Opinion
November 19, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Walsh, J.).
Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The petitioners claim that by delivering their general and privileged mail late and opening their correspondence concerning legal matters outside their presence, the respondents have violated their constitutionally protected mail rights. Such allegations, the petitioners assert, were sufficient to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We disagree.
It is settled that "[a] prisoner has a constitutional right of access to the courts for the purpose of presenting his claims, a right that prison officials cannot unreasonably obstruct and that states have affirmative obligations to assure" (Washington v. James, 782 F.2d 1134, 1138). "As a necessary corollary to this right, the states must permit the prisoner meaningful access to the postal system as this is typically the only manner in which a prisoner may communicate with the court" (Gramegna v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 675, 677). However, "systemwide injunctive relief may not be predicated on individual misconduct that `is not part of a pattern of persistent and deliberate official policy'" (Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1154, citing Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 526). In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for interference with an inmate's mail rights, therefore, more than "mere negligence" must be alleged (Guffey v. Trago, 572 F. Supp. 782, 784; see, Valiant-Bey v. Morris, 829 F.2d 1441; Averhart v. Shuler, 652 F. Supp. 1504, 1509). Further, "[w]here no damage is shown from interference with a prisoner's mailing privileges, dismissal or summary judgment is properly granted" (Gilliam v. Quinlan, 608 F. Supp. 823, 837).
Here, although the petitioners alleged several instances where their mail was unjustifiably delayed and privileged mail improperly opened absent their presence, the petition is devoid of allegations that such interference was the result of more than mere negligence. In addition, the petitioners have failed to allege any injury or prejudice from the alleged interferences. Accordingly, the court properly dismissed the petition for failure to state a cause of action (see, Richardson v. McDonnell, 841 F.2d 120; Averhart v. Shuler, supra; Guffey v. Trago, supra; Pickett v. Schaefer, 503 F. Supp. 27; Stinson v. Sheriff's Dept., 499 F. Supp. 259). Sullivan, J.P., Harwood, Miller and O'Brien, JJ., concur.