Summary
In Matter of Weber v Levitt (34 N.Y.2d 797), the court reviewed a decision of this court, in which we construed Kranker as upholding the use of lump-sum payments in the computation of final average salary only where there is a "prior administrative practice which might be said to give rise to a contract" (Matter of Weber v Levitt, 41 A.D.2d 452, 459).
Summary of this case from Matter of Bookhout v. LevittOpinion
Argued May 10, 1974
Decided June 6, 1974
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department, JOHN T. CASEY, J.
Allen R. Morganstern and Richard Hartman for appellants.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney-General ( John Q. Driscoll and Ruth Kessler Toch of counsel), for respondent.
MEMORANDUM. The order of the Appellate Division in each of the three proceedings should be affirmed, without costs, on the opinion of Mr. Justice LOUIS M. GREENBLOTT at the Appellate Division. Termination pay, although includible in the "final average salary" for pension purposes, was properly limited to that portion attributable to the last three years of service. The Appellate Division correctly interpreted the limited effect of Kranker v. Levitt ( 30 N.Y.2d 574) as creating a vested right to inclusion only if based on administrative construction and practice for a "given" or extended period of time, and then, only to the extent reasonable (see Matter of Hessel v. New York City Employees' Retirement System, 33 N.Y.2d 381, 385). Hence, vacation pay was limited to 30 days as was done in the Kranker case; and unused sick leave credits were wholly excluded as neither warranted by law nor administrative construction (see Retirement and Social Security Law, § 431).
Chief Judge BREITEL and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES, WACHTLER, RABIN and STEVENS concur in memorandum.
In each case: Order affirmed.