Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-938
01-24-2020
MANNA MASSAQUOI, Plaintiff v. SERGEANT J. MCCONAUGHEY, et al. Defendants
(MANNION, D.J.) ()
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no dispute that prison life is rigid and often harsh. However, a federal court is not the proper forum for challenging or changing every aspect of the harsh realities of confinement unless the conditions cannot be tolerated under the Constitution. In this case, a state prisoner recites a series of unpleasant encounters with prison staff, none of which involved personal injury, destruction of property, or significant interference with his rights. Plaintiff's righteous indignation is outlined in an amended complaint, consisting of thirty-three (33) typed pages and 138 paragraphs, naming fifty-five (55) corrections staff who have affronted his dignity.
Griffin v. Smith, 493 F. Supp. 129, 131 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
Presently before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 54) filed by all Defendants. For the reasons outlined in this Report, it is Recommended that the Defendant's Motion be granted without leave to amend and the case be closed.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ................................................................................................ 1 II. Background and Procedural History .......................................................... 5 III. Legal Standards .......................................................................................... 8
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard ....................................................................... 8
B. Poulis Standard ......................................................................................... 11 IV. Analysis .................................................................................................... 13
A. Merits of Plaintiff's Claims ..................................................... 13
1. Defendant Department of Corrections ..................................... 14
2. Defendant J McConaughey ................................................. 14
3. Defendant Kline .............................................................. 15
4. Defendant Shope ............................................................. 16
5. Defendant Boyd ............................................................... 18
6. Defendant Sheets ............................................................. 19
7. Defendant Deljanovan ....................................................... 20
8. Defendant Seese .............................................................. 20
9. Defendant Kauffman ......................................................... 21
10. Defendant Henry ............................................................ 22
11. Defendant Lear and Defendant Thomas .................................. 23
12. Defendant Steightiff ......................................................... 24
13. Defendant Keel ............................................................... 26
14. Defendant Grove ............................................................. 27
15. Defendant Householder ...................................................... 28
16. Defendant Williams, Defendant Huber, Defendant Moyer, and Defendant Parson ............................................................ 29
17. Defendant Kylor, Defendant Sullivan, Defendant Killinger, and Defendant Yoder ............................................................. 30
18. Defendant Ruiz ............................................................... 31
19. Defendant Bickert ............................................................ 31
20. Defendant Horton ............................................................ 32
21. Defendant Douglas ........................................................... 34
22. Defendant Wrentz ........................................................... 35
23. Defendant Ramey ............................................................ 36
24. Defendant Killinger ......................................................... 37
25. Defendant Long .............................................................. 38
26. Defendant Byers ............................................................. 38
27. Defendant Martz ............................................................. 39
28. Defendant Matula ............................................................ 40
29. Defendant Dickson .......................................................... 42
30. Defendant Ranch ............................................................ 42
31. Defendant Field .............................................................. 44
32. Defendant Mayers ........................................................... 44
33. Defendant Magee ............................................................ 45
34. Defendant Taylor ............................................................ 45
35. Defendant Runk .............................................................. 47
36. Defendant Parks ............................................................. 48
37. Defendant Morningstar ..................................................... 48
38. Defendant Ellenberger ...................................................... 49
39. Plaintiff's Retaliation Claims Against Defendant Murphy, Defendant Ellengerger, Defendant Byers, and Defendant Martz .................... 50
40. Named Defendants Without Claims Alleged Against Them: Crum, Nickum, Fortson, Ersek, Farabaugh, Gladfelter, Park, and Rentz ...... 53
41. Factual Allegations Without Identified Defendants ..................... 53
B. Poulis Analysis ................................................................... 54 V. Leave to Amend .................................................................. 57 VI. Recommendation ................................................................. 58 VII. Notice of Local Rule 72.3 ...................................................... 59
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint (Doc. 1) - a seven (7) page handwritten document made up of sixteen (16) paragraphs. At the outset, I note that on August 8, 2017, I screened Plaintiff's Original Complaint, explaining the deficiencies of Plaintiff's claims and granting Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 13). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 27) on April 27, 2018. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was a typed complaint consisting of thirty-three (33) pages and one hundred and thirty-eight (138) paragraphs.
According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was a state prisoner at SCI Smithfield. (Doc. 27, ¶ 62). Plaintiff filed grievances that led to him taking legal action in a civil suit separate from this case.Id. at ¶ 63. Plaintiff alleges numerous incidents involving prison staff. Id. at ¶¶ 63-94. Rather than provide a lengthy recitation of Plaintiff's factual allegations here, I will address the facts of each incident in my analysis of the merits of Plaintiff's claims.
In this civil suit, docketed at 3:15-CV-02448-MEM, a motion for summary judgment was granted and the case was closed on February 11, 2019.
Plaintiff initiated this suit by filing a Complaint (Doc. 1) on May 30, 2017. On August 8, 2017, I screened Plaintiff's Complaint and permitted him to amend his Complaint. (Doc. 13). On April 3, 2018, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint (Doc. 27).
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names fifty-five (55) defendants:
1. J. McConaughey (Correctional Sergeant)
2. Kline (Correctional Sergeant)
3. B. Shope (Correctional Sergeant)
4. J. Boyd (Correctional Sergeant)
5. Sheets (Correctional Sergeant)
6. T. Deljanovan (Correctional Sergeant)
7. S. A. Seese (Correctional Sergeant)
8. W. Henry (Correctional Sergeant)
9. Sullivan (Correctional Sergeant)
10. Lear (Correctional Lieutenant)
11. Streightiff (Correctional Lieutenant)
12. Kauffman (Correctional Lieutenant)
13. Crum (Correctional Lieutenant)
14. D. Keel (Correctional Lieutenant)
15. A. P. Grove (Correctional Captain)
16. J.M. Householder (Correctional Officer)
17. N.E. Nickum (Correctional Officer)
18. B.O. Williams (Correctional Officer)
19. J. Fortson (Correctional Officer)
20. D. Kylor (Correctional Officer)
21. M. Huber (Correctional Officer)
22. D. Ruiz (Correctional Officer)
23. A. Bickert (Correctional Officer)
24. W.W. Moyer (Correctional Officer)
25. C.G. Parson (Correctional Officer)
26. H.E. Ersek (Correctional Officer)
27. Sullivan (Correctional Officer)
28. D.V. Murphy (Correctional Officer)
29. F.C. Farabaugh (Correctional Officer)
30. D.A. Douglas (Correctional Officer)
31. Wrentz (Correctional Officer)
32. R. Ramey (Correctional Officer)
33. W. Killinger (Correctional Officer)
34. D.L. Horton (Correctional Officer)
35. C.J. Yoder (Correctional Officer)
36. Gladfelter (Correctional Officer)
37. S. Long (Correctional Officer)
38. A. Byers (Correctional Officer)
39. J. Martz (Correctional Officer)Id. at ¶ 6-60.
40. Matula (Correctional Officer)
41. Dickson (Correctional Officer)
42. Ranch (Correctional Officer)
43. J. Field (Correctional Officer)
44. Mayers (Correctional Officer)
45. Magee (Correctional Officer)
46. J. Taylor (Correctional Officer)
47. N. Wyles (Correctional Librarian)
48. J. Runk (Correctional Counselor)
49. A. Parks (Correctional Counselor)
50. N. Thomas (Correctional Unit Manager)
51. D. Morningstar (Correctional Unit Manager)
52. S. Ellenberger (Correctional Hearing Examiner)
53. Pennsylvania (Department and Employer of the above Defendants)
54. Brandon Rentz
55. Jay Park
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances and a civil suit against the prison and prison staff. Id. at ¶ 133. Plaintiff alleges violations of his First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at ¶ 135.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks $100,000 in compensatory damages "collectively and separately in his or her individual and official capacity." Id. at ¶ 137. Plaintiff also seeks a jury trial, payment of his costs by Defendants, and any relief this Court deems proper or appropriate. Id. at ¶ 138.
