Opinion
August 13, 1984
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Stolarik, J.).
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
The expiration date set forth in the parties' prior collective bargaining agreement was June 1, 1983 and the new agreement was not executed by the parties until August 1, 1983. In the interim, appellant had discharged two union members for alleged misconduct during a strike by employees. The union commenced this proceeding to compel appellant to arbitrate the subject discharges under the broad arbitration clause of the new collective bargaining agreement. Appellant contends that Special Term erred in granting the union's application because there was no agreement to arbitrate the subject disputes.
Since the duty to arbitrate is wholly contractual, courts have held that arbitration is not mandated where the dispute between the parties arose after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement and prior to the execution of the new agreement (see Procter Gamble Ind. Union v Procter Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181, 186, cert. den. 374 U.S. 830; Matter of Jennings [ St. Elizabeth Hosp.], 54 A.D.2d 607; Matter of Eisen, 191 Misc. 662, app dsmd 84 N.Y.S.2d 698; accord International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen Helpers v Kroger Co., 411 F.2d 1191). However, in this case, the fact the grievances arose while there was no agreement to arbitrate in existence is not determinative. Section 1 of article XIV of the new collective bargaining agreement provides that "[t]his agreement shall become effective JUNE 1, 1983, and shall remain in. effect until JUNE 1, 1986". Similar language has been interpreted to give retroactive effect to a collective bargaining agreement (see Buffalo Police Benevolent Assn. v City of Buffalo, 114 Misc.2d 1091, 1093; Matthews v Jeremiah Burns, Inc., 205 Misc. 1006, 1013). Furthermore, there is no language in the parties' agreement that specifically exempts the arbitration clause from the duration provisions in article XIV. Nor is there language which clearly manifests an intent to exclude the subject discharges from the scope of the broad arbitration clause.
The rule, in the field of labor relations, is that controversies arising between the parties to a collective bargaining agreement fall within the scope of a broad arbitration clause unless the parties have employed language which clearly manifests an intent to exclude a particular subject matter (see Matter of Acting Supt. of Schools [ United Liverpool Faculty Assn.], 42 N.Y.2d 509, 512; Matter of Howard Co. v Daley, 27 N.Y.2d 285, 289-290; Matter of Long Is. Lbr. Co. [ Martin], 15 N.Y.2d 380, 385; see, also, Procter Gamble Ind. Union. v Procter Gamble Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 644, 646). Absent exclusionary language, parol evidence of the bargaining history of the parties or the unilateral understanding of one of the negotiators to the agreement is not admissible to prove an intent to exclude the subject dispute from the scope of the arbitration clause (see International Union v Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 82, aff'd 326 F.2d 758; International Union v Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 228 F. Supp. 922; cf. Strauss v Silvercup Bakers, 353 F.2d 555, 558).
Consequently, Special Term correctly concluded that there was an agreement to arbitrate the issue of the subject discharges (see Buffalo Police Benevolent Assn. v City of Buffalo, supra). Mollen, P.J., Gibbons, Weinstein and Rubin, JJ., concur.