Opinion
February 2, 1996
Appeal from the Cattaraugus County Family Court, Nenno, J.
Present — Green, J.P., Fallon, Wesley, Davis and Boehm, JJ.
Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Family Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for an examination of Stephanie by respondent's expert (see, Matter of Jessica R., 78 N.Y.2d 1031, 1033-1034; Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. [Joanne W.] v. Edyth W., 210 A.D.2d 328; Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. [F. Children] v. Clifton F., 207 A.D.2d 836, 837). The court properly permitted the expert witness hired by petitioner to provide testimony corroborating the child's out-of-court statements (see, Matter of Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112, 122) and the expert testimony constituted sufficient corroboration of those statements (see, Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [vi]; Matter of Department of Social Servs. [Carol Ann D.] v Warren D., 195 A.D.2d 460, 461). The evidence is sufficient to support the court's findings that Stephanie had been sexually abused by respondent (see, Family Ct Act § 1046 [b]; Matter of Nicole V., supra, at 117) and that Joshua and Dylan are neglected children (see, Matter of Timothy O., 178 A.D.2d 1022, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 756; Matter of Lynelle W., 177 A.D.2d 1008).
The court failed, at the initial appearance, to advise respondent of the allegations in the petition, as required by Family Court Act § 1033-b (1) (b). At that appearance, however, the court adjourned the matter and appointed counsel for respondent. At the next court appearance, counsel stated on the record that he had reviewed the petition with respondent (see, Family Ct Act § 1033-b [b], [c]; § 262 [a] [i]). Reversal is not warranted because it is clear that respondent suffered no prejudice as the result of the court's failure to comply with section 1033-b (1) (b).
Nor is reversal required because of the failure of the court to identify the paragraph of Family Court Act § 1012 (e) it found to have been established, or to make a further finding of the specific sex offense committed by respondent as required by Family Court Act § 1051 (e) (see, Matter of Nichole L., 213 A.D.2d 750, 752, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 701; Matter of Ashley AA., 212 A.D.2d 937, 938). Based upon the record before us, this Court may make the finding that Family Court should have made (Matter of Nichole L., supra, at 752; Matter of Ashley AA., supra, at 938). We find that the record establishes that Stephanie is an abused child as defined in Family Court Act § 1012 (e) (iii) and that the sex offense committed against her was sexual abuse in the first degree as defined in Penal Law § 130.65 (3).