Opinion
August 30, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kassoff, J.).
Ordered that the final decree and the order and judgment are modified, by deleting the provisions thereof directing the claimant to pay interest in the amount of 7% per annum from January 1, 1986, to the date of availability of payment, and substituting therefor provisions granting interest in the amount of 6% per annum for that period; as so modified, the final decree and the order and judgment are affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The trial court properly rejected the claimant's appraisal, since the claimant failed to demonstrate that it was reasonably probable that the subject property, which was designed for use as a sanitation garage, could or would feasibly be converted for use as an air cargo facility in the near future (see, Matter of City of New York [Broadway Cary Corp.], 34 N.Y.2d 535, 536; Matter of City of New York [Shorefront High School — Rudnick], 25 N.Y.2d 146, 148-149, remittitur amended 26 N.Y.2d 748; Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v Neptune Assocs., 190 A.D.2d 669; 51 N.Y. Jur 2d, Eminent Domain, § 174).
Having rejected the claimant's appraisal, the trial court was bound to either accept the City's appraisal or explain the basis for any departure (see, Matter of City of New York [Reiss], 55 N.Y.2d 885, 886; Matter of County of Dutchess [285 Mill St.], 186 A.D.2d 891; Yonkers City Post No. 1666 v Bottiglieri, 143 A.D.2d 267, 271). Contrary to the claimant's assertions, we find that the City's expert sufficiently explained the basis of his adjustments, or the lack thereof, to the comparable leases which formed the basis of his appraisal, and the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in accepting those comparable leases as evidence of the value of the subject property (see, Levin v State of New York, 13 N.Y.2d 87, 92; Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v Neptune Assocs., supra; Chase Manhattan Bank v State of New York, 103 A.D.2d 211, 222).
We find, however, that the trial court erred in awarding interest at a rate of 7% per annum from January 1, 1986, to the date of availability of payment, since the claimant failed to demonstrate that the presumptively reasonable rate of 6% provided in the General Municipal Law was so unreasonably low as to constitute unjust compensation (see, General Municipal Law § 3-a; Adventurers Whitestone Corp. v City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 83, 87; Matter of Town of Oyster Bay, 174 A.D.2d 676, 677-678; cf., Matter of City of New York [Brookfield Refrig. Corp.], 58 N.Y.2d 532, 537; Matter of City of New York [Manhattan Civic Ctr. Arena], 57 Misc.2d 156, 160-161, affd 32 A.D.2d 530, affd 27 N.Y.2d 518). Mangano, P.J., Thompson, Pizzuto and Joy, JJ., concur.