Opinion
NNHCV156055621
11-04-2015
Masonicare Health Center v. Heidi Glatzel et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Filed Date November 6, 2015
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Jon M. Alander, Judge of the Superior Court.
The defendants Heidi Glatzel and Susan Glatzel are the co-fiduciaries of the estate of Erna Glatzel. The plaintiff, which is a licensed nursing home, has filed this action seeking payment for services rendered to Erna Glatzel, when she was a resident of the nursing home prior to her death on March 5, 2014. The defendants have moved to dismiss this action claiming that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to the failure of the plaintiff to institute suit within one hundred twenty days of the rejection of the claim by the co-fiduciaries as required by General Statutes § 45a-363. The plaintiff contends that the one hundred twenty-day requirement of § 45a-363 is procedural, not jurisdictional, and, therefore, not properly the subject of a motion to dismiss.
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the pertinent facts are not disputed by the parties. On or about October 16, 2014, the defendant Susan Glatzel provided the plaintiff with notice to present a claim upon the estate. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff made such a claim. On or about October 22, 2014, the defendant Helen Glatzel denied the plaintiff's claim for failure to provide verification of its claim. The plaintiff filed this action in court on June 29, 2015.
The plaintiff renewed its claim on November 6, 2014 and provided supporting documentation for the claim. This fact is not relevant to the defendants' motion to dismiss as the plaintiff does not contend that the renewed claim provides the court with subject matter jurisdiction.
The parties agree that this suit was not commenced within one hundred twenty days from the date of the rejection of the plaintiff's claim. They disagree as to whether that failure deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. General Statutes § 45a-363(a) provides in relevant part: " No person who has presented a claim [to the fiduciary of an estate] shall be entitled to commence suit unless and until such claim has been rejected, in whole or in part, as provided in section 45a-360." Section (b) states that " Unless a person whose claim has been rejected (1) commences suit within one hundred twenty days from the date of the rejection of his claim, in whole or in part, or (2) files a timely application pursuant to section 45a-364, he shall be barred from asserting or recovering on such claim from the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent or any creditor or beneficiary of the estate, except for such part as has not been rejected." The defendants assert that the failure to commence suit within one hundred twenty days is jurisdictional and subjects this action to dismissal. The plaintiff contends that the one hundred twenty-day requirement is procedural because the plaintiff's right of action exists independently of the statute in which the limitation is found.
Both sides point to a split of authority among superior court judges on this issue. Compare DeBiase v. DeBiase, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 10-6005302 (July 14, 2010, Gilardi, J.) , and Northeast Savings, F.A. v Milazzo, 44 Conn.Supp. 477, 691 A.2d 603 (1996) (holding that the one-hundred-twenty-day limitation contained in § 45a-363 is simply a statute of limitations and therefore procedural) with Blewett v. Petrokubi, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 316163 (February 10, 1995, Hauser, J.), and Connecticut National Bank v. Estate of Copeland, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. 64114, (April 7, 1992, Austin, J.) (finding the time limitation of § 45a-363 to be a jurisdictional requisite, thus requiring dismissal for any failure to comply with the statute). Not surprisingly, each side suggests that the line of cases supporting its position contains the better reasoned decisions.
Our Supreme Court recently addressed the nature of § 45a-363. The issue in Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 46 A.3d 102 (2012) was whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a claim against an estate which was not yet ripe for adjudication. The plaintiffs asserted that the court had subject matter jurisdiction because § 45a-363 confers jurisdiction for claims brought pursuant to that statute, regardless of whether they are ripe. The Appellate Court found that § 45a-363 is " purely procedural in nature . . . [It] only sets a procedural limit on the time in which a party may pursue a cause of action stemming from a claim that was rejected by an estate; the statute does not independently create a cause of action or confer jurisdiction on the Superior Court . . ." Id., 529. The Supreme Court rejected the Appellate Court's interpretation of § 45a-363. It found that § 45a-363 confers jurisdiction on the Superior Court over complaints filed pursuant to that statute, premised on a claim, including an unripe claim, that has been rejected by the fiduciary of an estate. Id., 532-35. The Supreme Court's ruling that § 45a-363 confers subject matter jurisdiction on the Superior Court does not resolve the issue of whether the time bar contained in subsection (b) of that statute is itself jurisdictional, that is, that the failure to adhere to its time requirements deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Appellate Court did hold that the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss but on grounds of ripeness.
