Opinion
Dkt. No. NA-08293-16 Case No. 2019-855 2018-3040 12495 12496
12-01-2020
IN RE AMIR A., a Child Under Eighteen Years of Age, etc., Matthew C., and Kristyle Z., Respondents–Appellants, v. Administration for Children's Services, Petitioner–Respondent.
The Law Offices of Salihah R. Denman, PLLC, Harrison (Salihah R. Denman of counsel), for Matthew C., appellant. Law Office of Thomas R. Villecco, P.C., Jericho (Thomas R. Villecco of counsel), for Kristyle Z., appellant. James E. Johnson, Corporation Counsel, New York (Julie Steiner of counsel), for respondent. Dawne A. Mitchell, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Riti P. Singh of counsel), attorney for the child.
The Law Offices of Salihah R. Denman, PLLC, Harrison (Salihah R. Denman of counsel), for Matthew C., appellant.
Law Office of Thomas R. Villecco, P.C., Jericho (Thomas R. Villecco of counsel), for Kristyle Z., appellant.
James E. Johnson, Corporation Counsel, New York (Julie Steiner of counsel), for respondent.
Dawne A. Mitchell, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Riti P. Singh of counsel), attorney for the child.
Gische, J.P., Webber, Oing, Mendez, JJ.
Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Valerie A. Pels, J.), entered on or about November 5, 2018, insofar as it brings up for review a fact-Finding order, same court and Judge, entered on or about May 3, 2018, which, after a hearing, determined that appellant Matthew C. was a person legally responsible for the subject child, and that he and the child's mother, respondent Kristyle Z., abused the subject child, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The evidence supports the court's finding that appellant Matthew C. was a person legally responsible for the subject child within the meaning of the Family Court Act § 1012(g). Appellant Matthew C. testified that he resided with the mother and child for a number of months. According to Matthew C., the child referred to him as "daddy," and he treated the child like his son. He stated that he fed the child, cleaned him, taught him how to speak, and took care of him on at least two occasions for multiple hours (see Matter of Kevin N. , 113 A.D.3d 524, 980 N.Y.S.2d 382 [1st Dept. 2014] ).
Petitioner satisfied its burden of making an initial prima facie showing of abuse by introducing expert medical testimony establishing that the child was hospitalized with trauma to his abdomen, damage to his liver, spleen, and pancreas, and bruising to his ribs, legs, back and cheek, as well as swelling on his scalp, and that his injuries were the result of nonaccidental trauma that would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the mother or Matthew C. (see Matter of Philip M. , 82 N.Y.2d 238, 243, 604 N.Y.S.2d 40, 624 N.E.2d 168 [1993] ; Matter of Syriah J. [Esther J.], 153 A.D.3d 430, 59 N.Y.S.3d 375 [1st Dept. 2017] ). The agency was not required to establish whether the mother or Matthew C. inflicted the injuries, or whether they did so together (see Matter of Matthew O. [Kenneth O.], 103 A.D.3d 67, 75–76, 956 N.Y.S.2d 31 [1st Dept. 2012] ).
Respondents failed to rebut the presumption of culpability with a credible and reasonable explanation of how the child suffered injuries to his internal organs, or otherwise demonstrate that they were not guilty of abuse. Respondents' attempts to blame each other or the child's father were insufficient. We see no reason to depart from the general rule of deferring to the hearing court's credibility findings (see Matter of Nasir J. v. Naomi J., 35 A.D.3d 299, 827 N.Y.S.2d 41 [1st Dept. 2006] ).