Opinion
No. 3D22-1520.
04-05-2023
AsiliA Law Firm P.A., and Jeremy McLymont , for appellant. Ashley Moody , Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman , Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before LOGUE, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.
AsiliA Law Firm P.A., and Jeremy McLymont , for appellant.
Ashley Moody , Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman , Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before LOGUE, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b) ("A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final...."); Cave v. State, 289 So.3d 980, 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) ("For purposes of [Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850], the two-year period begins to run when appellate proceedings have concluded and the court issues a mandate...."); Mathieu v. State, 258 So.3d 528, 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (affirming defendant's conviction by jury and sentence on charges of second-degree murder with a firearm and accessory after the fact); see also Card v. Dugger, 512 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1987) ("Where an initial motion for post-conviction relief raises the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court may summarily deny a successive motion which raises additional grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel.").