiff's claims are construed as against the State Defendants in their personal capacities, they are nevertheless immune from liability because state officials who carry out "acts of independent decision-making integral to the functioning" of quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings are absolutely immune from suit. Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1185, cert. denied 528 U.S. 816 (9th Cir. 1999).
To the extent that plaintiff may be seeking to invoke this court's supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, see, Complaint (#1) p. 20-24, I find that it is appropriate to refrain from exercising federal jurisdiction over those claims.
If the federal claim giving rise to the court's jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, supplemental state law claims may be dismissed as well. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(3). Indeed some cases hold that the proper exercise of discretion requires dismissal of state law claims unless "extraordinary circumstance" justify their retention. Wren v. Sletten Const. Co., 654 F.2d 529, 536 (9th Cir. 1991); Wentzka v. Gellman, 991 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1993). However, most courts hold that whether to dismiss supplemental claims is fully discretionary with the district court. Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993-994 (9th Cir. 1991), weighing factors such as economy, convenience, fairness and comity. Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 1995).
In this case, for the reasons discussed above, plaintiff's allegations fail to state a federal claim as a matter of law and are by this order dismissed. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any extraordinary circumstances to justify the retention of supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's putative state law claims. As noted above, the moving defendants are immune from suit under any circumstances. Moreover, plaintiff has not alleged the Oregon Tort Claims Act's jurisdictional prerequisite of notice against the state. See, ORS 30.275; Urban Renewal Agency v. Lackey, 275 Or. 35 (1975).
I find that the immunity issues discussed above are dispositive of plaintiff's claims against the State Defendants. However, I also note that plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to state a claim as a matter of law, even under the liberal pleading standards applicable to pro se litigants.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), a complaint shall include "(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends . . ., (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. "Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and direct." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e).
A district court has the power to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 (a) and 8 (e). McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996); Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
If the factual elements of a cause of action are scattered throughout the complaint but are not organized into a "short and plain statement of the claim," dismissal for failure to satisfy Rule 8(a) is proper. Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also, Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981).
Plaintiff's complaint alleges a myriad of facts, most of which are not specifically related to the alleged conduct of any specific individual or defendant. In order to state a claim against a named defendant, plaintiff must allege specific facts about that defendant and identify how that defendant's conduct violated his rights. General allegations are insufficient. The absence of any factual allegations against a named defendant will entitle that defendant to have the complaint dismissed as to him, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Polk v. Montgomery County, 548 F. Supp. 613, 614 (D.Md. 1982). See also, Morabito v. Blum, 528 F.Supp. 252, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Although pro se complaints are to be interpreted liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 92 S.Ct. 594 (1972), the court may not supply essential elements that are not pleaded. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1982); see also, Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (1994).
I find that the complaint before the court does not meet the minimal pleading requirements of the federal rules. Plaintiff's complaint is a rambling narrative of internally inconsistent factual averments is insufficient to enable defendants to form a response.
Plaintiff "specifically reserves the right to be able to correct defects, errors and omissions" in his complaint. Complaint (#1) p. 29. While leave to amend a complaint "shall be freely given when justice so requires, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the Ninth Circuit has held that leave to amend is not required where "it is clear the deficiency cannot be overcome by amendment."May Dewartment Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 1980).
In this case, assuming arguendo that the pleading defects could be overcome, due to the jurisdictional issues discussed above, any amendment to plaintiff's complaint would be futile.
Based on all of the foregoing, the State defendants' Motion to Dismiss (#9) is allowed. Plaintiff Is claims against defendant Graves, Penn and Tuttle are dismissed with prejudice.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (#15): Defendants Marion County, Jane Ellen Stonecipher, Bruce T. Armstrong, Gloria M. Roy, Kristen E. Lutz, Scott A. Norris, Ann Gasser and Raul Ramirez move to dismiss plaintiff Is claims against them on the ground that none of the moving defendants have been served with a copy of a summons as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 4(m) the time limit for service of a summons and complaint upon a defendant is 120 days. "If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified time. . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 (m).
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action on June 14, 2004, approximately eighty-five (85) days prior to the date of this order. Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is premature.
However, for the reasons stated above plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the complaint presently before the court is dismissed and plaintiff is allowed 30 days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint.
Summary: The State Defendants' motion to dismiss (#9) is allowed. Motion to Dismiss (#15) is denied. Plaintiff Is "Motion seeking answers in proof" (#13) is denied. Plaintiff's Motions to Strike (#20), (#21) and (#22) and Defendant's Motion to Strike (#18) are denied. Plaintiff is allowed 30 days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint against the remaining defendants which complies with pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 (a). Plaintiff is advised that failure to file an amended complaint that cures the pleading deficiencies discussed above within 30 days, this action will be dismissed for failure to prosecute.