Opinion
No. 1701 C.D. 2013
01-23-2015
Thomas Matsinger, Appellant v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH
Thomas Matsinger (Matsinger) appeals, pro se, from the August 9, 2013 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) dismissing as moot his motion for return of property, namely a television. Because the deficiencies in Matsinger's brief preclude meaningful review, we dismiss the appeal.
Motions for return of property are governed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 588, which provides:
(A) A person aggrieved by a search and seizure, whether or not executed pursuant to a warrant, may move for the return of the property on the ground that he or she is entitled to lawful possession thereof. Such motion shall be filed in the court of common pleas for the judicial district in which the property was seized.
(B) The judge hearing such motion shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision thereon. If the motion is granted, the property shall be restored unless the court determines that such property is contraband, in which case the court may order the property to be forfeited.
This case returns to us following our decision in Commonwealth v. Matsinger, 68 A.3d 390 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) ("Matsinger I"), wherein we vacated the trial court's order and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
In Matsinger I, we detailed the factual and procedural history of this case as follows:
On July 20, 2009, the Philadelphia Police Department executed a search warrant at Matsinger's home in connection with the theft of a television from an electronics store. During the search, officers seized a flat-screen television and Matsinger was arrested and charged with theft. Within a month of Matsinger's arrest, a Philadelphia police detective allegedly returned the television to the electronics store from which it had allegedly been taken. In February 2010, the trial court dismissed the criminal charges against Matsinger. Approximately one year later, by February 4, 2011 order, the trial court directed that Matsinger's arrest record be expunged, and further directed the Philadelphia Police Department to "destroy or deliver to [Matsinger] all ... personnel [sic] property pertaining to the charges ... which result from the arrest of Thomas Matsinger." Trial Ct. Order, February 4, 2011.
On November 5, 2010, Matsinger filed his Petition pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 588, seeking return of his television. The Commonwealth informed Matsinger by certified letter that it no longer possessed the
television. The Commonwealth also filed a motion to dismiss the Petition on the grounds that it was moot. On January 11, 2012, the trial court, without holding a hearing, granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss and denied Matsinger's Petition. On February 13, 2012, Matsinger appealed to this Court.Matsinger I, 68 A.3d at 392.
In Matsinger I, this Court held that "where the Commonwealth is no longer in possession of property, a petition filed for return of that property is moot." Id. at 396. However, because the trial court did not convene an evidentiary hearing and simply relied on a statement in the Commonwealth's motion to prove that the Commonwealth no longer possessed the television, we vacated the trial court's order and remanded to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 396-98.
On remand, the trial court held a hearing at which Detective James Severa testified. Detective Severa stated that he listed the television on a property receipt form and transported it to Northeast Detectives Headquarters. Detective Severa testified that an agent from Best Buy arrived at the headquarters, signed the property receipt, and took possession of the television. (Trial court op. at 3-4.)
The trial court found the testimony of Detective Severa credible. Accordingly, the trial court determined that the Commonwealth did not possess the television, and, following our directive in Matsinger I, dismissed Matsinger's motion for return of property as moot. (Trial court op. at 3-4.)
On appeal, Matsinger identifies seven issues in the statement of questions involved portion of his brief. However, the argument section of Matsinger's brief comprises only self-serving, cursory arguments that lack any meaningful discussion of the pertinent legal principles. Further, Matsinger does not cite any legal authority, and, in most instances, his contentions involve the proceedings in Matsinger I and the trial court's order expunging his arrest record.
These are: "(1) Was [the assistant district attorney (ADA)] obligated to notify [Matsinger] of listed witness that was going to give testimony;" (2) "Did [the] ADA . . . disregard the current order in place ordering all, not some of the documents and all files to be destroyed;" (3) "Was [the trial court] right in not granting [Matsinger] the continuance requested to prepare for the witness present;" (4) "Was [the trial court] obligated to sanction [the] ADA . . . for not following his order, stating destroy all case files;" (5) "Does the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure not clearly state that all discovery witness and evidence to be [sic] forwarded upon request;" (6) "Was there a proper evidentiary hearing held;" (7) "Does the mere assertion of a proven liar, Detective Severa, show the Commonwealth does not have the property in question." (Matsinger's brief at 5, unnumbered).
