Opinion
January 19, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Roberto, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the determination is confirmed, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits.
The Mayor had the authority to stop the fund drive because of his supervisory activity over the police (see, Village Law § 4-400 [e]). In addition, New York courts have upheld bans on police solicitations as reasonable measures to protect police integrity (see, McGuire v Krane, 48 N.Y.2d 661; Matter of Marano v Incorporated Vil. of Lake Success, 86 Misc.2d 936; Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v Kennedy, 25 Misc.2d 63). Finally, rule 12 of article VI of the Rules and Regulations of the Police Department of the Village of Hempstead prohibits direct or indirect solicitations by police officers. The affidavits produced by the petitioners in an attempt to prove a contrary intent are immaterial in light of the clear and unambiguous language of the rule (see, Matter of Washington Post Co. v New York State Ins. Dept., 61 N.Y.2d 557, 565; Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 208).
Therefore, in order to obtain the annulment of the Mayor's directive, the petitioners had to show that his action did not have a rational basis, and they have not sustained this burden (Matter of Larkin Co. v Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330, 334-335). Mangano, J.P., Bracken, Eiber and Harwood, JJ., concur.