Opinion
No. 1D22-1871.
04-12-2023
Edith Knapp MASON, Appellant, v. Kevin Gregory MASON, Appellee.
Charles F. Beall, Jr. of Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant. Michael T. Webster of Michael T. Webster, P.A., Shalimar, for Appellee.
Charles F. Beall, Jr. of Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant.
Michael T. Webster of Michael T. Webster, P.A., Shalimar, for Appellee.
Kelsey, J.
This appeal involving unprecedented facts asks if Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540 always means what it says: that there is "no time limit" on motions seeking relief from fraud committed in a family law financial affidavit. The facts presented test the reach of the rule, because these fraud allegations were not asserted until eleven years after the final judgment of dissolution (now entering year fourteen due to the litigation and appeal times). Nevertheless, the rule says "no time limit," and does not recognize any exceptions. We find no contrary controlling authority. We therefore reverse the final order dismissing Appellant/Former Wife's motion for relief from judgment, and remand for further proceedings on her motion. However, in light of the potentially far-reaching implications of allowing such an unprecedented but facially permissible delay in other cases, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court this question of great public importance:
DOES THE "NO TIME LIMIT" PROVISION OF FLORIDA FAMILY LAW RULE OF PROCEDURE 12.540(b) ALLOW A DELAY OF UP TO TEN YEARS AFTER FINAL JUDGMENT OF DISSOLUTION FOR FILING A MOTION BASED ON A FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT?
* * *
Rule 12.540: Text and Precedent.
Rule 12.540 is entitled "Relief From Judgment or Orders," and the title of the relevant sub-section is "Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud; etc." Here is the relevant text:
(b) ... On motion and on such terms as are just, the Court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
....
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
....
The motion must be filed within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than 1 year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken; except that there will be no time limit for motions based on
fraudulent financial affidavits in marital or paternity cases.
Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540(b) (emphasis added).
The "no time limit" part of what is now rule 12.540(b) has existed in Florida's procedural rules and applied to family law cases since January 1993. In re Amends. To The Fla. Rules of Civ. Pro., 604 So.2d 1110, 1111, 1170 (Fla. 1992). In 1992, the Florida Supreme Court approved the creation of family law rules separate from the general rules of civil procedure. In re Fla. Rules of Fam. Ct. Pro., 607 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1992). The court adopted those separate family law rules in 1995, effective at the beginning of 1996. See In re Fam. L. Rules of Proc. (In re Fam.II), 663 So.2d 1049 (Fla. 1995) (approving amended rules after public comment); In re Fam. L. Rules of Proc., 663 So.2d 1047, 1048-49 (Fla. 1995) (In re Fam. I) (original approval of rules pending public comment). The "no time limit" provision for family and marital law cases thus moved from the 1993 general civil procedure rules to the 1995 and subsequent family law rules, but its substance remained the same. See In re Fam. I, 663 So. 2d at 1081.
Multiple courts have recognized and applied the "no time limit" provision of rule 12.540(b). See Hess v. Hess, 290 So.3d 512, 518 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) ("The rule [12.540] contemplates the motion being filed after a final judgment giving a party relief from judgment."); Kohl v. D'Ambrosio, 232 So.3d 383, 2017 WL 4417730, at *1-2 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (unpublished table disposition) (explaining the rule "expressly provides" for no time limit for motions alleging fraudulent financial affidavits); Dyke v. Dyke, 837 So.2d 584, 586 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ("However, unlike rule 1.540, rule 12.540 provides that there is no time limit on actions seeking to set aside a judgment in a family case when the basis is alleged to be a fraudulent financial affidavit."); Landis v. Landis, 785 So.2d 599, 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (explaining wife alleged "a fraudulent financial affidavit that could have been properly entertained by the court" more than one year after final judgment —but her motion was conclusory); see also Bemenderfer v. Bemenderfer, 662 So.2d 747, 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (in case originating before recognition of the "no time limit" rule, explaining amendment creating no time limit did not apply retroactively, so wife could not seek relief based on a fraudulent financial affidavit fourteen years after dissolution).
We are required to interpret procedural rules according to their plain and ordinary meaning. See Brown v. State, 715 So.2d 241, 243 (Fla. 1998) ("Our courts have long recognized that the rules of construction applicable to statutes also apply to the construction of rules. Thus, when the language to be construed is unambiguous, it must be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning."); Falduto v. Lewis, 308 So.3d 667, 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (following Brown)).
Although several cases have acknowledged the "no time limit" provision of rule 12.540(b), there do not appear to be any cases involving a delay even remotely approaching eleven years. The trial court noted several shorter time frames ranging from two to sixteen months after entry of final judgment of dissolution. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 248 So.3d 271, 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (two months); Baker v. Baker, 394 So.2d 465, 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (nine months); Champion v. McDaniel, 740 So.2d 17,18 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (sixteen months).
Facts of This Case.
These parties married in 2002 and had two children. Late in 2009, unrepresented by counsel, they prepared their own dissolution documents. These included financial affidavits; a marital settlement agreement (MSA); and a waiver of mandatory disclosure for initial, supplemental, and permanent financial relief. Former Wife filed these documents in court on December 21, 2009, along with her petition for dissolution. The court entered a final judgment of dissolution in January of 2010, incorporating the MSA.
