Opinion
Civil Action 19 Civ. 6928 (RA) (SLC)
09-01-2022
MOISES MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. DONALD UHLER, Superintendent, Upstate Correctional Facility, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SARAH L. CAVE, United States Magistrate Judge.
TO THE HONORABLE RONNIE ABRAMS, United States District Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 24, 2019, pro se Petitioner Moises Martinez (“Martinez”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the “Petition”), following his July 7, 2016 conviction, based on a guilty plea, in New York State Supreme Court, Bronx County, for Manslaughter in the First Degree. (See ECF Nos. 2, 13). Pursuant to his plea agreement, the state court sentenced Martinez to 20 years' imprisonment and five years of post-release supervision, and Martinez waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. (ECF Nos. 13 at 14:10-17; 15 at 10 n.3).
Martinez raises two claims in the Petition: (1) that his waiver of his right to appeal (the “Waiver”) was neither knowing nor voluntary, in violation of his Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) that the police violated the Fourth Amendment in obtaining certain evidence admitted against him at trial. (ECF No. 2 at 5-7). Martinez does not claim that his guilty plea was involuntary, but rather that he did not understand the difference between the rights forfeited by his plea agreement and the rights forfeited by the Waiver, rendering the Waiver involuntary. (Id. at 5-6). Respondent Donald Uhler, Superintendent of Upstate Correctional Facility, represented by the Bronx County District Attorney (the “DA”), argues that the Petition should be denied because: (1) Martinez voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived his right to appeal, and the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department (the “Appellate Division”) correctly applied Supreme Court precedent in affirming his conviction; and (2) Martinez's Fourth Amendment claim is unreviewable because he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it in state court. (ECF No. 15 at 12, 16).
For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that the Petition be DENIED in its entirety.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On July 21, 2013, three plainclothes New York City Police officers on patrol on Walton Avenue in the Bronx came upon a livery car parked on the sidewalk. (ECF No. 11 at 7:7-12, 159:59, 160:6-14, 246:19-25). Martinez was standing near the car, and the car's open trunk was facing an open door on the side of an apartment building. (Id. at 7:7-12, 160:6-14, 161:1-2, 246:1925). After being asked by the officers, in Spanish, why the car was on the sidewalk, Martinez gave shifting explanations, first saying that he was throwing out garbage because he was moving, then claiming that he was performing construction and removing debris. (Id. at 7:18-25, 161:2-8). The officers noted that Martinez appeared nervous, sweaty, and agitated. (Id. at 8:23-9:5, 9:1820, 105:1-9, 250:3-8). After the officers told Martinez to move his car and Martinez drove away from the building, the officers followed him, suspecting that a drug transaction was underway. (Id. at 10:2-11, 66:14-23, 105:1-9, 193:25-194:10, 250:9-251:8).
After driving around the neighborhood for approximately thirty minutes, Martinez returned to the apartment building where the officers had initially seen his car parked in front of a fire hydrant, and entered the building. (ECF No. 11 at 10:12-19, 164:21-165:7). Twenty minutes later, the officers went up to Martinez's door. (Id. at 165:20-166:2). The officers shined a flashlight through Martinez's mail slot, saw him approaching, and then knocked on the door. (Id. at 122:18-123:12). When Martinez opened the door, Officer Anderson Ortiz (“Ortiz”) made a waving motion, and Martinez came out onto the sidewalk. (Id. at 181:12-21).
The officers asked Martinez why his car was parked in front of the hydrant, and about his previous statements that he was moving or clearing construction debris. (ECF No. 11 at 14:4-6, 168:13-14). Martinez did not respond to the questions and continued to appear “extremely agitated and nervous.” (Id. at 14:12-16). The officers then asked Martinez if he was alone. (Id. at 14:21-22). Martinez first responded that he was alone, but then said that his wife was inside. (Id. at 14:22-24). The officers asked Martinez to call her, and Martinez told the officers that they could check to see that she was inside. (Id. at 15:9-13). Martinez then said, unprompted, “la ahorque, ” Spanish for “I choked her” or “I strangled her.” (Id. at 145:21-22, 168:13-19).
