Opinion
April 20, 1992
Adjudged that the determination is confirmed and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.
The determination of the respondent Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the State of New York to revoke the petitioner's driver's license was supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" (300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180). At the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge had to determine the credibility of the witnesses. In such an instance, where room for choice exists, it is beyond the scope of the reviewing court to weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by the administrative agency (see, Matter of Stork Rest. v Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 267; see also, Matter of Berenhaus v Ward, 70 N.Y.2d 436, 443; Matter of Jeremias v Sander, 177 A.D.2d 488).
The testimony of the arresting officer supported the finding that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner was driving while intoxicated, and that after being given the appropriate warnings, the petitioner refused to submit to a blood test in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (see, Matter of Shaw v Passidomo, 123 A.D.2d 768; Medico v State of New York, Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 111 A.D.2d 374). Additionally, although the petitioner denied that he refused to submit to a blood test, or even that he was requested to submit to one, the Administrative Law Judge was not required to accept his account of the events (see, Medico v State of New York, Dept. of Motor Vehicles, supra). There is no evidence in the record to support the petitioner's allegation that the Administrative Law Judge prejudged the facts (see, Matter of Jeremias v Sander, supra). Bracken, J.P., Sullivan, Lawrence and Ritter, JJ., concur.