Eleven years later, in December of 2020, Former Wife (through counsel) filed a Rule-12.540(b) motion for relief from the MSA that had been incorporated in the 2010 final judgment of dissolution. She acknowledged her previous dissolution agreements and waivers. She nevertheless asserted Former Husband's financial affidavit "was intentionally false, misleading, and fraudulent because [he] intentionally failed to disclose or assign values to various marital assets, including, but not limited to," eight accounts and businesses. She filed an expert report detailing the alleged omissions and discrepancies. She asserted that Former Husband intentionally provided false, misleading, and fraudulent information in the dissolution proceeding; that he intended for her to rely on that information; that she was unaware that it was fraudulent; and that she did rely on it to her detriment. She also asserted that she was suffering from alcoholism and severe depression at the time of the dissolution, and that Former Husband knew her condition and took advantage of it to fraudulently induce her to execute the MSA. Finally, she asserted that she was impaired and intoxicated when she signed the MSA, and that Former Husband knew that as well.
Former Husband moved to dismiss Former Wife's 2020 motion for relief from judgment. He acknowledged the plain language of rule 12.540(b), but argued that the rule did not govern because it applied only to MSAs entered after litigation and discovery, pursuant to Macar v. Macar, 803 So.2d 707 (Fla. 2001). He argued that, because these parties entered into their MSA before litigation and discovery, Former Wife could challenge the MSA only upon showing more than a mere bad bargain or incomplete knowledge, as provided in Casto v. Casto, 508 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1987), which Former Wife failed to do. The trial court adopted Former Husband's argument and proposed order, and dismissed Former Wife's motion.
Former Wife timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(5). The appeal turns on questions of law, which we review de novo. See Brooks v. Brooks, 340 So.3d 543, 544-45 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (applying de novo review to court's dismissal of former husband's motion for relief from judgment as untimely, which was solely a question of law); Kohl, 2017 WL 4417730 at *2 (explaining denial of wife's 12.540 motion would be reviewed de novo because issue of timeliness was "one of pure law and interpretation of [procedural rules]").
Application of Rule 12.540(b).
The "no time limit" provision of rule 12.540(b) is clear and unambiguous. Nothing in the rule itself or in case law applying it creates exceptions for long delays between dissolution and invoking the rule. There is no statute of repose, no doctrine of laches, no reasonableness test on the delay, no requirement of due diligence, no "knew or should have known" inquiry, no question about what could have been raised earlier and when. Further, directly contrary to one of Former Husband's arguments and the trial court's ruling, we have held that the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine has been abolished in dissolution of marriage actions. Grant v. Wester, 679 So.2d 1301, 1305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). As much as this case illustrates the potential justification for adding a reasonableness limit to rule 12.540(b), the rule contains none, precedent recognizes none, and we are not at liberty to create one. Brown, 715 So. 2d at 243 (requiring courts to apply the plain meaning of procedural rules).
We reject the trial court's reliance on Former Husband's Casto and Macar argument. Neither of those cases addresses, let alone creates an exception to, the "no time limit" rule at issue. Casto was a postnuptial case that arose in 1978, years before the creation of the "no time limit" rule for fraud in marital cases. See Casto, 508 So. 2d at 332. The Casto parties entered a postnuptial agreement about a year before the husband filed for dissolution. Id. The wife alleged duress and overreaching. Id. The trial court ruled in favor of the wife, and the Fourth District affirmed. Id. at 332-33. The Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that a party to an MSA can challenge it in a subsequent dissolution proceeding on grounds of fraud, overreaching, and the like; or on grounds that it makes unfair or unreasonable provision for a spouse (though not on grounds of lack of competent counsel). Id. at 333-34. The "no time limit" issue presented here was not addressed in Casto because the "no time limit" provision did not yet exist.
Macar is equally inapposite. As to what Macar says about timing, we note that the Macar former wife's motion for relief from judgment was filed less than a year after entry of the final judgment of dissolution, as the Second District's opinion specifies. Macar v. Macar, 779 So.2d 479, 481, 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Hence, the rule-12.540(b) "no time limit" provision was not at issue.
On its merits, unlike the present case, the Macar couple filed for dissolution first and negotiated their MSA after extensive discovery and counseled adversary proceedings. Macar, 803 So. 2d at 709. The former wife challenged that MSA for alleged unfairness, duress, overreaching, and misrepresentation of assets. Id. at 709-10. The Florida Supreme Court refused to extend Casto relief to a spouse who had engaged in extensive litigation before entering an MSA, and thus noted the only relief would lie under rule 12.540. See id. at 710-14. Macar thus implied that relief would be available for appropriately alleged fraud. Here, we find Former Wife's allegations of fraud were sufficient to invoke rule 12.540(b). Neither Casto nor Macar creates an exception to rule 12.540(b).
Former Wife raises other arguments, as she did below, but because the trial court did not resolve them or they were not dispositive to the trial court's ruling, we decline to address them. She is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on remand.
REVERSED and REMANDED; QUESTION CERTIFIED.
B.L. Thomas and Nordby, JJ., concur.