Opinion
Civil Action 1:22-CV-268
10-14-2022
NATHAN L. MAY, JR., Plaintiff v. OFFICER DANIEL KLINEDINST, et al., Defendants
KANE, D.J.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
William I. Arbuckle U.S. Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Nathan L. May (“Plaintiff”) was arrested for, but not convicted of, DUI. His driver's license was suspended under Pennsylvania's Implied Consent Law because the arresting officer (Defendant Klinedinst) reported that Plaintiff refused chemical testing. Plaintiff initiated this civil rights action alleging due process violations, and as relief seeks to have his driver's license restored.
Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this case. (Doc. 7). The screening procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply to in forma pauperis complaints filed by prisoners and non-prisoners alike. See Atamian v. Burns, 236 Fed.Appx. 753, 755 (3d Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff's original complaint was reviewed, and the undersigned issued an order advising Plaintiff that his complaint would be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff was given leave to file an amended complaint. Instead,
Plaintiff wrote a letter, which this Court has construed as a supplement to Plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons explained herein, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's § 1983 claims be DISMISSED without leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted;
(2) The Court should DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claim; and.
(3) The Clerk of Court should be DIRECTED to close this case.
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 3, 2018, Defendant Klinedinst pulled over a vehicle because its registration lamps were not operational, and because its registration was expired. (Doc. 5-2, pp. 7-8). When Defendant Klinedinst approached the driver's side of the vehicle, the window was rolled up and Plaintiff was using his phone to record Defendant Klinedinst. Id. Plaintiff refused to roll down his window when asked. Plaintiff asked Defendant Klinedinst why he was being stopped. Id.
Defendant Klinedinst explained that Plaintiff's registration lamps were not operational and that Plaintiff's registration was expired. Id. Plaintiff refused to provide his license, registration, or insurance information, and instead began referencing Title 18 and his Constitutional rights. Id. Defendant Klinedinst reported that he smelled the odor of an intoxicating beverage emanating from the frame of the door. Id.
Due to Plaintiff's noncompliance, Defendant Klinedinst decided to impound the vehicle. Id. Plaintiff refused to exit the vehicle when asked. Id. A police officer broke the rear driver's side window, unlocked the driver's side door, and Plaintiff was arrested. Id. When Plaintiff was being placed in handcuffs, Defendant Klinedinst detected a strong odor of intoxicating beverage emanating from Plaintiff's person and expired breath. Id.
Plaintiff was placed in a police vehicle and transported to Memorial Hospital, where Defendant Klinedinst read the required chemical test warnings (i.e., O'Connell warnings). Id. Plaintiff allegedly refused to submit to a blood draw without his attorney present. Id. In his complaint, however, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Klinedinst did not give Plaintiff his O'Connell warnings. Id.
Following this incident, Plaintiff was charged with:
(1) obstructing administration of law or other governmental functions, in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 5101;
(2) resisting arrest, in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. 5104;
(3) disorderly conduct-hazardous/physically offensive condition, in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 5503;
(4) driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance, in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802;
(5) driving an unregistered vehicle, in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 1301;
(6) failure to carry and exhibit driver's license on demand, in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 1511;
(7) driving while operating privilege was suspended or revoked, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1543;
(8) driving without rear lights, in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 4303;
(9) failure to provide a registration card, in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 6308; and
(10) refusal to comply with an officer's requests, in violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 6311.
(Doc. 5-2, pp. 2-5).
On September 12, 2019, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to counts five (driving an unregistered vehicle), seven (driving while his operating privilege was suspended or revoked), and nine (failure to produce registration card). All other charges were dismissed. (Doc. 5-2, p. 10).
During the sentencing, the Judge noted that this was Plaintiff's seventh driving under suspension conviction. Plaintiff was sentenced to 30 days to six months incarceration, and fines were imposed. (Doc. 5-2, pp. 15-16). A notice of license suspension was also made a part of the record at sentencing. (Doc. 5-2, p. 10).
