Opinion
June 16, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Martin B. Stecher, J.).
We agree with the IAS court that the gist of petitioner's grievance is with its exclusion from the proposal process, communicated to it in the letter dated December 10, 1990 from respondent Transit Authority's General Contracts Manager advising that any bid it might make would not be considered. As the IAS court found, the impact of this unambiguous letter in excluding petitioner from further participation in the process was certain (Matter of Edmead v. McGuire, 67 N.Y.2d 714, 716), and thus its transmission to petitioner commenced the four-month period of limitations (CPLR 217). The time limitation was not tolled by petitioner's requests for reconsideration (see, Matter of Lubin v. Board of Educ., 60 N.Y.2d 974, 976, rearg denied 61 N.Y.2d 905, cert denied 469 U.S. 823; Matter of Dominick Dan Alonzo, Inc. v Levitt, 73 A.D.2d 741, 742), nor by the fact that the Authorities had yet to make a final determination as to whom should be given the contract (see, Matter of Edmead v. McGuire, supra; Matter of Queensborough Community Coll. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 926).
Concur — Rosenberger, J.P., Ellerin, Kupferman, Ross and Asch, JJ.