Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:19-1114
02-25-2020
LARRY J. MASON, Plaintiff, v. LAWRENCE J. O'TOOLE, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Larry J. Mason, is a state prisoner serving a life sentence on a conviction for first-degree murder. In his Complaint (ECF No. 4), he brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pertaining to the unsuccessful petition for collateral relief that he filed in June 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9541 et seq. For the reasons set forth below, it is respectfully recommended that this Court sua sponte dismiss the Complaint prior to service based upon the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is further recommended that leave to amend be denied as it would be futile for Plaintiff to amend his claims.
II. REPORT
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), courts are required to screen complaints when, among other things, a prisoner seeks redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. During the screening, the Court shall consider jurisdictional-related questions and should dismiss the case if it determines that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.").
The following background is from the facts alleged in the Complaint and attached Exhibits, as well as from information contained in the public record, of which the Court takes judicial notice. This includes: (1) the decisions issued by the Court of Appeals in Mason v. Kyler, 156 F. App'x 452 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Mason I") and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Mason, No. 190 WDA 2018, 2018 WL 4102790 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 2018) ("Mason II"); and (2) the dockets of Plaintiff's state-court criminal case before the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County at CP-02-CR-4826-1992 and his subsequent appeals to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania; the federal habeas case he filed with this Court in 2003 at 2:03-cv-712; and the related proceeding before the Court of Appeals at In re Mason, No. 15-2371.
Pennsylvania's state-court docket sheets are available to the public online at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us.
All further ECF citations are to the documents filed in the 2003 federal habeas case Plaintiff litigated in this Court at 2:03-cv-712.
A. Background
On January 5, 1994, after he was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Robert Moye, Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. Compl., ¶¶ 1, 18-20. Shaina Ballard-Murray (also known as Shaina Ballard or Shaina Murray) testified for the Commonwealth and identified Plaintiff as the shooter of Mr. Moye. Id., ¶¶ 2, 8, 19-20. The Honorable Lawrence J. O'Toole presided over Plaintiff's criminal case.
In Plaintiff's first PCRA petition, he raised several claims related to Ms. Ballard-Murray, including his contention that the Commonwealth violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) because it had suppressed evidence that she had been threatened prior to the trial by another Commonwealth witness. Compl., ¶ 2. In support, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit executed by Ms. Ballard-Murray on January 15, 2000. Id.; Compl., Ex. 1. Judge O'Toole denied Plaintiff's first PCRA petition and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed his decision. Id., ¶ 3.
In 2003, Plaintiff litigated a counseled habeas petition in this Court (civil action 2:03-cv-712) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He raised numerous grounds for relief, including the Brady claim pertaining to Ms. Ballard-Murray. Plaintiff relied upon the affidavit that Ms. Ballard-Murray had executed on January 15, 2000, as well as another affidavit that she executed on June 23, 2003. Compl., Ex. 2; ECF No. 25-1 at 11, 15-20; Mason I, 156 F. App'x at 454-57. This Court dismissed Plaintiff's habeas petition on November 20, 2003. ECF No. 19; ECF No. 25-1 at 7-26. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's petition in Mason I.
On May 22, 2012, Plaintiff, through counsel, filed a second PCRA petition in which he again raised claims for relief based upon Ms. Ballard-Murray's June 23, 2003 affidavit. Compl., ¶ 4. The PCRA has a one-year statute of limitations, which is codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9545(b) and is discussed in more detail below. Judge O'Toole dismissed Plaintiff's second PCRA petition on the grounds that it was untimely. The Superior Court affirmed his decision and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied a petition for allowance of appeal. Compl., ¶ 4.
Next, Plaintiff filed with this Court in his closed habeas case at 2:03-cv-712 a counseled motion he purported to bring under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 25. Plaintiff asserted that he was innocent and relied upon Ms. Ballard-Murray's two affidavits, as well as affidavits executed by other individuals. This Court transferred Plaintiff's motion to the Court of Appeals because it was a second or successive habeas petition. ECF No. 26.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), mandates that before a state prisoner can litigate a second or successive federal habeas petition with the district court, he or she must first obtain authorization from the appropriate court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). AEDPA's allocation of "gatekeeping" responsibilities to the courts of appeals has divested district courts of jurisdiction over habeas applications that are second or successive. See, e.g., Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007).