On February 22, 2022, Plaintiff initiated this civil action related to a suspension of his driver's license under Pennsylvania's “Implied Consent Law,” 75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(b)(1). Plaintiff alleges that:
York County Court concluded no evidence to support false charges made by Klinedinst. In retaliation he filed a 1547 with Penndot without my knowledge or proper due process. The 1547 chemical test refusal
was filed without evidence or conviction during my criminal case in York County. The Assistant District Attorney made the statement that the officer presented no evidence to support the charges. As per my transcript Officer Klinedinst knowingly violated Oconnell warning, due process and a host of civil rights without care for any consequences. My docket a video will show the officer committing the crimes further proving what the lower courts already have seen and acknowledged. Penndot was aware of the violation and failed to make it right. I was guaranteed by Regina Jackson-Dunbar that I would receive my probational license 1-3-2022 of which I did not. Penndot has knowingly received fraudulent and unsubstantiated charges from police without proper due process. Penndot has violated our verbal and contractual agreements repeatedly with consequence. Penndot has received thousands of dollars from me by its direction for cost and fees stating I would receive my license and I have not. All witnesses and documentation (written, video, and audio) will prove how I have been the victim of a number of civil rights violations.
I have reached out to Officer Klinedinst a number of times, phone, email, complaints, superiors and I have been blocked at every turn. I posted on the police website and did not get a response.
(Doc. 1, pp. 1-3).
As relief, Plaintiff requests:
Justice will finally be served. The traumatic experience I endured, the complete disregard or respect for due process. I was never given the opportunity for this officer to find me guilty in front of a judge, he used a loop hole which honestly was a crime also. I am a victim, I asked that the officer and those who helped him be brought to justice.
(Doc. 1, p. 3).
Along with his complaint, Plaintiff provided an application seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). One month later, Plaintiff provided exhibits to support his complaint. (Docs. 5, 6).
On July 28, 2022, the Court issued an order explaining that, as written, Plaintiff's complaint would typically be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. In that order, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to file an amended complaint on or before August 29, 2022.
On August 29, 2022, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Court. In that letter, Plaintiff wrote:
I am writing this letter to you in regards to the 1547 Chemical Test Refusal. In my words and before God I swear that the information is true and honorable. I went before a lawful court to defend my name against a charge made by Springettsbury Township Officer Daniel R. Klinedinst. I followed procedure, by reading carefully the charge and what the definition is. The case was presented in court and the State concluded that the charge was invalid and was dismissed according to lawful evidence presented by me both verbal and video. I humbly ask that this honorable court echo the decision made by the State by also ruling the invalid status of the 1547 charge as well. At the request of Penndot the ruling was made in accordance with all lawful procedure, however Penndot has requested the Federal Court (Civil) must present a ruling of invalid on the 1547 Charge as well. I ask that with the Invalid Ruling of the 1547 charge, that Penndot be made to honor its agreement to Re-Approve my Probationary license that I was charged a total of $600 to obtain. Penndot did not reimburse those funds to me, and I was misled for 2 years to believe that I would have no issues obtaining my Probationary License. Penndot's Drivers Licensing Division has already issued apologies for the circumstances of what has befallen me, however they are not looking to cover all liability for its mistake by inconveniencing me with the task of taking up this honorable Judge's Prestigious Time. In advance I ask for your forgiveness for such a small matter, however it is a necessity that I humbly beg your assistance in this matter. I have proven my case, I have done the work, I ask that the power your office holds be wielded to defend against this injustice. Please invalidate the 1547 (Chemical Test Refusal) charge in support of the Lower Courts righteous decision, thank you!!!
(Doc. 9). I have construed Plaintiff's letter as a supplement to his complaint. Although this letter does clarify the nature of Plaintiff's claim, and the nature of the relief he seeks, it does not change the undersigned's determination that these claims cannot proceed in federal court.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8: Requirements For A Complaint
A civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which directs that a complaint must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
Under this rule, a well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. It requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' ” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); see also Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007)).
Furthermore, a document filed by a plaintiff proceeding pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
B. Statutory Screening Obligation Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of complaints brought by a plaintiff who has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis and must dismiss a case sua sponte if: (i) the allegation of poverty is untrue, (ii) the action is frivolous or malicious, (iii) the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iv) the complaint seeks money damages from a defendant who is immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
As observed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, “[s]ome form of the IFP statute has been in existence for over a century,” in order to ensure “that no person is barred from ‘pursuing meaningful litigation' solely because of an inability to pay administrative court fees.” Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). In creating this procedure, however, Congress also “recognized that a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Id. (cleaned up).