On April 19, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 54). On May 3, 2019, Defendants filed a Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 55).
On August 22, 2019, I ordered Plaintiff to file a brief in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 56). On September 12, 2019, Plaintiff requested an extension of time to file his brief in opposition (Doc. 57), which I granted. (Doc. 58). At this time, Plaintiff has not filed a brief in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for disposition. For the reasons below, I RECOMMEND that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court "must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must "consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff's] claims are based upon these documents." Id. at 230.
In deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint as well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). These allegations and inferences are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. However, the court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Further, it is not proper to "assume that [the plaintiff] can prove facts that [he] has not alleged. . . ." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Following the rule announced in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "a pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations enough to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. Id. To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under the pleading regime established by the Supreme Court, the court must engage in a three-step analysis:
First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679). "In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief" and instead must 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).
As the court of appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the "plausibility" standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint which pleads facts "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, [ ] "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement of relief.'" Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955).Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011).
In undertaking this task, the court generally relies only on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider "undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, "documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered." Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that "[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment.") However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
B. POULIS STANDARD
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute, stating that "If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of the Court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F. 3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). That discretion, while broad, is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as Poulis factors.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion [in dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its balancing of
the following factors: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.
In exercising this discretion, "there is no 'magic formula' that we apply to determine whether a District Court has abused its discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute." Lopez v. Cousins, 435 F. App'x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008)). Therefore, "[i]n balancing the Poulis factors, [courts] do not employ a . . . 'mechanical calculation' to determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff's case." Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)). Consistent with this view, it is well-settled that "no single Poulis factor is dispositive," and that "not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint." Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, recognizing the broad discretion conferred upon the district court in making judgments weighing these six factors, the Court of Appeals has frequently sustained such dismissal orders where there has been a pattern of dilatory conduct by a pro se litigant who is not amendable to any lesser sanction. See, e.g., Emerson, 296 F.3d 184; Tillio v. Mendelsohn, 256 F. App'x 509 (3d Cir. 2007); Reshard v. Lankenau Hospital, 256 F.App'x 506 (3d Cir. 2007); Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 F.App'x 728 (3d Cir. 2007).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. MERITS OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
Plaintiff's claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). "It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely 'provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hilldebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)). To establish a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names fifty-five (55) defendants and alleges facts arising out of numerous incidents with prison staff. Plaintiff frames his Amended Complaint as claims of retaliation against all defendants. Upon reviewing his Amendment Complaint, it appears most of Plaintiff's claims allege non- retaliation constitutional violations and only a few claims actually alleging retaliation. I believe that the best method for analyzing Plaintiff's claims for purposes of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is to look at the claims against each defendant individually.
1. Defendant Department of Corrections
Plaintiff names the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("Defendant DOC") as a defendant. A § 1983 claim may only be brought against "persons." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Neither a state nor its agencies are considered a "person" for purposes of § 1983 actions and, therefore, are not subject to a § 1983 suit. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-27 (1991). Consequently, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant DOC are barred. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant DOC fail and should be dismissed.
2. Defendant J McConaughey
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McConaughey, a correctional sergeant, approached Plaintiff and stated, "I'm tire (sic) of you ignoring me, I'm going to destroy your dumb ass." (Doc. 27, ¶ 79). Defendant McConaughey issued Plaintiff a misconduct, but Plaintiff does not explain what facts gave rise to the misconduct. "Mere threatening language and gestures of a custodial officer do not, even if true, amount to constitutional violations." Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp. 3d 678, 698 (M.D. Pa. 2015). To state a constitutional claim, the verbal threats must be accompanied by some reinforcing act that "escalated the threat beyond mere words." Id. at 698. Regarding Defendant McConaughey, Plaintiff has not alleged more than mere words. Without more, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a constitutional violation. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant McConaughey fail and should be dismissed.
3. Defendant Kline
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Kline, Defendant Wrentz, and Defendant Douglas allowed other prisoners to go to the prison law library but held Plaintiff back for ten (10) minutes. (Doc. 27, ¶ 80). Inmates have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-56 (1996). However, in bringing a claim for deprivation of this right, the inmate must show actual injury. Id. at 349-57. "To establish a cognizable access to courts claim, a complainant must demonstrate that: (1) he suffered an 'actual injury' (i.e., that he lost an opportunity to pursue a nonfrivolous claim); and (2) he has no other remedy, save the present civil rights suit that can possibly compensate for the lost claim." Williams v. Clancy, 449 F. App'x 87, 89 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). Plaintiff fails to provide any facts to show he suffered some adverse decision in a non-frivolous case he was litigating as a result of the ten (10) minute law library delay. Without showing actual injury, Plaintiff's claim fails.
Plaintiff states that this was done in retaliation against him for filing grievances against prison staff. (Doc. 27, ¶ 80). However, Plaintiff does not provide any facts to support this claim of retaliation. Rather than outright conclude that Plaintiff fails to state a claim, I will construe Plaintiff's claim to be an Eighth Amendment access to the courts claim.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Kline, Defendant Wrentz, Defendant Douglas, and Defendant Morningstar denied him access to the showers on January 27, 2017. (Doc. 27, ¶ 84). However, based on his allegations, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights were not violated. The Eighth Amendment does not require that inmates receive frequent showers. Davenport v. De Robertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that one shower per week is constitutionally sufficient); Veteto v. Miller, 829 F.Supp. 1486, 1496 (M.D. Pa. 1992). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Kline and the correctional officers denied him access to the showers for an extended period of time. Plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional violation by Defendant Kline. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Kline fail and should be dismissed.
4. Defendant Shope
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Shope and Defendant Keel directed cell block officers to prohibit Plaintiff from eating lunch. (Doc. 27, ¶ 77). Plaintiff alleges that he mistakenly went to the regular lunch meal line when he should have waited until the "alternative protein" meal line was called. Id. When he realized his mistaken, he told Defendant Shope that he would return to his cell and wait until the "alternative protein" meal line was called. Id. Plaintiff returned to his cell. When the "alternative protein" meal line was called, the cell block officers did not permit Plaintiff to go eat. Id. The cell block officers stated that Defendant Shope and Defendant Keel instructed them to not permit Plaintiff to eat with the "alternative protein" meal line. Id.
I construe Plaintiff's claim to be an allegation that Defendant Shope violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right by denying him a meal. The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain include those that are totally without penological justification. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002). Conditions that inflict needless suffering, whether physical or mental, may constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Tillery v. Owens, 719 F.Supp. 1256, 1275 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990).
The Eighth Amendment requires that inmates be provided well-balanced meals containing sufficient nutritional value to preserve health. Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999). But "[t]he deprivation of food constitutes cruel and unusual punishment only if it denies a prisoner the 'minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'" Id. (quoting Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 214 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998)). "Whether the deprivation of food falls below this threshold depends on the amount and duration of the deprivation." Id. The "deprivation of a single meal does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation because 'only a substantial deprivation of food to a prisoner' states a viable Eighth Amendment claim." Rieco v. Moran, No. 15-2529, 2015 WL 7730985, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 1, 2015) (quoting Lindsey v. O'Connor, 327 F. App'x 319, 321 (3d Cir.2009)). Plaintiff only alleges that Defendant Shope deprived him of one meal. Thus, Plaintiff's allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Shope fail and should be dismissed.
5. Defendant Boyd
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Boyd, a correctional sergeant, instructed Plaintiff to retrieve his legal mail from the cell block's bubble window. (Doc. 27, ¶ 89). When Plaintiff attempted to retrieve his legal mail, Defendant Byers told Plaintiff to return to his cell. Id. Defendant Byers became aggressive and threatening. Id. Plaintiff received a misconduct as a result of this incident. Id. These are the only circumstances in which Plaintiff discusses Defendant Boyd. These facts appear to be a claim against Defendant Byers - not Defendant Boyd. Plaintiff does not appear to allege a claim against Defendant Boyd. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Boyd should be dismissed.
