Summary
In Gleason, the arbitrator modified his award to correct his previous "erroneous determination" in which he, like the arbitrator in Bowery, initially "refus[ed] to award the successful party counsel fees... in excess of his powers."
Summary of this case from Penneco Oil Co. v. Energy Corp. of Am.Opinion
June 14, 2001.
Appeal (upon remittal from the Court of Appeals) from an order of the Supreme Court (Keniry, J.), entered December 17, 1998 in Saratoga County, which, inter alia, granted petitioners' application pursuant to CPLR 7510 to confirm an arbitration award.
Bond, Schoeneck King L.L.P. (Carl Rosenbloom of counsel), Albany, for appellants.
De Graff, Foy, Holt-Harris Kunz L.L.P. (Kelly L. Munkwitz of counsel), Albany, for respondents.
Before: Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Carpinello and Mugglin, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before us upon remittur from the Court of Appeals which reversed our order dismissing the petition seeking confirmation of the arbitration award and held that CPLR 7502(a)(iii) should be applied retroactively ( 96 N.Y.2d 117 [May 1, 2001]). The facts surrounding the dispute and germane to the resolution of the remaining issues are reported in the prior decision of this Court ( 271 A.D.2d 736,revd 96 N.Y.2d 117 [May 1, 2001]).
Respondents contend that the arbitrator's award must be vacated since it is irrational and made in excess of his authority. "It is well settled that judicial review of an arbitration award is severely limited and may not be vacated unless 'it is violative of a strong public policy, is totally irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power'" (Matter of New York State Dept. of Taxation Fin. [Public Empls. Fedn.], 241 A.D.2d 780, 781, quotingMatter of Town of Callicoon [Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Town of Callicoon Unit], 70 N.Y.2d 907, 909). Respondents assert that the arbitrator was required to interpret the covenant not to compete and determine whether a breach had occurred and that his failure to address or answer these issues renders the award irrational. We disagree.
First, we observe that "an arbitrator is not bound by principles of substantive law * * *. He may do justice as he sees it, applying his own sense of law and equity to the facts as he finds them to be * * *" (Matter of Silvermann [Benmore Coats], 61 N.Y.2d 299, 308 [citations omitted]). Second, the covenant not to compete in this case prohibits,inter alia, direct or indirect involvement "in any business selling or serving food and/or alcoholic beverages" or employment or participation in "any business which is similar to the [b]usiness being sold". This language required the arbitrator to initially interpret the contract to determine what conduct the parties intended to proscribe. On this issue, he stated that respondents clearly violated the plain language of the covenant when they opened their business. His view that the covenant was ambiguous regarding whether it prohibited all restaurant activity within the designated geographic and time limits or whether it was intended to prohibit only direct competition, i.e., a restaurant with similarly priced food and services, was expressed only with respect to the issue of damages.
Likewise, we find nothing irrational regarding the award of damages. Although the arbitrator acknowledged that the evidence was weak, an arbitration award which is otherwise within the bounds of rationality may not be vacated due to errors of law or fact made by the arbitrator (see,Matter of Allen [New York State], 53 N.Y.2d 694, 696). Here, although there was a diminishment in petitioners' revenues during the months that respondents' restaurant was open, there was a lack of evidence demonstrating a correlation between the two. Nevertheless, as the arbitrator specifically stated, his finding of damages was predicated on the "overall fact pattern", which is well within the arbitrator's own sense of justice, law and equity (see, Matter of Silverman [Benmore Coats], supra, at 308).
Turning to the award of counsel fees made upon the application for modification, we find respondents' contention that the arbitrator exceeded his authority — since the counsel fee issue was not originally submitted to him — unpersuasive. The contract expressly required that the successful party in any arbitration proceeding recover reasonable counsel fees. Therefore, this issue was squarely presented to the arbitrator and his initial determination refusing to award the successful party counsel fees was a decision in excess of his power (see, Matter of Recore [Chateaugay Cent. School Dist.], 256 A.D.2d 801, 802, lv dismissed 93 N.Y.2d 957). Thus, the modification of the award simply represented the correction of an erroneous determination.
Cardona, P.J., Crew III and Carpinello, JJ. concur.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.