Opinion
2019–02535 Index No. 619554/18
01-20-2021
Douglas MATZEN, et al., appellants, v. Shawn ARMSTRONG, et al., respondents.
Gruenberg Kelly Della, Ronkonkoma, N.Y. (Zachary M. Beriloff of counsel), for appellants.
Gruenberg Kelly Della, Ronkonkoma, N.Y. (Zachary M. Beriloff of counsel), for appellants.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, ROBERT J. MILLER, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Paul J. Baisley, Jr., J.), dated February 13, 2019. The order denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
On June 18, 2018, a vehicle operated by the plaintiff Douglas Matzen (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) was struck in the rear by a vehicle operated by the defendant Shawn Armstrong (hereinafter the defendant driver) and owned by the defendant J. Kings Food Service Professionals, Inc., in the center eastbound lane of the Long Island Expressway near Exit 39. The injured plaintiff, and his wife suing derivatively, commenced this personal injury action against the defendants. The plaintiffs subsequently moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the plaintiffs appeal.
A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, requiring that operator to come forward with evidence of a nonnegligent explanation for the collision in order to rebut the inference of negligence (see Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 10 N.Y.3d 906, 908, 861 N.Y.S.2d 610, 891 N.E.2d 726 ; Lopez v. Dobbins, 164 A.D.3d 776, 777, 79 N.Y.S.3d 566 ). "A nonnegligent explanation may include that a plaintiff made a sudden lane change in front of a defendant's vehicle, forcing the defendant to stop suddenly" ( Fajardo v. City of New York, 95 A.D.3d 820, 821, 943 N.Y.S.2d 587 ; see Cruz v. Valentine Packaging Corp., 167 A.D.3d 707, 708, 89 N.Y.S.3d 316 ).
Here, in support of their motion, the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of the injured plaintiff wherein he averred that the vehicle that he was operating was stopped in traffic for three or four seconds when it was struck in the rear by the defendants' vehicle. Thus, the plaintiffs established, prima facie, that the defendant driver's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident (see Morgan v. Flippen, 173 A.D.3d 735, 736, 102 N.Y.S.3d 108 ; Miller v. Steinberg, 164 A.D.3d 492, 493, 82 N.Y.S.3d 597 ; Finney v. Morton, 127 A.D.3d 1134, 7 N.Y.S.3d 508 ; Sayyed v. Murray, 109 A.D.3d 464, 970 N.Y.S.2d 279 ).
In opposition, however, the defendants submitted the affidavit of the defendant driver, wherein he averred that the injured plaintiff's vehicle suddenly changed lanes without signaling, cutting in front of the defendants' vehicle. The defendants thereby raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver had a nonnegligent explanation for striking the rear of the injured plaintiff's vehicle (see Cruz v. Valentine Packaging Corp., 167 A.D.3d at 708, 89 N.Y.S.3d 316 ; Reitz v. Seagate Trucking, Inc., 71 A.D.3d 975, 976, 898 N.Y.S.2d 173 ; Rozengauz v. Lok Wing Ha, 280 A.D.2d 534, 535, 720 N.Y.S.2d 181 ).
Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
DILLON, J.P., CHAMBERS, MILLER and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.