Opinion
C.A. No. 00C-05-106 CHT
Submitted: October 1, 2002
Decided: February 3, 2003
TRIAL BY JURY OF TWELVE DEMANDED
On the Plaintiff Bernadette Matusky's Motion for a New Trial, or in the Alternative, Additur
Laura J. Kominkiewicz, Esquire, DALTON ASSOCIATES, P.A., Attorney for the Plaintiff.
Patricia D. Murphy, Esquire, CASARINO, CHRISTMAN SHALK, P.A., Attorney for the Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Presently before the Court is the Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and in the Alternative for Additur brought pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59. That which follows is the Court's resolution of the issues so presented.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On October 22, 1998, the vehicle in which the Plaintiff, Bernadette Matusky, was traveling, was struck in the rear by the vehicle driven by the Defendant, John Bonsall. The collision took place near the intersection of Delaware Route 72 and Dawson Drive, Newark, New Castle County, Delaware. As a result, the Plaintiff claimed to have suffered physical and emotional injury. She brought this action against the Defendant on May 10, 2000.
The trial was heard by the Court and a jury between May 13, and May 16, 2002. The Defendant admitted that he was negligent on the date of the accident but contested the causal relationship between that negligence and the injuries claimed by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff sought compensation for unpaid medical expenses and lost wages, as well as for pain and suffering inflicted as a result of the accident. Both sides presented testimony thru witnesses, including medical and biomechanical experts. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury rendered a verdict for the Plaintiff in the amount of $3,424.64. The Plaintiff filed the present Motion for a New Trial or in the Alternative for Additur on May 24, 2002.
The Plaintiff sought compensation for those items of damages that were not paid pursuant to the personal injury protection coverage provisions of her insurance and not excluded by 21 Del. C. § 2118.
The Plaintiff asserts several grounds upon which a new trial or additur should be granted. She argues that the jury award of $3,424.64 for her damages is against the great weight of the evidence, and is so low as to shock the Court's conscience and sense of justice. In addition, she argues that certain evidence presented by the Defendant was highly prejudicial to her case, and that defense counsel made improper remarks during closing arguments.
In response, the Defendant claims that the Plaintiff presented evidence that undercut the value of her claim, that she failed to meet her burden in establishing a causal connection between the accident and her injuries, and that the award is not against the great weight of the evidence. Lastly, the defense contends that any prejudice the Plaintiff claims she suffered at trial was cured by presentation of her own case and the Court's instructions to the jury.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff moves for a new trial pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59. When reviewing a motion for new trial, the jury's verdict is entitled to "enormous deference". A jury verdict should not be disturbed unless it is "manifestly and palpably against the weight of the evidence or for some reason, or a combination of reasons, justice would miscarry if it were allowed to stand."
Young v. Frase, Del. Supr., 702 A.2d 1234, 1236 (1997) (citing the Delaware Constitution, Art. IV, § 11( 1)(a)).
McCloskey v. McKelvey, Del. Supr., 174 A.2d 691, 693 (1961).
A motion for additur may be granted when the jury's award is "so out of proportion [to the injuries] as to shock the Court's conscience and sense of justice." "Under Delaware law, enormous deference is given to jury verdicts. In the face of any reasonable difference of opinion, courts will yield to the jury's decision. It follows that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the validity of damages determined by the jury should likewise be presumed." When passing on a motion for additur, the Court reviews the record and makes a determination of whether the award of damages "is within a range supported by the evidence."
Cusumano v. Ala, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 635 at *2.
Littrel v. Hanby, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 10 at *3-4, citing Young v. Frase, 702 A.2d 1234, 1236-7 (Del. 1997).
Id.
In this regard, initial note must be taken of the fact that the Defendant admitted that he was negligent on October 22, 1998, and that negligence proximately caused some injury to the Plaintiff. Also not in dispute was the fact that the Plaintiff had been involved in at least four accidents before the one involving the instant Defendant. What was in dispute was the nature and extent of the injuries suffered by the Plaintiff as well as their nexus to the October 22 accident as opposed to the prior accidents and other aspects of the Plaintiff's life.
The evidence showed that following the October 22 accident, the Plaintiff complained of injury to her neck, back, left arm and left hip as well as depression. She sought and received extensive treatment for those complaints, which the doctors who appeared at trial on behalf of the Plaintiff related to the October 22 accident. That treatment included taking medications, adjustments to daily activities and surgery. However, the defense presented expert testimony in opposition to that presented by the Plaintiff and argued that the surgery and some of the other treatment modalities were primarily due to conditions that existed prior to October 22. Additionally, the evidence established that the Plaintiff incurred post October 22 medical expenses and lost wages which totaled $31,137.85 and $17,829.68 respectively, and which remained unpaid at the time of trial.
Viewing the testimony introduced at trial, it is apparent that the Plaintiff's medical history and records reflecting the same were not a model of clarity or consistency. However, what was clear was that the Plaintiff did suffer injury because of the negligent conduct of the Defendant on October 22, 1998. It is also clear that the jury's award bore no apparent relationship to any of the medical testimony or special items of damage put before the jury. Even if one were to severely discount the total amount of the Plaintiff's specials in light of her prior medical history, there is no combination of figures, periods of treatment or prior accident related expenses which could lead to the award made. Furthermore, the Court cannot ignore the possibility that the questions posed by the defense regarding the causal connection between the depression the Plaintiff claimed to have suffered and her relationships with a sibling and that sibling's spouse, may have affected the jury's award.
While the defense places a great deal of emphasis on the number of accidents in which the Plaintiff was involved along with other complications in her life, there was little or no substantive evidence introduced suggesting that the pattern of expenses and medical treatment was simply a continuation of that which existed prior to October 22, 1998. Nor is there any argument that any preexisting injuries were not aggravated by the events which took place on the aforementioned date or that injuries claimed were not "real". Moreover, the Defendant appears to ignore that principle of tort law which mandates that a defendant takes a plaintiff as he finds her or him. Lastly, the jury's award does not appear to include compensation for pain and suffering, both physical and mental, which the testimony establishes the Plaintiff underwent following the accident.
As was expected, the both sides vigorously prosecuted their respective interests at trial, and there was evidence upon which a wide range of award could have been supported. Notwithstanding that fact, the jury's award of $3,424.64 is so out of proportion to the injuries as to shock the Court's conscience and sense of justice. Stated differently, it was against the great weight of the evidence. The proper measure of damages requires that compensation in an amount of no less than $65,000.00 be awarded to the Plaintiff in light of the medical expenses and lost wages incurred, along with the pain and suffering which she experienced as a result of the October 22 accident. This figure also takes into consideration the Plaintiff's prior medical history and the Defendant's argument regarding the same.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiff's Motion for Additur is hereby granted. The award is increased to $65,000.00 subject to the Defendant's written acceptance of this grant of additur within ten (10) days of the date of this order. If the Defendant agrees, the Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial will be denied as of the date of the filing of the Defendant's acceptance and judgment will be entered without further order of the Court. If the Defendant does not agree to this order, a new trial on damages only will be granted without further order of the Court. The Plaintiff's request for a new trial is denied pending receipt of the Defendant's response to the instant order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.