The decisions of the Superior Court which have held that the time restriction contained in § 45a-363 constitutes a statute of limitations have relied primarily on a statement in Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn. 530, 546, 29 A. 15 (1893) that the predecessor to § 45a-363, which similarly required suit to be brought by a creditor of an estate, against an administrator within four months after written notice of the disallowance of claim, was " simply a statute of limitations." See also Brown & Bros. v. Brown, 56 Conn. 249, 252, 14 A. 718 (1887) (the statute is " wholly a matter of defense"). The statements noted in both Grant and Brown & Bros., however, were dicta. The statutory predecessor to § 45a-363 was not in play in either case. Although dicta, the statements contained in these Supreme Court decisions are worth something. They inform us that justices who opined at a time much closer to the origin of the statute were of the mind that the statutory bar was intended as a statute of limitations.
The one appellate court which was directly confronted with the issue of whether the time limitation of a statutory predecessor to § 45a-363 was a condition precedent or a statute of limitations punted. In Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Kaminsky, 33 Conn.Supp. 512, 356 A.2d 909 (1976), the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant executrix for money due on two promissory notes which had been denied by the defendant. The defendant filed a demurrer asserting that the action was not filed within the four-month time limit of § 45-210, a predecessor to § 45a-363. The defendant asserted that the time limit was a condition precedent to filing suit while the plaintiff contended that the time restriction was a statute of limitations. The Appellate Session of the Superior Court upheld the trial court's granting of the demurrer but found it unnecessary to construe the time limit provision of § 45-210. Id., 514. It held that, in light of the manner in which the plaintiff framed its complaint, a demurrer was proper whether the statutory provision was a condition precedent or a statute of limitations. Id.
Our Supreme Court has set forth the standard to be used in deciding whether a statutory time limit is subject matter jurisdictional. In Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn. 258, 266-69, 777 A.2d 645, (2001), the court determined that the 180-day filing requirement for discrimination complaints under General Statutes § 46a-82(e) is not subject matter jurisdictional. In doing so, the court clarified the analysis to be used in making such a decision. " A conclusion that a time limit is subject matter jurisdictional has very serious and final consequences. It means that, except in very rare circumstances . . . a subject matter jurisdictional defect may not be waived . . . [and] may be raised at any time, even on appeal . . . and that subject matter jurisdiction, if lacking, may not be conferred by the parties, explicitly or implicitly . . . Therefore, we have stated many times that there is a presumption in favor of subject matter jurisdiction, and we require a strong showing of legislative intent that such a time limit is jurisdictional." (Citations omitted.) Id., 266. The Supreme Court recognized that in the past it had used inconsistent approaches in determining whether a time limitation is jurisdictional, one line of cases focusing " on whether the legislature intended the time limitation to be subject matter jurisdictional, and a second line of cases . . . focus[ing] on whether the statutory provision is mandatory or directory." Id., 267. The court, in Williams, concluded that a determination that a time limit is mandatory does not necessarily mean that it also is subject matter jurisdictional. Id., 269-70. " Although we acknowledge that mandatory language may be an indication that the legislature intended a time requirement to be jurisdictional, such language alone does not overcome the strong presumption of jurisdiction, nor does such language alone prove strong legislative intent to create a jurisdictional bar. In the absence of such a showing, mandatory time limitations must be complied with absent an equitable reason for excusing compliance, including waiver or consent by the parties. Such time limitations do not, however, implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the agency or the court." Id. Therefore, in deciding whether the filing requirement of § 45a-363(b) implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction, I need to determine whether the legislature, by setting the time limitation, intended to impose a subject matter jurisdictional requirement. See CHRO v. Savin Rock Condominium, 273 Conn. 373, 380, 870 A.2d 457 (2005).
" The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us to first consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mickey v. Mickey, 292 Conn. 597, 613-14, 974 A.2d 641 (2009). An examination of the text of the statute and its relationship to other statutes yields an ambiguous result. Accordingly, an examination of extratextual sources is appropriate. Stec v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 299 Conn. 346, 359, 10 A.3d 1 (2010).
