Opinion
July 7, 1955.
Appeal from Supreme Court, Albany County.
Present — Bergan, J.P., Coon, Halpern, Imrie and Zeller, JJ.
Paragraph c of subdivision 2 of section 7304 Educ. of the Education Law provides: "c. Any architect who has lawfully practiced architecture for a period of more than ten years without the state may be granted a license upon passing a practical examination the character of which shall be determined by the board." No hearing is provided for by the statute, upon an application of the character here involved, and no formal hearing was held. The facts are virtually undisputed. The petitioner claims to have satisfied the requirements of ten years of practice by practicing architecture in Connecticut, from 1928 to 1941 and from 1946 to 1953. In 1933, Connecticut first required architects to be licensed and the petitioner thereupon procured a license. However, throughout the years in question, the petitioner was employed during the usual hours of the business day by architects and architectural firms in the State of New York and throughout this period he was a resident of the State of New York. During this period, the petitioner claims to have worked on Connecticut jobs as a Connecticut architect, evenings, holidays and week ends. He also did some work in Connecticut for his New York employers. In his petition, he listed the total number of hours which he claimed to have worked in Connecticut in each of the twenty-two years in question and by dividing this total number by the number of hours which a full-time architect would normally devote to his practice during a year, the petitioner arrived at the conclusion that he had had the equivalent of over seventeen years of practice in Connecticut. We believe that it was well within the power of the board to find that this did not constitute the kind of practice outside the State contemplated by the statute. The statute contemplates regular practice during the usual hours of the business day or at least a holding out of availability for architectural work during such hours. As the secretary of the board stated in his affidavit in opposition to the application, "It is impossible to evaluate work carried on by an individual outside the hours of his regular employment in terms of years of practice within the meaning of subdivision 2-c, Section 7304 and such spare time activities do not provide a basis for the licensing of an applicant without the written examination under said subdivision 2-c." Order dismissing the petition unanimously affirmed, with $10 costs.