Opinion
November 10, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Erie County, Ostrowski, J.
Present — Dillon, P.J., Callahan, Boomer, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
Determination unanimously annulled on the law, petition granted without costs, and matter remitted to respondent Town Board for further proceedings, in accordance with the following memorandum: Supreme Court erred by transferring this zoning petition pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g). Since the petition seeks review of a determination of a Town Board, the court was statutorily obliged to dispose of the matter on the merits and determine all the issues raised by the pleadings (Town Law § 267; Matter of Petrocci v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 42 A.D.2d 676). In the interests of judicial economy, we determine the merits (Matter of Petrocci v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, supra).
Petitioner applied to the Town Board for a special permit allowing use of its property for a self-service car wash. The permit was denied after a public hearing.
The testimony of area residents regarding the effect of increased traffic upon property values is not sufficient to support the denial of the permit (see, Matter of Frangella Mushroom Farms v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 87 A.D.2d 962, affd 57 N.Y.2d 811; Matter of New York Tennis Assoc. v Town of Vestal, 97 A.D.2d 899). There is no evidence before the Town Board that the proposed use would increase traffic or affect property values to any greater extent than a use permitted within the district as a matter of right (see, Matter of Lee Realty Co. v Village of Spring Val., 61 N.Y.2d 892, 894; Matter of Hobbs v Albanese, 70 A.D.2d 1049, 1050).
The Board's findings that the proposed use would constitute a "possible safety hazard" and "could substantially affect property values" are conclusory in form and based on no more than speculation and conjecture and cannot serve as a basis for denial of a permit (see, Matter of Ennis v Crowley, 12 A.D.2d 999, 1000; Matter of Pluto's Retreat v Granito, 80 A.D.2d 899, 900-901).
Also, there is no evidence to support the determination that the proposed use is not a reasonable buffer to private residences. That conclusion is contrary to the findings of the Planning Board as well as to the settled rule that the inclusion of a use in the ordinance is a per se finding that it is in harmony with the neighborhood (Matter of North Shore Steak House v Board of Appeals, 30 N.Y.2d 238, 243).
Though we annul the Board's determination and direct that a permit be issued, the matter is remitted to the Board to consider whether any reasonable conditions consistent with the ordinance should be imposed upon issuance of the permit (Matter of Pluto's Retreat v Granito, supra.)