The relevant text of § 45a-363(b) provides that " Unless a person whose claim has been rejected . . . commences suit within one hundred twenty days from the date of the rejection of his claim, in whole or in part, . . . he shall be barred from asserting or recovering on such claim from the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent or any creditor or beneficiary of the estate . . ." The statute uses strong language in imposing the one hundred twenty-day time limit; the failure to comply with the time limit will " bar" the claimant from asserting or recovering on such claim. The language itself does not however speak directly to the jurisdiction of the court. Rather, it refers to a ban on asserting or recovering on such claim from the fiduciary. The statute by its language appears to be intended to limit the right of a claimant and protect the right of a fiduciary and not to limit directly and absolutely the jurisdiction of the Superior Court over an appeal. Cf. Orcutt's Appeal From Probate, 61 Conn. 378, 384-85, 24 A. 276 (1891) (The court held that a statute requiring that all probate appeals, by persons not inhabitants of this state, who were not present when the decree was passed, and did not have legal notice to be present, be taken within twelve months after the passage of such decree, should be considered a statute of limitations as it " was intended primarily and principally to limit the right of the appellant and to protect the rights the appellee, and not to limit directly and absolutely the power of the probate court to allow an appeal after the time has passed or to affect the jurisdiction of the Superior Court over an appeal"). The view that § 45a-363 and its predecessors addresses the rights of the parties, not the jurisdiction of the court, is further supported by the case of Husted v. Hoyt, 12 Conn. 160 (1837). In that case, the court held that the statute gave the administrator the power to force a claimant to determine the validity of his claim by suit, but the exercise of this power is optional with the administrator, and, after notice of refusal to pay has been given, he may at his discretion, until the period of four months has expired, revoke the notice. Id., 164.
A search of the legislative history of § 45a-363 yields nothing regarding the intent of the legislature in enacting the one hundred twenty-day ban. Such a ban has been with us at least since 1817. Caulfield v. Green, 73 Conn. 321, 325, 47 A. 334 (1900). The precise intent of the legislature has been lost in the mists of time.
In light of the above, the defendants have failed to make the necessary " strong showing of legislative intent to create a time limitation that, in the event of noncompliance, acts as a subject matter jurisdictional bar." Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, 257 Conn. 267. As a result, the presumption in favor of jurisdiction holds. Id.
Not to be denied, the defendants have pleaded in the alternative should this court hold that the time restriction is not jurisdictional. They have also moved to strike the complaint on the grounds that the suit is barred by failure to meet the one hundred twenty-day requirement of § 45a-363.
The law governing the court's consideration of a motion to strike is well established. " The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff." (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) Novametrix Medical Systems v. BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 214, 618 A.2d 25 (1992). " It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." Suffield Devel. Assoc. L.P. v. National Loan Inv., 64 Conn.App. 192, 197, 779 A.2d 822 (2001). " The role of the trial court is to examine the complaint, construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the pleading party has stated a legally sufficient cause of action." Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Company, 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).
Although the parties agreed for purposes of the defendants' motion to dismiss that this suit was not commenced within one hundred twenty days of the defendants' rejection of the plaintiff's claim, the facts alleged in the complaint differ. The complaint alleges that, after the defendants rejected the initial claim of the plaintiff for lack of verification on October 22, 2014, the plaintiff resubmitted the claim with supporting documentation on November 6, 2014. The complaint alleges that the defendants subsequently rejected that claim as well. The complaint alleges no date for this purported rejection. The defendants assert that they in fact never responded to the refiled claim. For purposes of deciding the defendants' motion to strike, however, I am limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. Since the complaint on its face does not reveal whether this suit was commenced beyond the one hundred twenty-day time limit of § 45a-363, the defendants' motion to strike must fail. The defendant is free to file a motion for summary judgment raising their claim that the plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations contained in § 45a-363. See Girard v. Weiss, 43 Conn.App. 397, 416-17, 682 A.2d 1078 (1996).
In light of the above, the defendants' motions to dismiss and strike the plaintiff's complaint are hereby denied.