Opinion
May 15, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court (Fingerhood, J.).
On December 23, 1986, the petitioners responded to a disturbance at 1082 Gerard Avenue. The building's superintendent and two tenants were in the hallway. The petitioners, the tenants, and the superintendent proceeded to apartment 4C where the disturbance was taking place. Upon entering the apartment, they met an unidentified male. The petitioners allowed the unidentified male to leave.
A search of the apartment produced drugs and an unaccounted amount of money. The petitioners permitted the tenants and the superintendent to take some money. The petitioners also pocketed money found in the apartment. After a hearing, the Commissioner dismissed the petitioners. The petitioners contend that the determination was not supported by substantial evidence, that the Hearing Officer did not allow re-cross-examination of the superintendent, and that the penalty imposed was excessive. After reviewing the record, we find no merit in the petitioners' contentions.
The scope of judicial review of an administrative determination is limited to a consideration of whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence. (300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 181.) Here, the witnesses testified that the petitioners permitted them to take money from apartment 4C. Moreover, the petitioners allowed an unidentified male to leave the apartment before first ascertaining whether he was involved in the disturbance.
The Hearing Officer did not err in limiting the petitioners' re-cross-examination to facts produced on redirect, since "inquiry as of right is limited to new matters brought out on the preceding examination" (People v. Bethune, 105 A.D.2d 262, 269). Finally, we find the penalty imposed not to be excessive in light of the evidence produced at hearing. (Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 237.)
Concur — Ross, J.P., Carro, Kassal, Ellerin and Rubin, JJ.