Opinion
October 16, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County, Balletta, J., O'Shaughnessy, J.
Ordered that the orders are affirmed, with one bill of costs.
The infant petitioner was allegedly injured as the result of a fall in a gymnasium class on May 17, 1984. No notice of claim was timely filed. In June 1987 the petitioner made an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim upon the grounds that he was an infant at the time of the incident, he had been misinformed about the seriousness of his injury, and he and his parents lacked familiarity with the law.
As we have stated previously, "[i]nfancy does not automatically entitle a claimant to an extension of the 90-day notice requirement of General Municipal Law § 50-e (1)" (Matter of Coyne v Cold Spring Harbor Cent. School Dist., 132 A.D.2d 660). In the instant case, we find that the disability of infancy is outweighed by other factors.
The petitioner has failed to adequately explain the unreasonable three-year delay in seeking the relief requested (see, Matter of Coyne v Cold Spring Harbor Cent. School Dist., supra; Matter of Morgan v City of Elmira, 115 A.D.2d 885). The delay was unrelated to his infancy, but rather was due to the fact that the injury did not appear to be serious at the time of the occurrence. Moreover, while counsel was contacted in December 1986, the original motion was not made until almost six months later. Finally, the respondent has demonstrated substantial prejudice due to the petitioner's failure to file a timely notice of claim (see, Matter of Hogan v Town of Orangetown, 108 A.D.2d 857).
Under the circumstances we find that the application and the renewed application were properly denied (see, Lallave v City of New York, 127 A.D.2d 634). Mangano, J.P., Lawrence, Kunzeman and Eiber, JJ., concur.