Two officers then entered the apartment to look for Martinez's wife, while one stayed outside with Martinez. (ECF No. 11 at 15:15-16:12). Initially, the officers believed that Martinez had committed an act of domestic violence and wanted to check on his wife's safety. (Id. at 15:16-19, 168:23-169:4). Once inside, Sergeant Miguel Sanchez (“Sanchez”) found a large garbage bin in one of the rooms, containing something wrapped up in blankets with a cord tied around the top. (Id. at 17:3-14, 26:12-19). When Sanchez looked inside the bin, he saw what appeared to be a piece of skin. (Id. at 17:21-23). After cutting the cord, Sanchez saw a limb fall out, and instructed Ortiz to handcuff Martinez. (Id. at 17:23-18:12). While being handcuffed, Martinez said, “la mate” to Ortiz, who testified he understood the statement to mean “I killed her.” (Id. at 171:5-12).
At the police station, Martinez made a written statement, in Spanish, to Detective Javier Fernandez (“Fernandez”), who translated the statement at the pretrial suppression hearing. (ECF No. 11 at 337:8-13, 345:6-9). Martinez wrote that he and his wife, Yajaira Reyes (“Reyes”), were experiencing marital difficulties. (Id. at 348:17-18). Reyes went to Martinez's apartment to discuss what would happen to their four children if they separated; Martinez apparently wanted all four to remain together in New York, while Reyes wanted two of the children to stay with her, and the other two to stay with her parents. (Id. at 346:11-17). An argument ensued, and Reyes went to push Martinez, but fell and began hitting her head on the floor. (Id. at 346:22-347:1). Martinez claimed that, to prevent her from hurting herself further, he placed his hands over her mouth. (Id. at 347:2-5). When questioned by Fernandez, Martinez admitted that he held his hands over Reyes's mouth for three to five minutes until he saw blood. (Id. at 334:24-25). After realizing that Reyes was nonresponsive, Martinez went out for a walk to clear his head, and on his return, she was still nonresponsive. (Id. at 335:1-5). Martinez told Fernandez that he took a shower, watched television, picked up and dropped off a passenger, and returned to his apartment to see that Reyes was still lying on the ground where he had left her. (Id. at 335:612).
B. Procedural History
1. The Indictment
On July 26, 2013, a Bronx County Grand Jury, in Indictment Number 2342/2013, indicted Martinez for Murder in the Second Degree, pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(1), and Manslaughter in the First Degree, pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1). (ECF No. 14 at 2).
2. Suppression hearings
On December 16, 18, and 22, 2014, and January 5, 2015, Justice Peter J. Benitez held hearings on Martinez's motions to suppress physical evidence found in his apartment, including Reyes's body, as well as the statements he made to the officers and his post-arrest videotaped statement to an Assistant District Attorney. (ECF No. 11 at 1, 85, 156, 288; ECF No. 14-4 at 1). The prosecution also introduced a video - without audio - of the interaction between the officers and Martinez outside his apartment. (ECF No. 14-4 at 1-2). Martinez argued that this evidence should be suppressed because: (1) there was no credible evidence to support the officers' suspicion of criminal activity; and (2) the officers fabricated testimony to assert constitutional grounds for entering the apartment. (ECF No. 14-4 at 3).
Justice Benitez denied Martinez's motions to suppress. (ECF No. 14-4 at 9). He found that the police officers' suspicion was reasonable, given that Martinez's “conduct, demeanor, and statements” were “all highly consistent with a drug transaction.” (Id. at 3). Justice Benitez also determined that the officers' testimony was credible, and that any minor discrepancies between their testimony and the police reports did not alter their credulity. (Id. at 5-6). Moreover, Justice Benitez explained that Martinez's consent to the officers' entry to speak to his wife “gave the police the right to enter,” and then his statement that “he had choked or strangled her gave the police broader authority under the emergency doctrine to enter the apartment” to search for her. (Id. at 8).
3. Plea proceedings
On June 13, 2016, before Justice Alvin Yearwood, Martinez pled guilty to Manslaughter in the First Degree pursuant to a plea agreement. (ECF No. 12 at 10:17-11:1). During the proceedings, James Culleton (“Culleton”) represented Martinez. (Id. at 1). Assistant District Attorney David Birnbaum (“Birnbaum”) confirmed that he gave Culleton a Spanish-language version of the Waiver prior to the hearing, which Culleton reviewed with Martinez. (Id. at 3:17). Martinez and Culleton signed the Waiver in open court. (Id. at 3:11-12). Before the allocution, Justice Yearwood asked Martinez several questions to ensure that his plea was knowing and voluntary. Among these questions, Justice Yearwood asked, “[Y]ou're also going to waive your right to appeal; is that correct?” to which Martinez replied in the affirmative. (Id. at 5:16-18). Following the allocution, but before accepting the plea, Justice Yearwood asked Martinez questions regarding his understanding of the Waiver:
At the start of the plea proceedings, defense counsel informed Justice Yearwood that there had been a disposition, and that Martinez had authorized him to withdraw his prior plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to one count of Manslaughter in the First Degree. (ECF No. 12 at 2:17-25).