The claims against Defendant Byers are discussed later in this Report.
6. Defendant Sheets
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sheets conducted a strip search that was, by comparison, too invasive. Id. at ¶ 92. Plaintiff alleges:
Sheets who had strip search me numerous times during admission to segregation, decided this time (3.20.2017) to look in my ass hole instead of the normal routine of squatting with cheeks apart and coughing. He threatened to issue me a misconduct for refusing to obey an order if I didn't bent (sic) over and spread my cheeks (butt) in his face. Every other prisoner that I spoke to and requested to know how was they strip search and who strip search them said, it was [Sheets] wit (sic) the normal routine of squatting with cheeks apart and coughing. Since March 20, 2017, Sheets had always strip search (sic) me, threatening and demanding that I bent (sic) over and spread my cheeks (butt) in his face.Id. at ¶ 92.
An inmate retains some constitutional protection under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches, but this protection is limited to the need to maintain prison security and the inmate's own reduced expectation of privacy. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979). A strip search must be conducted in a reasonable manner. Id. at 560. Based on Plaintiff's allegations, the strip search, conducted as a visual body cavity search, does not appear to be done in an unreasonable manner. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Sheets fails and should be dismissed.
7. Defendant Deljanovan
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Deljanovan, Defendant Kauffman, and Defendant Keel falsely accused Plaintiff of breaking cell restriction. (Doc. 27, ¶ 63). Defendant Deljanovan accused Plaintiff of refusing to hand him the recreation pass after Plaintiff returned from morning yard recreation. Id. Defendant Deljanovan issued Plaintiff a misconduct, and Plaintiff was placed in segregation. Id. However, this misconduct was dismissed. Id. A prison inmate "has no constitutional guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest." Bodge v. Zimmerman, No. 86-6051, 1988 WL 100749, *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1988). Based on his allegations, Plaintiff claim against Deljanovan fails and should be dismissed.
8. Defendant Seese
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Seese, a correctional sergeant, and Defendant Grove subjected Plaintiff to thirty (30) days segregation, fourteen (14) days food restriction, and thirty (30) days denial of cell cleaning, recreation, and law library. (Doc. 27, ¶ 71). This punishment allegedly arose out of an incident Plaintiff had with Defendant Householder.Id. Defendant Seese "sided with" Defendant Householder and issued the punishment to Plaintiff. Id. Even if Defendant Householder's version of the events was untrue, Plaintiff does not have a claim against Defendant Seese for believing Defendant Householder's version of what happened. As stated above, inmates do not have immunity from being wrongly accused of conduct that could give rise to punishment. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Seese fails and should be dismissed.
Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Householder will be discussed later in this Report.
9. Defendant Kauffman
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Kauffman, Defendant Deljanovan, and Defendant Keel, falsely accused Plaintiff of refusing to return his morning recreation pass to Defendant Deljanovan. As stated above, Plaintiff is not immune from false accusations. Thus, this claim fails.
Plaintiff also alleges that while he was in segregation, Defendant Kauffman, Defendant Henry, Defendant Grove, Defendant Runk, Defendant Ruiz, Defendant Taylor, and other prison staff denied him of his property and heightened the restrictions on Plaintiff - citing Plaintiff's threatening behavior towards staff. Id. at ¶ 65. Plaintiff does not provide further details regarding this incident. Without more, I cannot determine whether Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated during this incident. Both of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Kauffman fail and should be dismissed.
10. Defendant Henry
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Henry, Defendant Kauffman, Defendant Grove, Defendant Runk, Defendant Ruiz, Defendant Taylor, and other prison staff denied him of his property and heightened the restrictions on Plaintiff - citing Plaintiff's threatening behavior towards staff. Id. at ¶ 65. As stated above, I cannot determine whether Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated during this incident without more facts regarding the incident.
Plaintiff also alleges that "[Defendant Henry] and [Defendant Householder] on May 4, 2015 issued [Plaintiff] a misconduct for refusing to obey direct order by being argumentative and refusing to get out of the RHU shower, and I was denied shower, cell cleaning, RHU law library and recreation for 30 days. I was truthfully placed in the shower at 2:35 p.m. and got out at 2:45 p.m." Id. at ¶ 66. Plaintiff does not provide further facts regarding this incident. It is not clear what gave rise to the misconduct or what happened in the shower. Without more facts, I cannot determine whether Defendant Henry violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights during this incident.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Henry, Defendant Matula, and other prisoner staff were present on the RHU block when a fire emergency occurred. Id. at ¶ 70. The prison staff told inmates to cover their face with shirts, rather than evacuating the prisoners. Id. Plaintiff alleges that prisons staff did not employ the proper fire emergency procedure. Id. Not all unsafe conditions are cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. First, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a condition must "involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). In the present context, it must be an objectively serious safety risk to the inmate. Second, the condition, or the risk it creates, must be the product of defendants' deliberate indifference - mere negligence is not sufficient to violate the Eighth Amendment. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991). Based on Plaintiff's allegations, no constitutional violation appears to have occurred. Plaintiff does not even allege any harm occurred from this fire emergency. All of the claims against Defendant Henry fail and should be dismissed.
11. Defendant Lear and Defendant Thomas
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lear and Defendant Thomas refused to perform a pat down on Plaintiff. (Doc. 27, ¶ 91). When Plaintiff returned from morning recreational, Defendant Ramey requested to perform a pat down search on Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff requested that Defendant Ramey wore gloves to perform the search, but she refused. Id. Defendant Ramey issued Plaintiff a misconduct. Id. Plaintiff asked Defendant Lear, Defendant Thomas, and Defendant Ramey if any officer would perform the pat down search while wearing gloves. Id. They each refused and placed Plaintiff in segregation. Id. Plaintiff's claim appears to be against Defendant Ramey, not Defendant Lear or Defendant Thomas, for her initial refusal to wear gloves. Plaintiff has not provided sufficient facts to allege a claim against Defendant Lear or Defendant Thomas. The claims against Defendant Lear and Defendant Thomas fail and should be dismissed.
Plaintiff's claim arising from these circumstances appears to be against Defendant Ramey. The claims against Defendant Ramey are addressed later in this Report.
12. Defendant Streightiff
Plaintiff alleges that he informed Defendant Streightiff, a correctional lieutenant, of the presence of an insect or rodent in the banana peel that Defendant Bickert served Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 68. Hours after Defendant Bickert served Plaintiff the allegedly contaminated food, Defendant Streightiff and Defendant Bickert photographed and videotaped the tray containing the insect or rodent. Id. Defendant Streightiff and Defendant Bickert did not offer Plaintiff medical attention. Id. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison conditions, a plaintiff must show "he has suffered an objectively, sufficiently serious injury, and that prison officials inflicted the injury with deliberate indifference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. At a minimum, correctional institutions must provide inmates with "adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety." Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992). To establish deliberate indifference: (1) a prison official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; (2) the official must be aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and (3) the official must also draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Streightiff failed to take steps to alleviate the risk posed by an insect or rodent in Plaintiff's food. Defendant Streightiff documented the presence of the insect or rodent in the food by photographing and videotaping the tray. (Doc. 27, ¶ 68). Plaintiff does not allege that he continued to have insects or rodents in his food or that Defendants failed to prevent further contamination of his food. Further, Plaintiff does not allege that he requested medical attention or Defendant Streightiff had any reason to know that Plaintiff wanted medical attention. Plaintiff does not even allege he needed medical attention.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Streightiff and Defendant Myers failed to follow proper prison procedure when they did not number a grievance filed by Plaintiff before it was sent to security for investigation. Id. at ¶ 81. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Streightiff and Defendant Myers violated his constitutional rights but only identifies Defendant Steightiff and Defendant Myers as "security" who picked up the grievance box. Id. Plaintiff alleges that "they" did not number his grievance in an effort to delay the grievance process. Id. However, later in his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff identifies this grievance with a number (660219-17) and states that the grievance was filed, investigated, and denied. Id. at ¶ 114. Plaintiff does not allege that a delay actually occurred or that Defendant Streightiff prevented his grievance from being properly handled. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Streightiff fail and should be dismissed.
