Opinion
February 22, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaccaro, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The failure to serve a notice of claim on behalf of the infant petitioner was the result of the infant petitioner sustaining serious injuries, which, together with treatment, occupied a lengthy time. The infant's mother, who acted on his behalf, was more concerned with her son's injury and recuperation than she was in pursuing litigation as well as involving herself with its prerequisites (see, Morano v. County of Dutchess, 160 A.D.2d 690; Matter of Savelli v. City of New York, 104 A.D.2d 943; Matter of Bensen v. Town of Islip, 99 A.D.2d 755).
In the present case, the decision to grant or deny an application under General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) was within the court's discretion (see, Matter of Kurz v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 174 A.D.2d 671), inasmuch as the application was made within the one year and 90-day period of limitations imposed by General Municipal Law § 50-e (1) (a) (see, Matter of Underwood v. New York City Hous. Auth., 177 A.D.2d 698).
Considering the overall circumstances present here, including the nature of the injuries and the mother's natural predisposition to be concerned first with her child's condition, the granting of leave to serve a late notice on behalf of the infant only was not an improvident exercise of discretion (see, Matter of Brown v. New York City Hous. Auth., 194 A.D.2d 667). Sullivan, J.P., Santucci, Goldstein and Florio, JJ., concur.