The Court of Appeals denied Plaintiff's request for leave to file a second or successive federal habeas petition. See Order, In re: Larry Mason, No. 15-2371 (3d Cir. Aug. 27, 2015). It held that he failed to satisfied AEDPA's criteria, which, in relevant part, requires that he make a prima facie showing that "(i) the factual predicates for [his] claim[s] could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim[s], if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of guilty" of first-degree murder. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). See also id., § 2244(b)(3)(C). The Court of Appeals further held that to the extent Plaintiff's claims were merely a variation of the ones he presented in his 2003 federal habeas petition, they were subject to dismissal pursuant to § 2244(b)(1), which provides that "[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed."
Approximately two years later, on June 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed, pro se, his fourth PCRA petition. Compl., ¶ 6; Compl. Ex. 4. He raised claims of actual innocence and of police and prosecutorial misconduct, including that the Commonwealth committed Brady violations and introduced perjured testimony at his trial. Id. In support of these claims, Plaintiff relied upon an investigator's notes from an interview conducted of Ms. Ballard-Murray on April 17, 2017, and a witness statement executed by her on April 22, 2017, which she supplemented on June 28, 2017. Id., ¶¶ 6, 8, 22-23; Compl., Exs. 3, 4.
In 2016, Plaintiff filed a third PCRA petition which was subsequently denied. Compl., ¶ 5. It is not relevant to this case.
As set forth above, the PCRA has a one-year statute of limitations. It is jurisdictional, Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014), and it provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]
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(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), (b)(2).
Effective December 24, 2018, § 9545(b)(2) was amended to allow a one-year period for filing a PCRA petition under one of the exceptions set forth at § 9545(b)(1).
Judge O'Toole dismissed Plaintiff's petition on the grounds that it was untimely under the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations. Compl., ¶ 7. He rejected Plaintiff's argument that his claims were timely filed under § 9545(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(2) because they were based upon newly-discovered evidence and were raised within the required 60-day time period. Id., ¶ 7, 27-28. The Superior Court affirmed Judge O'Toole's decision in Mason II and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Plaintiff's petition for allowance of appeal on July 3, 2019. Id., ¶ 7.
Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced this action in which he brings civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He named as defendants Judge O'Toole and the attorneys who represented the Commonwealth in his PCRA proceeding—District Attorney Stephen A. Zappala, Jr. and Assistant District Attorneys Amy Elizabeth Constantine and Michael Wayne Streily. Plaintiff has sued each Defendant in his or her official and individual capacities.
Plaintiff brings two claims against the Defendants. He asserts that they have violated his First Amendment right to access the court, id., ¶¶ 31-34, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law, because they have precluded him from receiving a hearing and a decision on the merits on his PCRA claims. Id., ¶¶ 35-42. He seeks declaratory relief, a permanent injunction "enjoining Defendants from interfering and denying [him] access to the Courts and a hearing to be heard on his claims[,]" as well as "[a]ny other relief this Court deems appropriate." Id. at 13-14.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff challenges the application of the PCRA's statute of limitations to his claims. According to Plaintiff, the claims that were raised in his fourth PCRA petition were timely filed under § 9545(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(2) but Defendants refused to acknowledge that fact and follow the law. Compl., ¶¶ 7, 9, 27-28. Defendants' failure to follow the applicable state law has harmed him, Plaintiff asserts, because it has prevented him from litigating on the merits his claims based upon his alleged newly-discovered evidence pertaining to Ms. Ballard-Murray and obtain collateral relief under the PCRA. Compl., ¶¶ 28-29, 33, 39-41.