13. Defendant Keel
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Keel, Defendant Deljanovan, and Defendant Kauffman falsely accused Plaintiff of refusing to hand his recreation pass to Defendant Deljanovan. Id. at ¶ 63. As stated above, Plaintiff is not immune from false accusations of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Thus, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Keel regarding false accusations fails.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Keel and Defendant Shope, denied Plaintiff of a meal. Id. at ¶ 77. Plaintiff alleges that he mistakenly went to the regular lunch meal line when he should have waited until the "alternative protein" meal line was called. Id. When he realized his mistaken, he told Defendant Shope that he would return to his cell and wait until the "alternative protein" meal line was called. Id. Plaintiff returned to his cell. When the "alternative protein" meal line was called, the cell block officers did not permit Plaintiff to go eat. Id. The cell block officers stated that Defendant Shope and Defendant Keel instructed them to not permit Plaintiff to eat with the "alternative protein" meal line. Id.
As I did with the claim against Defendant Shope, I construe Plaintiff's claim to be an allegation that Defendant Keel violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right by denying him a meal. As stated above, the denial of one meal does not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Rieco, 2015 WL 7730985, at *1. Thus, Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Keel denied him of a meal does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Keel fail and should be dismissed.
14. Defendant Grove
Plaintiff alleges that while he was in segregation, Defendant Grove, Defendant Kauffman, Defendant Henry, Defendant Runk, Defendant Ruiz, Defendant Taylor, and other prison staff denied him of his property and heightened the restrictions on Plaintiff - citing Plaintiff's threatening behavior towards staff. Id. at ¶ 65. Plaintiff does not provide further details regarding this incident. Without more, I cannot determine whether Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated during this incident.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Grove and Defendant Seese subjected Plaintiff to thirty (30) days segregation, fourteen (14) days food restriction, and thirty (30) days denial of cell cleaning, recreation, and law library. (Doc. 27, ¶ 71). This punishment allegedly arose out of an incident Plaintiff had with Defendant Householder. Id. Defendant Grove and Defendant Seese "sided with" Defendant Householder and issued the punishment on Plaintiff. Id. Even if Defendant Householder's version of the events was untrue, Plaintiff does not have a claim against Defendant Grove for believing Defendant Householder's version of what happened. As stated above, inmates do not have immunity from being wrongly accused of conduct that could give rise to punishment. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Grove fail and should be dismissed.
15. Defendant Householder
Plaintiff alleges that "[Defendant Henry] and [Defendant Householder] on May 4, 2015 issued [Plaintiff] a misconduct for refusing to obey direct order by being argumentative and refusing to get out of the RHU shower, and [Plaintiff] was denied shower, cell cleaning, RHU law library and recreation for 30 days. [Plaintiff] was truthfully placed in the shower at 2:35 p.m. and got out at 2:45 p.m." Id. at ¶ 66. Plaintiff does not provide further facts regarding this incident. It is not clear what gave rise to the misconduct or what happened in the shower. Without more facts, I cannot determine whether Defendant Householder violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights during this incident.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Householder refused to collect his empty tray. Id. at ¶ 71. Plaintiff does not allege how this is a violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges that he was punished by Defendant Seese and Defendant Grove related to this incident, but he fails to allege any facts as to what happened. He merely states that Defendant Householder refused to take his tray. Id. Without more facts, I cannot determine whether Defendant Householder violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Householder fail and should be dismissed.
16. Defendant Williams, Defendant Huber, Defendant Moyer, and Defendant Parson
Plaintiff alleges that while he was in segregation, Defendant Williams, Defendant Huber, Defendant Moyer, and Defendant Parson served Plaintiff his meals while they had chewing tobacco in their mouths. Id. at ¶ 67. Plaintiff alleges that this was in violation of prison policy. Id. I construe Plaintiff's claim to be a conditions of confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual living conditions. As stated above, at a minimum, correctional institutions must provide inmates with "adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety." Young, 960 at 364. Only extreme deprivations are sufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Dockery v. Beard, 509 Fed.Appx. 107, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Plaintiff does not allege any harm. Plaintiff does not allege a single instance where his meals were contaminated by chewing tobacco. Plaintiff does not allege that he was deprived meals. Plaintiff's claim related to the chewing tobacco against Defendant Williams, Defendant Huber, Defendant Moyer, and Defendant Parson fails and should be dismissed.
17. Defendant Kylor, Defendant Sullivan, Defendant Killinger, and Defendant Yoder
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Kylor, Defendant Yoder, Defendant Killinger, and Defendant Sullivan refused to allow Plaintiff to take his scheduled shower on September 3, 2016. (Doc. 27, ¶ 74). Plaintiff alleges that he signed up to take a shower but was not permitted to take the shower. Id. Defendants told Plaintiff that they opened his door to permit him to leave his cell for the shower, but he never left. Id. Plaintiff alleges this was not true. Id. Plaintiff asked Defendants if he could shower later that day, but Defendants denied this request. Id. The relevant Eighth Amendment inquiry is whether the alleged deprivation is "sufficiently serious" and whether the inmate has been deprived of the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Plaintiff's claim regarding showering is not a constitutional violation. Plaintiff only alleges he was denied access to showering on one occasion. Further, Plaintiff does not allege he suffered any harm from being denied this shower. Plaintiff's claims related to his denial of a shower against Defendant Kylor, Defendant Sullivan, Defendant Killinger, and Defendant Yoder fail and should be dismissed.
Plaintiff alleges another claim against Defendant Killinger. This second claim will be addressed separately later in this Report.
18. Defendant Ruiz
Plaintiff alleges that that while he was in segregation, Defendant Ruiz, Defendant Grove, Defendant Kauffman, Defendant Henry, Defendant Runk, Defendant Taylor, and other prison staff denied him of his property and heightened the restrictions on Plaintiff - citing Plaintiff's threatening behavior towards staff. (Doc. 27, ¶ 65). Plaintiff does not provide further details regarding this incident. Without more, I cannot determine whether Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated during this incident. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Ruiz fails and should be dismissed.
19. Defendant Bickert
Plaintiff alleges he discovered an insect or rodent in his food. Plaintiff alleges that he informed Defendant Streightiff, a correctional lieutenant, of the presence of an insect or rodent in the banana peel. Id. at ¶ 68. Hours after Defendant Bickert served Plaintiff the allegedly contaminated food, Defendant Streightiff and Defendant Bickert photographed and videotaped the tray containing the insect or rodent. Id. Defendant Streightiff and Defendant Bickert did not offer Plaintiff medical attention. Id. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison conditions, a plaintiff must show "he has suffered an objectively, sufficiently serious injury, and that prison officials inflicted the injury with deliberate indifference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Streightiff failed to take steps to alleviate the risk posed by an insect or rodent in Plaintiff's food. Defendant Bickert documented the presence of the insect or rodent in the food by photographing and videotaping the tray. (Doc. 27, ¶ 68). Plaintiff does not allege that he continued to have insects or rodents in his food or that Defendants failed to prevent further contamination of his food. Further, Plaintiff does not allege that he requested medical attention or Defendant Bickert had any reason to know that Plaintiff wanted medical attention. Plaintiff does not even allege he needed medical attention. Plaintiff fails to allege an Eighth Amendment violation against Defendant Bickert. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Bickert fails and should be dismissed.
