Opinion
April 1, 1996
Adjudged that the determination is confirmed and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.
The administrative review of the decision to terminate the petitioner's substitute teaching certificate was an "informational" proceeding, and not a hearing mandated by direction of law ( see, CPLR 7803; 7804 [g]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have disposed of this proceeding on the merits instead of transferring it to this Court ( see, Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn. v. Town of Riverhead, 220 A.D.2d 411; Matter of Agusta v. Silva, 201 A.D.2d 405; Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection v. Department of Envtl. Conservation, 120 A.D.2d 166). However, this Court will decide the case on the merits in the interest of judicial economy ( see, Matter of 125 Bar Corp. v. State Liq. Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 174, 180; Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn. v. Town of Riverhead, supra).
Turning to a review of the parties' contentions, we agree with the respondents' claim that this proceeding is barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations because it was not commenced within four months after the petitioner's services and per diem substitute teaching certificate were terminated. Here, the petitioner was notified, by letter dated April 18, 1991, that his services as a substitute teacher had been terminated as of March 28, 1991, and that his teaching certificate was terminated. The decision to discharge the petitioner from employment and terminate his certificate was thus final and binding as of April 18, 1991 ( see, Matter of Lubin v. Board of Educ., 60 N.Y.2d 974; Matter of Schulman v. Board of Educ., 184 A.D.2d 643), and this proceeding, which was commenced more than four months after the determination, is barred by the Statute of Limitations ( see, Matter of De Milio v. Borghard, 55 N.Y.2d 216; Matter of Schulman v. Board of Educ., supra; Matter of Jones v. Board of Educ., 159 A.D.2d 506). Moreover, the administrative review of the determination to terminate the petitioner's teaching certificate, conducted by the Chancellor's Committee pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, did not serve to extend the limitations period ( see, Frasier v. Board of Educ., 71 N.Y.2d 763, 766-767; Matter of Schulman v. Board of Educ., supra). Thompson, J.P., Joy, Krausman and McGinity, JJ., concur.