Opinion
December 30, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Robbins, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs to the respondent General Accident Insurance Company of America.
Assuming, arguendo, that the petitioner's submission of a police report indicating an insurance code for the offending vehicle satisfied its burden of coming forth with prima facie evidence that that vehicle was insured by General Accident Insurance Company of America (hereinafter GAIC) (see generally, Matter of Peerless Ins. Co. v Milloul, 140 A.D.2d 346; Matter of Eagle Ins. Co. v Olephant, 81 A.D.2d 886), this evidence was overwhelmingly rebutted by the proof submitted by the claimant and GAIC. The evidence submitted in opposition to the petitioner's application included a registration record printout, New York State Department of Motor Vehicles forms DP-37 and FS-25, an affidavit of an employee of GAIC, and a notice of cancellation of insurance stamped by the United States Post Office and sent by GAIC to the owner of the offending vehicle. All of these uncontroverted evidentiary submissions clearly refute the petitioner's claim of coverage and amply support the Supreme Court's conclusion that no insurance coverage was in effect with respect to the offending vehicle on the date of the accident (see, e.g., Matter of Nationwide Ins. Co. [Dye], 170 A.D.2d 683).
The petitioner failed to come forward with additional evidence to raise an issue of fact regarding the question of coverage (see generally, Matter of State Wide Ins. Co. v Libecci, 104 A.D.2d 893; Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Yeglinski, 79 A.D.2d 1029). Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied the application for a stay of arbitration without conducting a hearing (see, e.g., Matter of State-Wide Ins. Co. v Valdes, 173 A.D.2d 624; Matter of General Acc. Ins. Co. v Fitzgerald, 112 A.D.2d 423). Similarly, a hearing was not required to explore the validity of the termination of coverage by GAIC, because the petitioner never alleged the existence of any particular defect in the notice or otherwise advanced any specific challenge to the validity of the termination of coverage. Kunzeman, J.P., Sullivan, Eiber and O'Brien, JJ., concur.