20. Defendant Horton
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Horton refused to sign Plaintiff's library pass. Id. at ¶ 76. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Horton became aggressive and threatening, telling Plaintiff, "I don't give a fuck about your legal deadline." Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Horton threw away Plaintiff's law library pass and ordered him back to his cell. Id. I construe Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Horton to be for a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional right to have access to the court. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania aptly summarized the state of the law on this issue:
The Supreme Court has recognized that all prisoners have a constitutional right of access to court. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1494, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Access to court must be adequate, effective and meaningful under the Federal Constitution. Id., at 822, 97 S.Ct. at 1495; Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir.1981); Williams v. Dark, 844 F.Supp. 210, 214 (E.D.Pa.1993),
aff'd 19 F.3d 645 (1994); Agresta, 801 F.Supp. at 1472. The right of access to court is not unlimited; all that is required is a reasonable right of access, to afford a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 226 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1019, 107 S.Ct. 673, 93 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986); Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 757 F.2d 548, 554 (3d Cir.1985); Boyd v. Petsock, 795 F.Supp. 743, 746 (W.D. Pa. 1992).Muhammad v. Hilbert, 906 F. Supp. 267, 270-71 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
Meaningful access to a law library is part of a prisoner's right of access to the courts. Reasonableness, not unlimited use, is the standard that must be met, in order for access to the law library to be meaningful. Lindquist v. Idaho Bd. of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir.1985); Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir. 1978).
. . . .
Courts have generally held that a one-time denial of library use fails to show a violation of the Constitution. A one-time denial is not an unreasonable restriction on access, and therefore does not state a cause of action under Section 1983. Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1387 (4th Cir.1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 949, 114 S.Ct. 393, 126 L.Ed.2d 341 (1993) (one-time denial of library entry is not infringement of right to court access); Oliver v. Marks, 587 F.Supp. 884, 886-87 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (one-time denial of library use not actionable under Section 1983). Indeed, "restricted access to the law library is not per se denial of access to the courts . . . The prison library is but one factor in the totality of all factors bearing on the inmates' access to the courts which should be considered[.]" Twyman, 584 F.2d at 357.
Plaintiff does not allege that he was repeatedly denied access to the prison law library. In fact, Plaintiff only alleges one occurrence of such a denial. Based on his allegations, Plaintiff's constitutional right to access to the courts was not violated. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Horton fails and should be dismissed.
21. Defendant Douglas
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Douglas, Defendant Parks, and Defendant Runk watched Defendant Horton refuse to sign Plaintiff's library pass. (Doc. 27, ¶ 76.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Horton became aggressive and threatening, telling Plaintiff, "I don't give a fuck about your legal deadline." Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Douglas failed to intervene in the situation by stating that he had nothing to do with the situation. Id. To state a valid § 1983 claim for failure to intervene, a plaintiff must show that an officer had a reasonable opportunity to intervene in the face of a constitutional violation and he simply refused to do so. Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002). Importantly, "an officer is only liable if there is a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene." Id. at 651 (citations omitted). Based on Plaintiff's allegations, I cannot conclude that Defendant Douglas faced a constitutional violation. As stated above, Defendant Horton did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights when he did not allow Plaintiff to go to the law library. Thus, Plaintiff's failure to intervene claim against Defendant Douglas fails.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Douglas, Defendant Wrentz, and Defendant Kline caused him to be late for his scheduled law library time by ten (10) minutes. (Doc. 27, ¶ 82). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants purposely did not open his door. Id. I construe Plaintiff's claim as being a violation of his constitutional right to access to the courts. However, Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied access to the prison law library. Plaintiff merely alleges that he was ten (10) minutes late. Further, this one a one-time occurrence - Plaintiff does not allege that he was repeatedly denied access to the prison law library. Plaintiff's claim regarding his late arrival at the prison law library does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Douglas, Defendant Kline, Defendant Wrentz, Defendant Morningstar, and other prison staff denied him access to the showers on January 27, 2017. Id. at ¶ 84. The Eighth Amendment does not require that inmates receive frequent showers. Davenport v. De Robertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that one shower per week is constitutionally sufficient); Veteto v. Miller, 829 F.Supp. 1486, 1496 (M.D. Pa. 1992). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Douglas denied him access to the showers for an extended period of time. Plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional violation by Defendant Douglas. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Douglas fail and should be dismissed.
22. Defendant Wrentz
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wrentz, Defendant Douglas, and Defendant Kline caused him to be late for his scheduled law library time by ten (10) minutes. (Doc. 27, ¶ 82). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants purposely did not open his door. Id. I construe Plaintiff's claim as being a violation of his constitutional right to access to the courts. However, as stated above, Plaintiff's claim regarding his late arrival at the prison law library does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Wrentz, Defendant Kline, Defendant Douglas, Defendant Morningstar, and other prison staff denied him access to the showers on January 27, 2017. Id. at ¶ 84. The Eighth Amendment does not require that inmates receive frequent showers. Davenport v. De Robertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that one shower per week is constitutionally sufficient); Veteto v. Miller, 829 F.Supp. 1486, 1496 (M.D. Pa. 1992). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Wrentz denied him access to the showers for an extended period of time. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Wrentz fail and should be dismissed.
23. Defendant Ramey
Plaintiff alleges that when he returned from morning recreation, Defendant Ramey requested to perform a pat down search on Plaintiff. (Doc. 27, ¶ 91). Plaintiff requested that Defendant Ramey wore gloves to perform the search, but she refused. Id. Defendant Ramey issued Plaintiff a misconduct. Id. I construe Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Ramey to be under the Eighth Amendment. To be actionable under the Eighth Amendment, a defendant's conduct or issued punishment must be "objectively, sufficiently serious," and the corrections officer must have a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (1994). Nothing from Plaintiff's allegations suggests that Defendant Ramey failed to comport with constitutional standards. Ultimately, Defendant Ramey did not even conduct a pat-down search because Plaintiff refused to be subjected to the search. Id. Defendant Ramey did not violate Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights by directing him to submit to a pat-down search. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Ramey fails and should be dismissed.
24. Defendant Killinger
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Killinger and Defendant Field issued Plaintiff a grievance for breaking cell restriction and refusing to obey an order. (Doc. 27, ¶ 85). Plaintiff alleges he asked his cellmate to get grievance appeal forms for him. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Killinger told Plaintiff's cellmate that Plaintiff could get the forms himself. Id. Defendant Field also told Plaintiff to retrieve the forms himself. Id. Plaintiff alleges that when he went to get the forms, Defendant Killinger told Plaintiff he broke cell restriction and ordered him to return to his cell. Id. Defendant Killinger and Defendant Field issued Plaintiff a misconduct, and Plaintiff received thirty (30) days segregation. Id. Plaintiff's claim is not clear. Plaintiff has not alleged enough facts for me to make a determination whether his constitutional rights were violated. Thus, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Killinger fails and should be dismissed.
25. Defendant Long
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Long "served [him] a second cold meal while held on segregation[,] and [Plaintiff] did not accept it because the policy require (sic) 2 hot meals a day. [Plaintiff] requested [Defendant Long] to get [him] a supervisor and a hot meal, and [Defendant Long] did not get [Plaintiff] his supervisor or a hot meal." Id. at ¶ 86. "[W]hile prisoners are guaranteed a nutritionally adequate diet under the Eighth Amendment, . . . there is no constitutional right to hot meals." Laufgas v. Speziale, 263 Fed.Appx. 192, 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 571 (10th Cir. 1980); Brown-El v. Delo, 969 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1992)). "Provision of a cold meal in place of a hot meal does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Long fails and should be dismissed.
