Opinion
March 20, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Roberto, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the petition is granted to the extent of annulling the determination in question and the matter is remitted to the Board of Zoning Appeals which is directed to grant the application for the variances upon such conditions as it deems appropriate.
The petitioner is entitled to the requested area and width variances under the doctrine of single and separate ownership, as the parcels in question were joined at the rear, thus forming a "back to back split" and there is no evidence on the record that any merger existed during the period of common ownership (see, Matter of Bexson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 28 A.D.2d 848, 849, affd 21 N.Y.2d 961; Matter of Baretto v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 123 A.D.2d 692; Matter of Guazzo v. Chave, 59 Misc.2d 1050). To enforce area and frontage requirements in such a case would constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of property (see, Matter of Bexson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra; Matter of Mandalay Constr. v. Eccleston, 9 A.D.2d 918; Matter of Dittmer v. Epstein, 34 A.D.2d 675; see also, Matter of Mackay v Mayhall, 92 Misc.2d 868, 870-871). The petitioner is also entitled to the requested front and rear yard setback variances as the imposition of these restrictions in this case would result in the virtual confiscation of her property (Matter of Richards v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 285 App. Div. 287). Mollen, P.J., Mangano, Thompson and Rubin, JJ., concur.