When conducting this screening analysis, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Endrikat v. Ransom, No. 1:21-CV-1684, 2022 WL 4111861 at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2022) (“In dismissing claims under §§ 1915(e), 1915A, and 1997e, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). At this early stage of the litigation, the district court must:
“accept the facts alleged in [a plaintiff's] complaint as true,” “draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in [his or her] favor,” and “ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to
state a plausible . . . claim.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015).Shorter v. United States, 12 F. 4th 336, 374 (3d Cir. 2021). A court need not “credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions,' ”Morse v. LowerMerion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted), and does not need to assume that a plaintiff can prove facts not alleged, Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Furthermore, a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic documents] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Although a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment”).
IV. ANALYSIS
Under Pennsylvania's implied consent law, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1547, if a person placed under arrest for a violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802 (relating to driving under the influence) is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, “the testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police officer, the department shall suspend the operating privilege of the person . . . for a period of 12 months.” 75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(b)(1). That suspension is effective even if the person is later acquitted of the DUI charge.
Based on the allegations in the complaint, attached exhibits, and supplement, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with DUI in a criminal complaint. He was not convicted of the DUI charge. His license was suspended under 75 Pa. C.S. § 1547.
Plaintiff alleges that the suspension is unlawful for several reasons. First, he argues that he refused the blood draw without the benefit of any O'Connell warning. (Doc. 1, p. 2) (“Officer Klinedinst knowingly violated Oconell [sic] warning . . .”). Second, Plaintiff argues that the documentation related to the blood draw refusal was “filed without evidence or conviction during [his] criminal case.” Id. Third, he alleges that a Penndot employee (Regina Jackson-Dunbar) gave him incorrect information regarding the date Plaintiff would be eligible to receive a probationary license. Id. (“I was guaranteed by Regina Jackson Dunbar that I would receive my Probationary license 1-3-2022 of which I did not.”). In his supplement, Plaintiff clarifies that the only relief he seeks is for this Court to overturn the § 1547 suspension.
Although framed as a due process claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff's true objective in this case appears to be filing a civil statutory appeal of the suspension under 75 Pa. C.S. § 1550.
A. Plaintiff Has N ot Pleaded A Viable Due Process Claim
Plaintiff's due process claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). “It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely ‘provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)). To establish a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that his procedural right to due process was violated by Defendant Klinedinst, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”), and two PennDOT employees (Regina Jackson-Dunbar and Yassmin Gramian). Plaintiff has not alleged, however, that he utilized the available state processes that are available to him.
When a driver's license is suspended under 75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(b)(3), the driver has the “same right of appeal as provided for in cases of suspension for other reasons.” See also 75 Pa. C.S. § 1550 (providing that any person whose driver's license has been “cancelled, . . . suspended, revoked or disqualified by the department shall have the right to appeal to the court vested with jurisdiction of such appeals”). The Pennsylvania Courts of Common Pleas have jurisdiction of appeals from final orders issued by PennDOT. 42 Pa. C.S. § 933(a)(1)(ii).
“In order to state a claim for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must have taken advantage of the processes that are available to him or her, unless those processes are unavailable or patently inadequate.” McDaniel v. Collins, 615 Fed.Appx. 91, 93 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)). In this case, Plaintiff does not suggest that he used the available process-a civil statutory appeal pursuant to § 1550-and he does not allege facts that suggest this process was unavailable or inadequate. Instead, Plaintiff suggests that the suspension is unlawful because he was not convicted of DUI. However, under § 1547, a driver does not need to be convicted to have his or her license suspended.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that suggest he appealed the § 1547 to the appropriate court of common pleas, his due process claim should be dismissed.
B. The Court Should Decline To Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Any Remaining State Law Claims
In addition to his § 1983 claim, Plaintiff also alleges a breach of contract claim and may have intended this complaint to be a § 1550 appeal of his suspension (which should have been filed in the state court of common pleas). The undersigned has recommended dismissal of the only underlying federal claim (Plaintiff's due process claim).
Where a district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Whether the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within its discretion. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009). That decision should be based on “the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
Ordinarily, when all federal law claims have been dismissed and only state law claims remain, the balance of these factors indicates that these remaining claims properly belong in state court. Id. at 350. This case is no exception. Accordingly, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims.
C. Leave to Amend Should be Denied
If a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). In this case, Plaintiff has been granted one opportunity to amend his complaint, and did so by filing a supplement. (Doc. 9). Despite amendment, however, Plaintiff has not asserted a viable federal claim against any Defendant. Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to appeal his driver's license suspension, he should do so in state court.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's § 1983 claim be DISMISSED without leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted;
(2) The Court should DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claim; and.
(3) The Clerk of Court should be DIRECTED to close this case.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the
Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.