26. Defendant Byers
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Byers is liable for withholding his legal mail. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Boyd instructed Plaintiff to retrieve his legal mail from the cell block's bubble window. (Doc. 27, ¶ 89). When Plaintiff attempted to retrieve his legal mail, Defendant Byers told Plaintiff to return to his cell. Id. Defendant Byers became aggressive and threatening. Id. Plaintiff received a misconduct. Id. Shortly after, Plaintiff received his legal mail. Id. I construe Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Byers withheld his legal mail to be an access to the court claim. A violation of a prisoner's constitutional right of access to the court is only established where the prisoner shows that he was actually injured - that is, hindered in his efforts pursuing a legal claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. To show injury, a prisoner must show that a nonfrivolous, arguable claim was lost. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). Plaintiff has not alleged any injury from Defendant Byers' withholding of his legal mail. Plaintiff admits he did, in fact, receive his legal mail shortly after. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Byers fails and should be dismissed.
27. Defendant Martz
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Martz is also liable for the withholding of his legal mail. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Boyd instructed Plaintiff to retrieve his legal mail from the cell block's bubble window. (Doc. 27, ¶ 89). When Plaintiff attempted to retrieve his legal mail, Defendant Byers told Plaintiff to return to his cell. Id. During the incident, Defendant Byers became aggressive and threatening. Id. Plaintiff received a misconduct from Defendant Byers, Defendant Martz, and Defendant Boyd. Id. Plaintiff was able to get his legal mail shortly after. Id. It is not clear what Plaintiff's claim is against Defendant Martz. I cannot make a determination as to whether Defendant Martz violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to indicate that Defendant Martz did so. Thus, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Martz fails and should be dismissed.
28. Defendant Matula
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Matula, Defendant Henry, and other prisoner staff were present on the RHU block when a fire emergency occurred. Id. at ¶ 70. The prison staff told inmates to cover their face with shirts, rather than evacuating the prisoners. Id. Plaintiff alleges that prisons staff did not employ the proper fire emergency procedure. Id. As stated above, to prove an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must show that the alleged unsafe condition "involve[d] the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain" and prison staff were deliberately indifference to the safety risk to the prisoner. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 305. Based on Plaintiff's allegations, no constitutional violation appears to have occurred. Plaintiff does not even allege any injury from this fire emergency.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Matula accused Plaintiff of stealing food and being in an unauthorized area. (Doc. 27, ¶ 83). One morning during breakfast, Plaintiff allegedly forgot his I.D., and a correctional officer told Plaintiff to return to his cell block to retrieve his I.D. Id. When Plaintiff returned to breakfast, Defendant Matula told Plaintiff to throw away the food. Id. Defendant Matula accused Plaintiff of eating breakfast already. Id. Plaintiff does not allege whether he actually threw the breakfast away or if he was denied breakfast that day. Even if Plaintiff was denied breakfast that day, denial of one meal does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Thus, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Matula fails.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Matula accused Plaintiff of destroying and tampering with property. Id. at ¶ 94. Defendant Matula issued Plaintiff a misconduct related to this accusation. Id. Plaintiff alleges that two correctional officers inspected his cell before Defendant Matula's inspection and did not issue him a misconduct. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Matula inspected the cell after Plaintiff left and found trash in the toilet and on the floor. Id. Even assuming arguendo that Defendant Matula falsely accused Plaintiff regarding the state of his cell, no constitutional violation occurred. As long as an inmate charged with a misconduct is afforded procedural due process rights, an allegation that he was falsely accused will not be sufficient to claim a constitutional violation. Flanagan v. Shively, 783 F.Supp. 922, 931-32 (M.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd, 980 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 829 (1993). Plaintiff does not allege that the prison denied him due process regarding that misconduct. In fact, later in his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that there was never a hearing or investigation related to this misconduct "due to its overwhelming frivolousness." (Doc. 27, ¶ 130). According to Plaintiff's allegations, his due process rights protected him from this "frivolous" misconduct. Plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional violation against Defendant Matula. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Matual fail and should be dismissed.
29. Defendant Dickson
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dickson called Plaintiff a "dick" to Plaintiff's cellmate. Id. at ¶ 75. Insults alone are not constitutional violations. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Dickson's alleged verbal harassment was accompanied by any act. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Dickson fails and should be dismissed.
30. Defendant Ranch
Plaintiff alleges that on March 30, 2015, when he asked Defendant Ranch for a pass for recreation, Defendant Ranch became aggressive. Id. at ¶ 64. Defendant Ranch told Plaintiff he was being "smart" by not noting that he was on cell restriction when he asked for a recreation pass. Id. Defendant Ranch denied Plaintiff recreation time and ordered him back to his cell. Id. Denial of recreation on one occasion does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Bacon v. Minner, 229 Fed. Appx. 96, 99 (3d Cir.2007) (holding that an Eighth Amendment claim could not stand where the prisoner "merely alleged a change, and subsequent reduction, in the recreation schedule . . . rather than a complete elimination of exercise for inmates"). Plaintiff's claim related to his denial of recreation time on March 30, 2015 fails.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Douglas knew that Plaintiff was on cell restriction and failed to inform Defendant Ranch of this. (Doc. 27, ¶ 64). I construe this claim to be a failure to intervene claim. To state a valid § 1983 claim for failure to intervene, a plaintiff must show that an officer had a reasonable opportunity to intervene in the face of a constitutional violation and he simply refused to do so. Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002). As stated above, no such constitutional violation could occur because denial of recreation on one occasion is not a constitutional violation. Thus, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Douglas should not survive Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff also alleges on December 25, 2016, Defendant Ranch and Defendant Magee did not permit Plaintiff to leave his cell for dinner meal time. Id. at ¶ 78. Plaintiff also alleges that he was not permitted to file a grievance related to this incident. Id. As stated above, the "deprivation of a single meal does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation because 'only a substantial deprivation of food to a prisoner' states a viable Eighth Amendment claim." Rieco, No. 15-2529, 2015 WL 7730985, at *1 (quoting Lindsey, 327 F. App'x at 321). Plaintiff has not alleged that he was consistently denied meals. Instead, Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant Ranch denied him one meal. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Ranch regarding denial of meals. Plaintiff's claim that he was denied his right to file a grievance also fails. Prison inmates do not have a constitutional right to grievance procedures. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 137-138 (1977). Even if the prison provides for a grievance procedure, as the DOC does, violations of those procedures do not amount to a civil rights cause of action. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 898 (1988); Hoover v. Watson, 886 F.Supp. 410, 418 (D. Del. 1995), aff'd., 74 F.3d 1226 (3d Cir.1995). Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Ranch fails and should be dismissed.
31. Defendant Field
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Field and Defendant Killinger issued Plaintiff a grievance for breaking cell restriction and refusing to obey an order. (Doc. 27, ¶ 85). Plaintiff alleges he asked his cellmate to get grievance appeal forms for him. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Killinger told Plaintiff's cellmate that Plaintiff could get the forms himself. Id. Defendant Field also told Plaintiff to retrieve the forms himself. Id. Plaintiff alleges that when he went to get the forms, Defendant Killinger told Plaintiff he broke cell restriction and ordered him to return to his cell. Id. Defendant Killinger and Defendant Field issued Plaintiff a misconduct, and Plaintiff received thirty (30) days segregation. Id. Plaintiff's claim is not clear. Plaintiff has not alleged enough facts for me to make a determination whether his constitutional rights were violated. Thus, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Field fails and should be dismissed.
32. Defendant Mayers
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mayers conducted a pat-down search on Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 88. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mayers became upset when he discovered Plaintiff had not emptied his pockets prior to the search. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mayers became aggressive and threatened Plaintiff, telling him he would slam him into the floor and issue him a misconduct if it ever happened again. Id. Defendant Mayers also said, "Try me next time and you will learn who I really I'm (sic)." Id. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Mayers fails because mere threats are not sufficient to bring a constitutional claim. Lewis, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 698. To state a constitutional claim, the verbal threats must be accompanied by some reinforcing act that "escalated the threat beyond mere words." Id. Plaintiff has not done so. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Mayers fails and should be dismissed.
