Opinion
October 6, 1997
Appeal from the Superintendent of schools of the Soyesset School Dist.
Adjudged that the determination is confirmed and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.
The petitioner, an elementary school student, brought to school a utility knife which included an approximately three-inch-long blade, as well as an approximately four-inch-long jagged saw. Following a hearing, the respondent Board of Education of the Syosset Central School District adopted the decision of the Superintendent of Schools of the Syosset Central District, made upon the recommendation of a Hearing Officer, to suspend the petitioner for 20 school days. The petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding asserting, inter alia, that the determination was not made upon substantial evidence and that the punishment imposed was excessive.
Whether or not the petitioner possessed a knife on school premises was not an issue solely within the special competence of the Commissioner of Education. Accordingly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply ( see, Matter of Hessney v Board of Educ., 228 A.D.2d 954; Matter of Barone v. Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., 125 A.D.2d 305; cf., Matter of Patti Ann H. v. New York Med. Coll., 88 A.D.2d 296, 301, affd 58 N.Y.2d 734).
It is well settled that an administrative determination is supported by substantial evidence when the evidence consists of "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" ( People ex rel. Vega v Smith, 66 N.Y.2d 130, 139, quoting 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180). In this case, the record established that the principal of Baylis Elementary School found the knife in the petitioner's book bag and that the petitioner had shown the knife to other students while on school property. Accordingly, the determination that the petitioner violated Baylis Elementary School policy against possessing a weapon on school premises was supported by substantial evidence ( see, Matter of Lahey v. Kelly, 71 N.Y.2d 135, 140; Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231). Furthermore, the determination that the petitioner should be suspended for 20 school days as a result of the violation was not "`so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness'" ( Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., supra, at 233; Matter of Benson v. Board of Educ., 209 A.D.2d 693; see also, Matter of John Paterno, Inc. v. Curiale, 88 N.Y.2d 328, 336).
The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit ( see generally, Matter of Juan C. v. Cortires, 89 N.Y.2d 659; Matter of Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d 588).
Bracken, J.P., Copertino, Sullivan and McGinity, JJ., concur.