In its entirety, the argument section of Matsinger's brief reads:
This case has been mishandled from the start, the Commonwealth has tried to cover [its] tracks from the first day July 28, 2009. First Detective Severa, acting without a complaint charges [Matsinger] with an unproven crime. Second, the Commonwealth [and] [the ADA] have denied this Appellant any justice at all. [The trial court] has also tried to sideline this case from the start. The first appeal, February 13, 2012, was filed 2 days late due to the Clerk of Court not [complying] with the Pa.R.C.P, this was shown to [the trial court], from the start, yet he still tried to dismiss this case. From there on the District Attorney . . . got into the picture and argued that the Commonwealth did not have the property, but that [Matsinger] did not properly file [a petition]. This was proven not true, then the ADA . . . filed for a forfeiture hearing [on] December 28, 2010, 18 months after the property was supposedly returned to Best Buy, 2 months after [Matsinger] filed the Return of Property Motion. Why would this Commonwealth do any of this if it no longer had the property? Legally I now know what the Commonwealth is saying, we don't have what you are asking for, and this petition you filed only allows us to return the property. As what was stated in the first appeal, where is the proof, all the Commonwealth provided was a statement "I gave it away." This could have been challenged by [Matsinger] if the [ADA] "as [sic] admitted in the court records from August 9, 2013." [The ADA] is entitled to the evidence but [Matsinger is] not supposed to have [it] due to the Expungement Order in place.(Matsinger's brief at 6-7, unnumbered).
[The trial court] admitted [Matsinger] should have gotten the evidence upon the request for full discovery. There were 8 requests for full discovery, with no response. Two were made before February 4, 2011, when the Order for Expungement was granted, so [the ADA] can't hide under that action as she tries. [The ADA] still had non-legal files that were to be destroyed under the Order by [the trial court].
Now the person, I the Appellant, can't figure out how any legal system can allow any legal Government agency to simply take property from an "innocent until proven guilty" person and do anything with it. There have been many proven cases against Philadelphia Police Officers, so to simply take one of their words as the truth, is just wrong. Detective Severa has given false testimony in at least one other case. Detective Severa's credibility could have been challenged if the Commonwealth followed the proper procedures, not just [when] it feels like it.
Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special benefit upon an appellant. See Means v. Housing Authority of City of Pittsburgh, 747 A.2d 1286, 1289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Accordingly, a pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court, and this Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if an appellant fails to conform with the requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Means, 747 A.2d at 1289 (quashing appellant's pro se appeal where the deficient briefing impaired our ability to discern the issues and arguments and precluded any meaningful appellate review); Robinson v. Schellenberg, 729 A.2d 122, 125-26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (same). See Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 252 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Under our Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[w]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived. It is not the obligation of this Court . . . to formulate [an appellant's] arguments for him." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009) (citations omitted).
Because the argument section of Matsinger's brief is so woefully deficient that it impedes our ability to engage in meaningful review of any of the issues that he lists in his statement of the questions involved, we conclude that all of the issues that Matsinger purports to raise are waived. See id.; Browne v. Commonwealth, 843 A.2d 429, 435 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) ("At the appellate level, a party's failure to include analysis and relevant authority results in waiver.").
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
Even if Matsinger's issues were not waived on account of deficient briefing, we would affirm on the basis of the trial court's Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, which fully addresses and ably disposes of the issues that Matsinger raised and preserved in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. We note that the first four issues that Matsinger identifies in his appellate brief as his statement of questions were not raised in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement or reasonably suggested thereby; therefore, these issues would be waived. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) ("Issues not included in the Statement . . . are waived."); Lang v. Department of Transportation, 13 A.3d 1043, 1049 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). --------
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of January, 2015, the appeal filed by Thomas Matsinger (Matsinger), pro se, from the August 9, 2013 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is dismissed.
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
Id. A motion filed under Pa.R.Crim.P. 588 is essentially the "mirror image" of a forfeiture action commenced by the Commonwealth under the act commonly known as the Controlled Substances Forfeiture Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§6801-6802. In Re One 1988 Toyota Corolla, 675 A.2d 1290, 1295 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).