33. Defendant Magee
Plaintiff alleges on December 25, 2016, Defendant Magee and Defendant Ranch did not permit Plaintiff to leave his cell for dinner meal time. (Doc. 27, ¶ 78). Plaintiff also alleges that he was not permitted to file a grievance related to this incident. I concluded above that deprivation of one meal is not sufficient to establish a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Magee denied him a meal on one occasion. Further, as concluded above, Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights regarding a grievance, because there is not a constitutional right to grievance procedures. Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Magee fails and should be dismissed.
34. Defendant Taylor
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Taylor, Defendant Kauffman, Defendant Henry, Defendant Grove, Defendant Runk, Defendant Ruiz, and other prison staff denied him use of his property and heightened the restrictions on Plaintiff - citing Plaintiff's threatening behavior towards staff. Id. at ¶ 65. Plaintiff does not provide further details regarding this incident. Without more, I cannot determine whether Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated during this incident.
Plaintiff also alleges that on two occasions, Defendant Taylor and Defendant Wyles approached Plaintiff's cell with Plaintiff's legal documents and photocopies of legal documents but refused to give them to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 73. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants denied him access to the court. Id. As stated above, "[t]o establish a cognizable access to courts claim, a complainant must demonstrate that: (1) he suffered an 'actual injury' (i.e., that he lost an opportunity to pursue a nonfrivolous claim); and (2) he has no other remedy, save the present civil rights suit that can possibly compensate for the lost claim." Williams, 449 F. App'x at 89 (citing Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205. Plaintiff does not allege he suffered some adverse decision in a non-frivolous case he was litigating as a result of not having those legal documents. Because Plaintiff has not alleged actual injury, his claim fails. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Taylor fail and should be dismissed.
Plaintiff asserts an identical claim against Defendant Wyles. (Doc. 27, ¶ 73). For the same reason, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Wyles fails and should not survive Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
35. Defendant Runk
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Runk, Defendant Henry, Defendant Kauffman, Defendant Grove, Defendant Ruiz, Defendant Taylor, and other prison staff denied him of his property and heightened the restrictions on Plaintiff - citing Plaintiff's threatening behavior towards staff. Id. at ¶ 65. As stated above, I cannot determine whether Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated during this incident without more facts regarding the incident.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Runk, Defendant Douglas, and Defendant Parks watched Defendant Horton refuse to sign Plaintiff's library pass. Id. at ¶ 76. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Horton became aggressive and threatening, telling Plaintiff, "I don't give a fuck about your legal deadline." Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Runk failed to intervene in the situation by stating that he had nothing to do with the situation. Id. As stated above, to state a valid § 1983 claim for failure to intervene, a plaintiff must show that an officer had a reasonable opportunity to intervene in the face of a constitutional violation and he simply refused to do so. Smith, 293 F.3d at 650. Based on Plaintiff's allegations, I cannot conclude that Defendant Runk faced a constitutional violation. As stated above, Defendant Horton did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights when he did not allow Plaintiff to go to the law library. Thus, Plaintiff's failure to intervene claim against Defendant Runk fails. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Runk fail and should be dismissed.
36. Defendant Parks
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Parks, Defendant Douglas, and Defendant Runk watched Defendant Horton refuse to sign Plaintiff's library pass. (Doc. 27, ¶ 76). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Horton became aggressive and threatening, telling Plaintiff, "I don't give a fuck about your legal deadline." Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Parks failed to intervene in the situation by stating that he had nothing to do with the situation. Id. Based on Plaintiff's allegations, I cannot conclude that Defendant Parks faced a constitutional violation. As stated above, Defendant Horton did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights when he did not allow Plaintiff to go to the law library. Thus, Plaintiff's failure to intervene claim against Defendant Parks fails and should be dismissed.
37. Defendant Morningstar
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Morningstar, a correctional unit manager, while reviewing a misconduct, refused to review video surveillance or dismiss the misconduct. (Doc. 27, ¶ 83). This misconduct was related to the incident where Defendant Matula accused Plaintiff of stealing food and ordered him to throw away his meal. Id. After reviewing the misconduct, Defendant Morningstar ordered Plaintiff to pay for the meal and gave him a warning. Id. Plaintiff appealed the decision and the misconduct was dismissed. Id. Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Morningstar improperly handled the misconduct. However, based on Plaintiff's allegations, the issue with the misconduct was resolved - the misconduct was ultimately dismissed. Plaintiff does not allege any injury arising from this misconduct. Thus, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Morningstar fails.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Morningstar, Defendant Kline, Defendant Wrentz, Defendant Douglas, and other prison staff denied him access to the showers on January 27, 2017. Id. at ¶ 84. However, based on his allegations, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights were not violated, because the Eighth Amendment does not require that inmates receive frequent showers. Davenport, 844 F.2d at 1316; Veteto, 829 F.Supp. at 1496. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Morningstar denied him access to the showers for an extended period of time. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Morningstar fail and should be dismissed.
38. Defendant Ellenberger
Plaintiff alleges that
[Defendant Ellenberger] was never hire (sic) by the civil service commission as hearing examiner. He has resided (sic) over several misconduct hearings against [Plaintiff] as hearing examiner (HEX). The civil service act 71 P.S. § 741.206 provides that the executive director for the civil service commission has the power to appoint and assign all hearing examiner for the department of corrections. He has committed perjury against [Plaintiff], violated my due process, retaliate (sic) against [Plaintiff], imposed false imprisonment on [Plaintiff], subjected [Plaintiff] to cruel and unusual punishment and violated 71 P.S. § 741.206, 71 P.S. § 61(a), 2 Pa.C.S. § 5105(a)(2), 37 P.S. §93.10 and 2 Pa.C.S. 504, and as also stated in Mason v. Pa. Dept. of Corr., 886 A.2d 724 2005 Pa. Comm. LEXIS 694 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 2005).(Doc. 27, ¶ 93).
Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Ellenberger should not be presiding over misconduct hearings but does not provide reasoning for this argument except to say that he was not "hired" by the Civil Service Commission. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Ellenberger is not a hearing examiner but provides no facts to support this claim. Id. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ellenberger violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights and numerous statutes. However, Plaintiff does not provide any facts to support this claim or allege any injury arising from said violations. Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead a claim against Defendant Ellenberger. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Ellenberger fail and should be dismissed.
39. Plaintiff's Retaliation Claims Against Defendant Murphy, Defendant Ellengerger, Defendant Byers, and Defendant Martz
Although Plaintiff frames his claims as being retaliation claims, most of Plaintiff's claims are solely claims of constitutional violations. I addressed those claims appropriately. However, Plaintiff does allege four instances of retaliation by Defendants related to Plaintiff's grievances. I will address these retaliation claims together.
Retaliating against a prisoner for the exercise of his constitutional rights is unconstitutional." Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 376 (3d Cir. 2012). Retaliation claims are judged against exacting legal standards. "To state a claim for retaliation, a prisoner must allege that: (1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) 'he suffered some "adverse action" at the hands of prison officials,' and (3) 'his constitutionally protected conduct was "a substantial or motivating factor" in the decision' to take that action." Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)).
"Once a prisoner has made his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [he or she] 'would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to penological interest.'" Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334). Prison officials may prevail by proving that they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334.
Plaintiff alleges four specific instances where Defendants made derogatory statements regarding Plaintiff's grievances:
1. On August 10 or 11, 2015 at about 6 p.m., D. V. Murphy came to my cell door (RHU-KA2-32) and said, "I know you wasn't going to be hard to bring back, we will deal with you Mr. jailhouse lawyer. After we are done, you will never forget SCI-Smithfield." I was standing at my cell door when he came over, I said nothing in response and he walked away with a smirk on his face. (Doc. 27, ¶ 72).
