Opinion
December 27, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Smith, J.).
Ordered that the order is modified, as a matter of discretion, by (1) deleting the first decretal paragraph thereof, and substituting therefor a provision determining that a reasonable counsel fee to be awarded to the appellant is the amount of $85,000, and (2) deleting the second decretal paragraph thereof, and substituting therefor a provision that the petitioner has a charging lien for $50,000 which remains unpaid; as so modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the appellant.
The evaluation of what constitutes reasonable counsel fees is a matter that is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court (see, De Cabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881; Aronesty v Aronesty, 202 A.D.2d 240; Levine v Levine, 179 A.D.2d 625), which is often in the best position to judge those factors integral to the fixing of counsel fees, such as the time, effort, and skill required and the review of contemporaneous time records (see, Lefkowitz v Van Ess, 166 A.D.2d 556; Shrauger v Shrauger, 146 A.D.2d 955, 956; Matter of Van Hofe, 145 A.D.2d 424, 426). We find that, upon our review of the trial transcript and the exhibits in the record, the trial court's award was inadequate to the extent indicated.
We note that in the companion matrimonial action (see, Merzon v Merzon, 210 A.D.2d 462 [decided herewith]), the husband has been directed to pay the wife's counsel fees and disbursements. Balletta, J.P., O'Brien, Copertino and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.