Opinion
April 8, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County [Carol H. Arber, J.].
Petitioner's claim that respondent's regulation, 9 NYCRR 4119.7 (a) (2), is unconstitutionally vague is without merit inasmuch as the term "associating * * * with persons who have been convicted of a crime" is not so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning (see, Foss v City of Rochester, 65 N.Y.2d 247, 253; City of New York v Castro, 160 A.D.2d 651, 652).
With regard to petitioner's argument concerning whether Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law § 309 (2) and 9 NYCRR 4119.7 should have been applied at all in evaluating his initial license application, paragraph (e) of the former has been deemed to apply to the denial of applications as well as to revocations and suspensions (see, Bonacorsa v Van Lindt, 129 A.D.2d 518, 520, affd 71 N.Y.2d 605), and respondent's use of the criteria listed under 9 NYCRR 4119.7 in evaluating an applicant's "experience, character and general fitness" under section 309 (2) has been upheld (see, e.g., Kramer v New York State Racing Wagering Bd., 153 A.D.2d 606; see also, Matter of Webster v Van Lindt, 117 A.D.2d 555, 558 [use of 9 NYCRR 4117.4 in evaluating application for harness owner license]).
Also without merit is petitioner's claim that the regulation was selectively applied to him, there being no showing either that "`the selective application of the law was deliberately based upon an impermissible standard such as race, religion or some other arbitrary classification'", or that there was "`a grossly disproportionate incidence of nonenforcement against others similarly situated in all relevant respects'" (Matter of Agnello v Corbisiero, 177 A.D.2d 445, 446 [quoting Matter of 303 W. 42nd St. Corp. v Klein, 46 N.Y.2d 686, 693, 695], lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 758).
We find the record contains substantial evidence to support the determination.
Concur — Milonas, J.P., Rosenberger, Kupferman and Ross, JJ.