Opinion
September 29, 1997
Appeal from Family Court, Kings County (McLeod, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
An order of child support may be modified upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances ( see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [9] [b]). However, it is the burden of the moving party to establish the substantial change in circumstances warranting the modification ( see, Matter of Heverin v. Sackel, 239 A.D.2d 418; Matter of Roth v. Bowman, 237 A.D.2d 447; Matter of Catterson v. Catterson, 235 A.D.2d 420). In addition, such a determination of a substantial change in circumstances is a matter "addressed to the discretion of the court with each case turning on its particular facts" ( Matter of King v. King, 193 A.D.2d 800, 801; see also, Stempler v. Stempler, 200 A.D.2d 733, 734). When a request for downward modification of child support depends on the credibility of the movant, the determination of the trier of facts is to be accorded great weight ( see, Matter of Roth v Bowman, supra; Matter of Catterson v. Catterson, supra; Stempler v Stempler, supra).
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, it is clear that the father did not establish a substantial change of circumstance ( see, Matter of Heverin v. Sackel, supra). Here, the Family Court properly concluded that there was no basis in the record for interference with the Hearing Examiner's conclusions.
Miller, J.P., Florio, McGinity and Luciano, JJ., concur.