2. While I was at the misconduct (B908183) hearing, S. Ellengerger threaten to put me on segregation if J. McConaughey rewrites the misconduct (misconduct #B908183 was dismissed without prejudice and eventually rewritten (as #B908176)) or if I was to ever see him again for any misconduct report. He then became provocative by saying, "I cannot understand your writing, and tell me your version because you don' know how to read or write. I see you playing federal court games so have your stuff packed the next
time you come before me. You're refusing to participate in the [unwritten D.O.C. policy] pilot programme (sic), you going to learn your lesion (sic) in 2022 when we max you out." Id. at ¶ 82.
3. After being release from segregation, I was remove (sic) from I-Block and place on A-Block. On March 12, 2017 while locked in my cell (AA-32), A. Byers came to my door requesting to talk to me and I informed him that I had no interest in talking to him (due to the fact that he had told me to lock in when I requested to access my cell during the 5 minutes on the door movement). He then said that he heard a lot about me, my lawsuit, grievances, the bullshit I did on I-Block, throughout the prison with employees, that A-Block was where they put inmates like me, that I should get along or get deal with, that next time he will not come talk to me about anything but issue me a misconduct and get me treated like a kid. He also said, "Your grievance means nothing like all the other grievances," when I told him that I was going to grievance him for what he said and did. Id. at ¶ 87.
4. On March 18, 2017 at about 7 p.m. during 5 minutes on the doors, J. Martz passed all other inmates that were at other cells door came directly to me and demanded that I step away from around the door. While I was leaving, I asked him why only me and no one else at other cell doors and he said, "I don't care about they are doing, they don't file paperworks (sic) against us like you and I'm ordering you for the last time to get away from around this cell door." I walked away and then realize that I was being targeted and retaliated against for exercising my constitutional protected right against SCI-Smithfield employees. Id. at ¶ 90.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants commented to him or threatened him because he filed grievances. However, mere words are not sufficient. "Mere threatening language and gestures of a custodial officer do not, even if true, amount to constitutional violations." Lewis, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 698. To state a constitutional claim, the verbal threats must be accompanied by some reinforcing act that "escalated the threat beyond mere words." Id. at 698. Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the threats were fulfilled. Without actual conduct arising from these threats, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a claim for retaliation.
Further, Plaintiff does not allege a causal connection between the filing of any particular grievance and any specific adverse action by Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that he had filed grievances during his time as a prisoner. Plaintiff also alleges that he had a difficult relationship with prison staff. The mere existence of both is not sufficient to establish a connection. Plaintiff has the burden to prove such a connection. Plaintiff has not done so. Plaintiff's claims for retaliation fail and should be dismissed.
40. Named Defendants Without Claims Alleged Against Them: Crum, Nickum, Fortson, Ersek, Farabaugh, Gladfelter, Park, and Rentz
Plaintiff included the following as defendants: Crum, Nickum, Fortson, Ersek, Farabaugh, Gladfelter, Park and Rentz. However, Plaintiff does not mention any of these defendants in his Amended Complaint. Plaintiff's claims against these defendants should be dismissed, and these defendants should be terminated from the case.
41. Factual Allegations Without Identified Defendants
Plaintiff includes one claim where he merely provides facts without identifying any Defendants. Despite failing to identify the parties involved in the allegations, I will weigh the merits of the claim.
Plaintiff alleges that after being placed in segregation, prison staff did not provide Plaintiff with "basic issue items. (Doc. 27, ¶ 69). Plaintiff did not receive a new toothbrush, toothpaste, or a garbage bag. Id. I construe Plaintiff's claim to be a conditions of confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual living conditions. As stated above, at a minimum, correctional institutions must provide inmates with "adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety." Young, 960 at 364. However, only extreme deprivations are sufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Dockery, 509 Fed.Appx. at 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Plaintiff has not alleged an extreme deprivation. Thus, his claim fails and should be dismissed.
B. POULIS ANALYSIS
Plaintiff has failed to respond to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, thus requiring a Poulis analysis. In this case, a dispassionate assessment of the Poulis factors weighs in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint.
Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984).
Consideration of the first factor, the extent of the party's personal responsibility, shows that the delays in this case are entirely attributable to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has failed to abide by court orders and neglected to litigate this case. Throughout the litigation of this case, Plaintiff has consistently been unresponsive and has missed multiple briefing deadlines. Plaintiff failed to file a brief in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. For these reasons, the first Poulis factor, the party's personal responsibility, weighs in favor of dismissal.
The second Poulis factor, the prejudice to the adversary caused by Plaintiff's failure to prosecute, weighs in favor of dismissal in this case. Plaintiff has failed to respond to two court orders directing him to respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff's actions have created an unnecessary stalemate. Plaintiff's failure to litigate his claims or comply with court orders now wholly frustrates and delays the resolution of this action. Accordingly, I find that the second Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
The third Poulis factor, the history of dilatoriness on the plaintiff's part, cuts in favor of dismissal. Plaintiff has failed to participate in this litigation after filing his Complaint. Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Even after I issued orders directing Plaintiff to file responsive pleadings, Plaintiff has not participated in this litigation. Plaintiff's apparent abandonment of his claims, coupled with his failure to submit a brief in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, weighs in favor of dismissal.
The fourth Poulis factor, whether Plaintiff's conduct was willful or in bad faith cuts against Plaintiff. In this setting, the Court must assess whether Plaintiff's failure to prosecute reflects mere inadvertence or willful conduct, in that it involved "strategic," "intentional or self-serving behavior," and not mere negligence. Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps. Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 875-76 (3d Cir. 1994). At this juncture, when a plaintiff fails to comply with instructions of the Court directing him to take specific actions in the case, the Court is compelled to conclude that the plaintiff's actions are not accidental or inadvertent but instead reflect an intentional disregard for this case and the Court's instructions. I cannot say whether the repeated delays were "strategic," however it appears Plaintiff's behavior was "intentional and self-serving." Therefore, the fourth factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
The fifth Poulis factor, the effectiveness of lesser sanctions, weighs in favor of dismissal. Cases construing Poulis agree that in a situation such as this case, where we are confronted by a pro se litigant who will not comply with the rules or court orders, lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative. See e.g., Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262-63; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. Here, Plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability of the court to utilize other lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion. I have endeavored to use lesser sanctions by entering our prior orders and counseling Plaintiff on his obligations in the case, to no avail. As such, I find that a lesser sanction would be ineffective in this case.
Finally, under Poulis, the Court is cautioned to consider one other factor: the meritoriousness of Plaintiff's claims or defenses. Generally, in determining whether a plaintiff's claims are meritorious, we use the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70. "A claim, or defense, will be deemed meritorious when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff or would constitute a complete defense." Id.
As stated above, Plaintiff's claims fail on the merits. Thus, the Poulis factors all weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff's claims.
V. LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff should not be given leave to amend his Amended Complaint because it would be futile. "District courts are to offer amendment in pro se civil rights cases unless doing so would be 'inequitable or futile.'" Flynn v. Dep't of Corr., 739 Fed. Appx. 132, 1365 (2018) (quoting Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007)). Plaintiff's Original Complaint was screened, and the deficiencies of his claims were identified. Plaintiff was given leave to amend, but the deficiencies of his claims still remain. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a viable civil rights claim. Thus, granting Plaintiff leave to amend would be futile. Thus, I recommend that Plaintiff not be granted leave to amend his Amended Complaint.
VI. RECOMMENDATION For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 54) be GRANTED as Plaintiff fails to state claims upon which relief may be granted against Defendants; and,Date: January 24, 2020
(2) Plaintiff should not be granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint; or,
(3) In the alternative, Plaintiff's claim be DISMISSED for failure to prosecute his claims pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(4) The Clerk of Court close the case.
BY THE COURT
S/William I. Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3 which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.Date: January 24, 2020
BY THE COURT
s/William I. Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge