Opinion
248 A.D.2d 784 670 N.Y.S.2d 61 In the Matter of the Claim of Gunars RUGELIS, Appellant. The Pfaudler Company, Respondent. John E. Sweeney, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent. 1998-01926 Supreme Court of New York, Third Department March 5, 1998.
Bilgore, Reich, Levine, Krolls&sKantor (Theodore S. Kantor, of counsel), Rochester, for appellant.
Harris, Beach s&sWilcox (Edward A. Trevvett, of counsel), Rochester, for The Pfaudler Company, respondent.
Before CARDONA, P.J., and MERCURE, WHITE and SPAIN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION.
Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed February 24, 1997, which ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because he voluntarily left his employment without good cause.
Claimant was a sales representative for the employer until he retired on December 30, 1994. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ruled that claimant left his job for personal and noncompelling reasons and disqualified him from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. Substantial evidence supports the Board's decision. Claimant decided to retire because he felt he was going to be discharged because of his supervisors' repeated but unfounded criticism of his work and the poor performance evaluations he had received. The record, however, supports the Board's conclusion that the employer did not have plans to fire claimant and that there was continuing work available to him. It has been held that neither criticism of an employee's work performance by a supervisor (see, Matter of Shabbir [Sweeney], 242 A.D.2d 820, 661 N.Y.S.2d 1019) nor an employee's resignation in anticipation of discharge (see, Matter of Toth [Sweeney], 244 A.D.2d 752, 664 N.Y.S.2d 489) constitutes good cause for leaving employment. To the extent that claimant decided to retire to take advantage of the employer's offer to pay part of his retiree medical premiums, a benefit which was effective only if he retired prior to the end of 1994, we have held that voluntary separation from one's employment in order to accept early retirement or health benefits does not constitute a separation for good cause within the meaning of the Labor Law (see, Matter of Guarnera [Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield--Sweeney], --- A.D.2d ----, ----, 662 N.Y.S.2d 944, 945).
ORDERED that the decision is affirmed, without costs.