An English translation of the Waiver appears at ECF No. 15 at 10 n.3.
[THE COURT:] This morning, did you sign a document entitled waiver of the right to appeal?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Did you discuss it with your attorney before signing it?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Did you understand what you were signing?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Did you sign it voluntarily?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: You understand that once the case is finished, you won't be able to take this case - once you're sentenced, you won't be able to take the case to a higher court seeking to raise errors or to change the agreement or to raise other issues?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions for me?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions for your attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Do you wish me to accept the plea?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.(ECF No. 12 at 9:1-10:9). Thereafter, Justice Yearwood accepted Martinez's guilty plea, finding it to be “knowing[], voluntary], and intelligent[]” and set the sentencing for July 7, 2016. (Id. at 10:11-23, 11:24-12:10).
4. Sentencing proceeding
On July 7, 2016, Justice Yearwood sentenced Martinez, pursuant to his plea agreement, to 20 years' imprisonment, followed by five years' supervised release. (ECF No. 13 at 1, 14:1017).
5. Direct appeal
In November 2017, Martinez appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division. (ECF No. 14-5). On appeal, Martinez argued that the Waiver was invalid because Justice Yearwood did not specify that it was distinct from the rights automatically waived with a guilty plea, and because he did not sufficiently confirm that Martinez understood the Waiver. (Id. at 21-24). Martinez also argued that Justice Benitez erred in denying his motions to suppress. (Id. at 24).
Martinez also raised the claim, not presented in his Petition, that his sentence was excessive. (ECF No. 14-5 at 35).
On May 22, 2018, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed Martinez's conviction, concluding that “Defendant made a valid waiver of his right to appeal.” People v. Martinez, 161 A.D.3d 593, 593 (1st Dep't 2018). The court explained that “[t]he oral colloquy, which avoided conflating the right to appeal with the rights forfeited by pleading guilty, met the minimum standards for such a colloquy .... Defendant also signed a written waiver, and the court confirmed that defendant understood the document and had discussed it with counsel.” Id. at 593-94 (citing People v. Bryant, 28 N.Y.3d 1094 (2016)). The court concluded that the valid Waiver precluded review of the suppression claims, and also held that Justice Benitez “properly denied” Martinez's suppression motion. Id. at 594.
On September 26, 2018, the New York Court of Appeals denied Martinez's request for leave to appeal. People v. Martinez, 32 N.Y.3d 1005 (2018). Martinez did not seek review by the United States Supreme Court. (ECF No. 2 at 3).
C. The Petition
Martinez's Petition raises two claims: (1) the Waiver was involuntary and unknowing; and (2) the physical evidence and his statements should have been suppressed because they were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (ECF No. 2 at 5-7).
On November 25, 2019, the DA submitted transcripts of the suppression, plea, and sentencing proceedings (ECF Nos. 11, 12, 13), and on November 26, 2019, the DA submitted a Declaration (ECF No. 14) and Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Petition (ECF No. 15) (the “Opposition”). The DA argues that the Petition should be denied because: (1) Martinez voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived his right to appeal, and the Appellate Division correctly applied Supreme Court precedent in affirming his conviction; and (2) Martinez's Fourth Amendment claim is unreviewable because he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it in state court. (ECF No. 15 at 12, 16).
ECF No. 11 contains the transcripts of all three proceedings. ECF Nos. 12 and 13 appear to be duplicative of the plea and sentencing proceedings, respectively. For purposes of discussion, the Court will reference ECF Nos. 12 and 13 for those proceedings.
On January 6, 2020, Martinez responded to the two counterarguments in the DA's Opposition (the “Reply”). (ECF No. 16). As to the validity of the Waiver, Martinez argued that he was not shown the Waiver until shortly before his appearance at the plea hearing, and did not fully understand what he was signing, because there was no interpreter present. (Id. ¶ 3). Martinez also claims that Justice Yearwood never explained which rights he was waiving and which rights he retained, and that his attorney erred in remaining silent and not “correcting” the court during the plea proceeding. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5). Martinez reiterated his claim that the evidence presented against him should have been suppressed because the police officers searching his apartment did not have a warrant or probable cause to enter. (Id. at 7).
