Opinion
No. 01-04-01142-CR
Opinion issued December 8, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from County Criminal Court at Law No. 9, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1243768.
Panel consists of Justices NUCHIA, JENNINGS, and HIGLEY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Colin Rhea Matthews, was charged by information with driving while intoxicated, a Class B misdemeanor. After the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of his arrest, appellant entered a plea of guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to confinement for 180 days, suspended for one year of community supervision, and a fine of $300. On appeal, appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
At the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress, Officer Thad Olive testified that he observed appellant driving east on Albans Street approaching the Kirby Drive intersection. Olive testified that appellant did not stop at the stop sign, but was "almost into the intersection prior to stopping." Olive also stated that appellant stopped somewhere near a utility pole. Olive testified that appellant "stopped at an unsafe point." Olive further testified that he initiated a traffic stop because he believed that appellant had run the stop sign. Both the State and appellant introduced photographs of the Albans-Kirby intersection. Some of appellant's photographs, taken approximately two weeks after appellant's arrest, showed a crosswalk and stop line on Albans Street marked by a series of round road humps. The photographs also showed the stop sign near the marked stop line and a utility pole a short distance past the crosswalk. The trial court found that Olive had a reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant ran the stop sign or did not stop at the appropriate spot.DISCUSSION
Standard of Review Generally, the standard for reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is abuse of discretion. Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). However, a trial court's determination regarding reasonable suspicion is reviewed de novo. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). Reasonable Suspicion A police officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that the person detained actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.). The State has the burden to establish the reasonableness of the stop. Id. If an officer has a reasonable basis for suspecting that a person has committed a traffic offense, the officer may legally initiate a traffic stop. Id. The State is not required to show that a traffic offense was actually committed, but only that the officer reasonably believed that a violation was in progress. Id. Here, the officer stopped appellant because appellant did not stop at the stop sign, but drove through the crosswalk and stopped "almost into the intersection." The Transportation Code provides,(a) Unless directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic-control signal, the operator of a vehicle or streetcar approaching an intersection with a stop sign shall stop as provided by Subsection (c).
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(c) An operator required to stop by this section shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection. In the absence of a crosswalk, the operator shall stop at a clearly marked stop line. In the absence of a stop line, the operator shall stop at the place nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway.Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010 (Vernon 1999). The Transportation Code further provides, "Any peace officer may arrest without warrant a person found committing a violation of this subtitle." Id. § 543.001 (Vernon 1999). Appellant relies on Vicknair v. State, 751 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986), to support his contention that his investigative stop was illegal. In Vicknair, an officer stopped the appellant because the officer saw some white light coming through the appellant's cracked tail light, which also emitted a visible red light. Id. at 187. As a result of the stop, the officer discovered marijuana in the appellant's car. Id. The officer had been taught at the police academy that any visible white light coming from the tail light was a violation of the traffic laws. Id. The court of appeals rejected the officer's "good faith" belief that the appellant had violated a traffic law because what the officer observed was not such a violation, and his "well-intentioned but mistaken belief that it did [would] not legitimate this search." Id. at 188. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the holding and the reasoning of the court of appeals. Id. In the present case, Olive testified that he observed appellant drive through the stop sign and "almost into the intersection" before stopping. We conclude that Olive could have reasonably believed that appellant was violating subsection (c) of section 544.010 of the Transportation Code. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress the evidence. We affirm the judgment.