MFY Legal Services, Inc. v. Dudley

Full title: In the Matter of MFY LEGAL SERVICES, INC., Appellant, v. EDWARD R. DUDLEY…

Court: Court of Appeals of the State of New York

Date published: Feb 11, 1986

67 N.Y.2d 706 (N.Y. 1986)

499 N.Y.S.2d 930

490 N.E.2d 849

Opinion

Argued January 7, 1986

Decided February 11, 1986

Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department.

Stephen Myers, Norman Siegel and Daniel L. Greenberg for appellant.

Joseph L. Clasen, III, and Owen McGivern for respondents.

Robert Abrams, Attorney-General (Frederic L. Lieberman, Howard L. Zwickel, O. Peter Sherwood and Robert Hermann of counsel), for State of New York and another, amici curiae. Conrad A. Johnson, Mary Marsh Zulack, John E. Kirklin and Scott A. Rosenberg for Legal Aid Society of New York, amicus curiae. Kathleen Peratis for New York Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae.

MEMORANDUM.

The judgment of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

This is an article 78 proceeding in the nature of prohibition instituted by petitioner, a not-for-profit legal services corporation, against respondents, Justices of the Appellate Term, First Department. Petitioner seeks to prohibit respondents from issuing ex parte orders that (1) direct entry of final judgment pursuant to CPLR 5704 (b) in summary proceedings seeking possession of real property or (2) forbid Civil Court Judges from holding inquests in such proceedings. Although several issues are presented on appeal, the issue of standing is dispositive.

Petitioner does not have standing to maintain this proceeding in its own right because it has failed to demonstrate that it has suffered any injury in fact as a result of respondents' actions (see, Matter of Dental Socy. v Carey, 61 N.Y.2d 330, 334). Its claim that the entry of default judgments without inquests results in a greater demand for its services than holding inquests is too speculative to give rise to a cognizable interest and its large volume of litigation in landlord-tenant disputes does not confer standing upon it. In so urging, petitioner relies on Matter of Morgenthau v Cooke ( 56 N.Y.2d 24) but that decision does not support its contention. In Morgenthau we held that the District Attorney had standing to challenge the manner of designating Judges to the Supreme Court in New York City not because of the large volume of litigation he engaged there but because as a public officer of those courts he had a duty to ensure that the appointment of judges complied with constitutional requirements (see, id., at p 30). Finally, no "impenetrable barrier", the situation mentioned in Boryszewski v Brydges ( 37 N.Y.2d 361, 364), prevents judicial scrutiny of respondents' actions if we refuse to accord petitioner standing because the issues raised on this appeal can be presented on a motion to vacate the default judgment (CPLR 5015 [a]) and on an appeal from a denial of that motion.

Petitioner also lacks standing to proceed as a representative of its clients. National Org. for Women v State Div. of Human Rights ( 34 N.Y.2d 416), Matter of Douglaston Civic Assn. v Galvin ( 36 N.Y.2d 1) and Matter of Dental Socy. v Carey ( 61 N.Y.2d 330, supra), relied upon by petitioner, are to be distinguished because in each of those cases at least one member of the association had standing whereas here none of petitioner's lawyer members has standing. Unless its members have standing, petitioner can claim none as their representative (see, Matter of Dental Socy. v Carey, supra, at p 333). In reality, what petitioner is attempting to do is to sue on its own behalf for a declaration of its potential clients' rights and it may not do so (see, Matter of Legal Aid Socy. v Scheinman, 53 N.Y.2d 12, 15; Hiscock Legal Aid Socy. v Hennessy, 101 Misc.2d 1046, 1048-1049, affd 78 A.D.2d 775, lv denied 52 N.Y.2d 703).

Chief Judge WACHTLER and Judges MEYER, SIMONS, KAYE, ALEXANDER and TITONE concur; Judge HANCOCK, JR., taking no part.

Judgment affirmed, without costs, in a memorandum.