Opinion
March 8, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County, Ramirez, J.
Present — Green, J.P., Lawton, Wesley, Doerr and Davis, JJ.
Judgment unanimously reversed on the law without costs, petition granted in part and matter remitted to respondent New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: In March 1984 petitioner tenant filed a complaint of rent overcharge with respondent New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR). Respondent Surrey Management Corp. (Surrey), the landlord, failed to comply with DHCR's request, pursuant to Code of the Rent Stabilization Association of New York City, Inc. § 42 (A), for a complete rent history. As a result, the District Rent Administrator calculated the lawful stabilization rent in accordance with DHCR's default procedure ( see, Matter of Drewbar Realty Co. v State of N Y Div. of Hous. Community Renewal, 181 A.D.2d 617). Based upon that calculation, the District Rent Administrator issued an order directing Surrey to roll back petitioner's rent and refund its overcharge in the amount of $6,273.12.
Surrey filed a petition for administrative review (PAR). DHCR granted the PAR on constraint of Matter of J.R.D. Mgt. Corp. v Eimicke ( 148 A.D.2d 610, 612), which holds that a complaint must be processed in accordance with "the law as it existed at the time of the determination of the matter" rather than "the law as it existed at the time of the complaint" ( see also, Woodner Co. v Eimicke, 160 A.D.2d 907). The law in effect at the time of the determination required the landlord to produce rent records for only the four-year period prior to the most recent registration of the premises (former Administrative Code § YY51-6.0.5 [g] [now § 26-516 (g)]). DHCR determined that, because Surrey had submitted a four-year rental history, the District Rent Administrator improperly applied the section 42 (A) default procedure in establishing the base rent and calculating the overcharge. DHCR further determined that there was no evidence that petitioner had been overcharged for the period in issue.
Petitioner commenced the instant CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge that determination. Supreme Court erred in dismissing the petition. The Court of Appeals has made it clear that the law in effect when the rent overcharge complaint was filed (Code of Rent Stabilization Assn. of N Y City, Inc. § 42 [A] [now codified at 9 N.Y.CRR parts 2520-2530]) applies to petitioner's rent overcharge complaint ( see, Matter of Century Tower Assocs. v State of N.Y. Div. of Hous. Community Renewal, 83 N.Y.2d 819, 822). We grant in part the petition, therefore, by annulling the determination, and we remit the matter to DHCR to determine petitioner's rent overcharge complaint under the law in effect when the complaint was filed.