B. Discussion
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts are barred from exercising jurisdiction "over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments." Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 165. The doctrine is narrow in scope. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). See also Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532-33 (2011). For it to apply, four requirements must be met: "(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff 'complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments'; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments." Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284).
"The doctrine takes its name from the only two cases in which the Supreme Court has applied it to defeat federal subject-matter jurisdiction: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)." Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2010).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply in the federal habeas context because Congress has expressly authorized federal district courts to review state prisoners' habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 292 n.8. Plaintiff can litigate a second or successive federal habeas petition in this Court only if he first receives authorization from the Court of Appeals in accordance with AEDPA's provisions codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). --------
Plaintiff lost in state court. Judge O'Toole dismissed his fourth PCRA petition as untimely, the Superior Court affirmed this decision, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied a petition for allowance of appeal. All of these events occurred before Plaintiff filed his Complaint with this Court. Therefore, the first and third requirements are met.
The Court of Appeals has instructed that the second requirement, that the plaintiff is complaining of injuries caused by the state-court judgments, "may also be thought of an inquiry into the source of the plaintiff's injury." Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 166 (citations omitted). "[W]hen the source of the injury is the defendant's actions (and not the state court judgments), the federal suit is independent, even if it asks the federal court to deny a legal conclusion reached by the state court[.]" Id. at 167. "The critical task is thus to identify those federal suits that profess to complain of injury produced by a state-court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it." Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted). "A useful guidepost is the timing of the injury, that is, whether the injury complained of in federal court existed prior to the state-court proceeding and thus could not have been caused by those proceedings." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Here, the source of Plaintiff's injury is the state court judgments that his claims based upon the alleged newly-discovered evidence pertaining to Ms. Ballard-Murray are time-barred under the PCRA. It is those judgments that prevented him from receiving merits review of his PCRA claims, and it is his inability to receive that review that caused the harm of which he complains in the Complaint. Therefore, the second requirement is present.
The fourth and final requirement—that the plaintiff is inviting review and rejection of the state court judgments—"is closely related" to the second requirement. Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d. at 168. "A subsequent federal claim constitutes '[p]rohibited appellate review' only when it 'consists of a review...to determine whether [the lower tribunal] reached its result in accordance with law,' or when the federal plaintiff seeks 'to have the state-court decisions undone or declared null and void[.]'" Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 360 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 169, 173) (altered text added by Court of Appeals). Each claim Plaintiff raises in his Complaint is premised upon his allegation that the state courts erred in deciding that the claims he raised in his fourth PCRA petition were time- barred, and the relief Plaintiff seeks in this Court would effectively overrule or void the state courts' judgments. Therefore, the fourth requirement is met.
Based upon the forgoing, all four requirements for the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are met in this action. Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claims Plaintiff raised in the Complaint and the Court should dismiss it for that reason. Alvarez v. Attorney General for Fla., 679 F.3d 1257, 1262-65 (11th Cir. 2012) (Rooker-Feldman barred prisoner's "as applied" constitutional challenge to state court's application of state procedures denying him access to physical evidence for DNA testing); Pittman v. Pennsylvania General Assembly, 642 F. App'x 87, 89 (3d Cir. 2016) ("to the extent [the plaintiff] challenges the state court rulings that his successive petitions were untimely under the PCRA, his claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine."); Benchoff v. Fogal, 576 F. App'x 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2014) (Rooker-Feldman barred prisoner's civil rights claims against common pleas court judge and district attorney that were premised upon his challenge to the state court's application of the PCRA court's statute of limitations).
"Dismissal on the basis of Rooker-Feldman is recognized as a situation where amendment of the plaintiff's complaint would be futile." Wagner v. Dist. Attorney of Allegheny Cnty., No. 2:11-cv-762, 2012 WL 2090093, *5 n.2 (W.D. Pa. May 21, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by, 2012 WL 2089799 (W.D. Pa. June 8, 2012). Thus, the Court should not provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to amend the Complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
It is respectfully recommended that this Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint without leave to amend. Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, Plaintiff is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).
/s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
United States Magistrate Judge Date: February 25, 2020