Opinion
March 3, 1998
Appeal from the Family Court, New York County (Leah Marks, J.).
Appellant's suppression motion was properly denied. A review of the record supports the determination of the hearing court that once properly detained in the Youth Services office in the Port Authority Bus Terminal, appellant consented to the search of her knapsack. In this regard, we note that "`[i]n reviewing the suppression court's rulings * * * where different inferences may be drawn from the proof, the choice of inferences rests with the trier of fact and should not be rejected by an appellate court unless unsupported as a matter of law.'" ( Matter of Robert S., 159 A.D.2d 358, 359, appeal dismissed 76 N.Y.2d 770.) Furthermore, in view of the fact that appellant accompanied the first officer to the Youth Services office without protest, that she was questioned by only one officer there, and that the officer searched appellant's knapsack for identification at appellant's own urging, we conclude that the presentment agency met its heavy burden of establishing consent ( People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 128; People v. Zimmerman, 101 A.D.2d 294). In any event, appellant's detention pursuant to Family Court Act § 718 was, as a matter of law, a full custodial arrest, which justified the officer's search of appellant's knapsack as incident to her lawful arrest ( Matter of Jamel J., 246 A.D.2d 388; Matter of Michael J., 233 A.D.2d 198; Matter of Mark Anthony G., 169 A.D.2d 89, 93).
Concur — Milonas, J. P., Nardelli, Williams and Mazzarelli, JJ.