Summary
In Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixon, 1951, 83 Ga. App. 172, 63 S.E.2d 272, 274, a police officer recently hospitalized following a heart attack was involved in an automobile chase of a hit-and-run driver.
Summary of this case from Grimes v. Goodlett and AdamsOpinion
33377.
DECIDED JANUARY 25, 1951.
Appeal; from Habersham Superior Court — Judge Frankum. October 2, 1950.
Kimzey Kimzey, for plaintiffs in error.
Kimzey Crawford, contra.
Where, as here, the evidence authorizes a finding that the immediate precipitating cause of the injury to an employee in a workmen's compensation case is overexertion within the regular course of his employment, the case is compensable, although the actual seizure from which the employee died did not incapacitate him until after he had finished his work at the end of the day.
DECIDED JANUARY 25, 1951.
This is a proceeding for workmen's compensation brought by Julia Dixon as the widow of Claud Dixon, who was at the time of his death Chief of Police of Cornelia, Georgia, against the City of Cornelia and its insurance carrier, Maryland Casualty Company. The case was first heard by a deputy director of the Board of Workmen's Compensation, and an award entered in favor of the claimant. This award was affirmed on appeal to the full board and on appeal to the Superior Court of Habersham County was again affirmed.
The evidence introduced at the hearing would have authorized the director hearing the case to find facts substantially as follows: that Claud Dixon was an employee of the City of Cornelia, and was covered by the terms of the workmen's compensation law; that he had been employed in the capacity of policeman since January, 1946; that prior to March 11, 1949, he had been in good health; that on that date he suffered a heart attack and was taken to the hospital where he remained for ten days; that on April 5, fifteen days before his death, he returned to work; that two or three days before his death the deceased and a witness set out in the police car to apprehend a hit-and-run driver; that they chased the car some distance from town and back into town but did not catch it; that during the chase and while he was driving the automobile, the deceased appeared highly nervous and excited; that his face became overflushed and his condition was reflected by the manner in which he was driving in that he nearly hit two or three automobiles; that afterwards he appeared completely exhausted; that he had appeared to be feeling fairly well until this time; that he then appeared tired and worn out and on leaving stated, "If I am feeling all right I will see you in the morning"; that he died at approximately 11:30 on Sunday night, having been on duty that day until 7:30. Medical testimony was offered that physical or emotional strain is likely to bring on a coronary occlusion, from which it was established that the employee died; that where the attack is not too severe the patient may be able to continue to live a fairly normal but inactive life since, although a part of the blood supply to the heart muscles is impaired, this may be re-established in part by collateral circulation from the remaining arteries feeding the heart, but that either physical exertion or mental strain would aggravate such a condition by increasing the supply of blood needed for the heart in its impaired condition. The attending physician testified that at the time the deceased was released from the hospital after the first heart attack he was instructed to go home and remain inactive, and that, in the witness's opinion, the return to work and the excitement of the automobile chase were indicated as precipitating factors in the second heart attack. It was also established that as chief of police the deceased was on duty and subject to call 24 hours a day, but that he was not actually performing any of the duties of his office at the time of his death.
To be compensable, the injury received by an employee must, under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act, be the result of an accident, either directly or as a contributing proximate cause, arising out of and in the course of the employment. Code, § 114-102; Ocean Accident Guarantee Corp. v. Farr, 180 Ga. 266, 270 ( 178 S.E. 728); Brown v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 49 Ga. App. 99 ( 174 S.E. 359). An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the condition of health. Williams v. Maryland Casualty Co., 67 Ga. App. 649 ( 21 S.E.2d 478); Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Sprayberry, 195 Ga. 393 (2) ( 24 S.E.2d 315). Where the employment contributes to the injury, it is an accident under the terms of the law, regardless of whether or not some other factors united with the employment to produce it. Fidelity Casualty Co. v. Adams, 70 Ga. App. 297 ( 28 S.E.2d 79). Nor must the accident suffered by one caused by external factors alone, such as a blow or other external violence, but a stroke, a ruptured blood vessel, or a heart attack may, under proper circumstances, be the subject-matter of compensation. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277 ( 9 S.E.2d 84); Griggs v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 61 Ga. App. 448 ( 6 S.E.2d 180); Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Alford, 51 Ga. App. 237 ( 179 S.E. 912); U.S. Casualty Co. v. Richardson, 75 Ga. App. 496 ( 43 S.E.2d 793). The fact that such an attack is made more likely or probable by a pre-existing weakened physical condition is not a ground for denying compensation, if there is sufficient competent evidence that it was traumatic rather than ideopathic in origin. Maddox v. Buice Transfer Storage Co., 81 Ga. App. 503 ( 59 S.E.2d 329). And, if the exertion of the employment was the immediate precipitating cause of the employee's death or disability, the mere fact that the attack itself was delayed somewhat, and occurred after the employee had left the premises of his employer, is not in itself sufficient reason for denying compensation. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Meeks, 81 Ga. App. 800 ( 60 S.E.2d 258).
It thus becomes a question of fact as to whether there is in the record evidence to support the finding of the director, either awarding or denying compensation, in cases involving strokes, seizures and fatalities of like kind. Where the duties of the employment call for a quantity and quality of exertion which actually contribute as an immediate precipitating factor to the injury in the physical condition of the employee's health, whatever it may have been, it is compensable, regardless of whether on or off the actual physical premises of the employer. Liberty Insurance Co. v. Meeks, supra. In most of the cases above cited the director found the evidence sufficient to establish this fact, and awarded compensation. In Maddox v. Buice Transfer Storage Co., supra, Merritt v. Continental Casualty Insurance Co., 65 Ga. App. 826 ( 16 S.E.2d 612), Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Woodward, 53 Ga. App. 778 ( 187 S.E. 142), and other cases, the director found the evidence insufficient to establish this fact, and this judgment was affirmed. In the present case, the director found for the claimant. The evidence upon which this award is based is sufficient to authorize the director to find that during the automobile chase in which the chief of police participated two days before his death he suffered a second heart attack; that this attack was a contributing concurrent proximate cause of his death; that the attack occurred while he was engaged in the performance of his duties and that it accordingly arose out of and in the course of his employment. The director was therefore authorized to find that this attack was an accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law.
The findings of fact of the director are supported by some evidence, and the judge of the superior court did not err in affirming the award allowing compensation to the claimant.
Judgment affirmed. MacIntyre, P.J., and Gardner, J., concur.