Summary
In Matter of Smith v. Regan (115 A.D.2d 161) and Matter of Maso v. Regan (81 A.D.2d 734), this court sustained the Comptroller's determination denying accidental disability benefits to claimants who had sustained injuries while entering or leaving the employer's premises before or after the workday.
Summary of this case from Matter of Marino v. ReganOpinion
November 21, 1985
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Albany County.
The facts are undisputed. Petitioner, who was employed as a stenographer by the State University of New York at Stony Brook, fell and was injured in the campus parking lot while en route to her office at approximately 8:25 A.M., on April 29, 1981. Her official workday began at 8:30 A.M. She reported to work and notified her supervisor of the incident. In due course, petitioner filed an application for accidental disability retirement benefits pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law § 63. After a hearing, petitioner's application was denied on the basis that she was not "in service" at the time of the incident, having yet to report to work. The instant CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued and was transferred to this court.
Petitioner's claim for ordinary disability retirement has been withdrawn.
The sole issue is whether respondent's decision is supported by substantial evidence. In Matter of Maso v Regan ( 81 A.D.2d 734), this court confirmed a determination by respondent denying an application for accidental disability retirement benefits in an instance where the applicant was injured in a parking lot provided by the employer on the way to her car immediately after work. In so ruling, we rejected the applicant's contention that respondent construed the "in service" element of Retirement and Social Security Law § 63 (a) (2) too narrowly (id.). This case is virtually indistinguishable from Maso. There is no logical distinction between petitioner, who was injured en route to work, and the applicant in Maso, who was injured leaving work, for in either event, respondent could rationally conclude that the incident did not occur "in service". Nor, as we reiterated in Maso, does the fact that petitioner qualified for workers' compensation benefits (see, Matter of Brooks v New York Tel. Co., 87 A.D.2d 701, affd 57 N.Y.2d 643) determine the issue before us. In the matter before the Workers' Compensation Board, respondent did not have an opportunity to challenge the issue. Respondent's decision is supported by substantial evidence and we, accordingly, confirm (see, Matter of Maso v Regan, supra; see also, Matter of Pucillo v Regan, 98 A.D.2d 877, affd 62 N.Y.2d 736; Matter of Sorli v Levitt, 77 A.D.2d 773, appeal dismissed 52 N.Y.2d 897).
Determination confirmed, and petition dismissed, without costs. Mahoney, P.J., Main, Weiss, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.