The record indicates that Martinez's Waiver was written in Spanish, his native language. (ECF No. 12 at 3:3-5).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Legal Standards
1. Exhaustion
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal court may not consider a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a prisoner in state custody unless he has exhausted all state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see Jackson v. Conway, 763 F.3d 115, 133 (2d Cir. 2014). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have “fairly presented” his claims to the state courts, thereby affording those courts the opportunity to correct the alleged violations of federal rights. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). The exhaustion requirement is fulfilled once the federal claims have been presented to “the highest court of the state.” Galdamez v. Keane, 394 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted).
Here, Martinez raised both of the claims in his Petition on direct appeal to the Appellate Division and in seeking leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. Martinez, 32 N.Y.3d at 1005; Martinez, 161 A.D.3d at 593-94; see ECF No. 14-5. He has therefore exhausted his claims for the purposes of federal court review. See Galdamez, 394 F.3d at 74 (explaining that “one complete round” of New York's appellate review process involves appeal to Appellate Division and then application to Court of Appeals for certificate granting leave to appeal). The Petition is timely because it was filed on July 24, 2019, within one year of September 26, 2018, the date on which the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. Martinez, 32 N.Y.3d at 1005; ECF No. 2 at 1. The DA agrees that Martinez's claims are exhausted and timely. (ECF No. 15 at 12 n.5).
2. Standard of review
In a habeas proceeding, this Court must apply a “highly deferential” standard in reviewing a claim that the state court has adjudicated on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal citation omitted). A claim has been “adjudicated on the merits” when the state court ruled on the substance of the claim itself, “rather than on a procedural, or other, ground.” See Bell v. Miller, 500 F.3d 149, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2007); Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that “adjudicated on the merits” means “a decision finally resolving the parties' claims, with res judicata effect, that is based on the substance of the claim advanced, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground”).
A claim is not cognizable on habeas review if “a state-law default prevents the state court from reaching the merits of a federal claim.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). The state court must have “clearly and expressly state[d] that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989) (internal quotation omitted). A state court decision that invokes a procedural bar but then proceeds to address the merits of a claim can be reviewed in a federal habeas proceeding. See id. at 266 n.13.
Here, although the Appellate Division noted that a “valid waiver forecloses review” of Martinez's claims, it then considered and rejected Martinez's Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims on the merits. Martinez, 161 A.D.3d at 593-94. Therefore, this Court must adhere to the “limited” standard of review set forth in Section 2254(d). Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 92 (2011). Section 2254(d) permits, in relevant part, a court to grant a writ of habeas corpus on a claim that has been previously adjudicated on the merits by a state court only if the state adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
Under Section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law where the state court either applies a rule that contradicts Supreme Court precedent or confronts a case with materially similar facts to a Supreme Court case and arrives at a different result. See Rosario v. Ercole, 601 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2010). An “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law occurs when the state court identifies and applies the correct governing legal principle, but its application was “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000)). Under Section 2254(d)(2), the Court must consider the reasonableness of the decision in light of the evidence presented at the proceeding under review. See Cardoza v. Rock, 731 F.3d 169, 182 (2d Cir. 2013). The question under the AEDPA “is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable,” which is “a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).
Finally, under the AEDPA, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Nelson v. Walker, 121 F.3d 828, 833-34 (2d Cir. 1997). The petitioner must rebut this presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
3. Appeal waivers
There is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). Instead, "[t]he right of appeal, as we presently know it in criminal cases, is purely a creature of statute . . . .” Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977). Knowing and voluntary appeal waivers enjoy a presumption of enforceability. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“It is by now well established that a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal is generally enforceable.”). A habeas petitioner may, however, challenge “the validity of the process by which the waiver has been procured.” Frederick v. Warden, 308 F.3d 192, 195-96 (2d Cir. 2002).
In New York, the statutory provision setting forth the right to appeal appears at N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 450.10 (McKinney 1999).
A waiver of appeal is enforceable where “the record ‘clearly demonstrates' that the waiver was both knowing (in the sense that the defendant fully understood the potential consequences of his waiver) and voluntary.” United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted), superseded on other grounds as stated in United States v. Cook, 722 F.3d 477 (2d Cir. 2013); accord United States v. Arevalo, 628 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Castillo, 303 Fed.Appx. 989, 990 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order) (“At bottom, under Federal Law, a waiver of the right to appeal will be upheld if the record clearly demonstrates that he waiver was both knowing . . . and voluntary.” (internal citations omitted)).
This mirrors the standard for the validity of guilty pleas as articulated in United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), which states that pleas must be made voluntarily, “‘knowing[ly], intelligent[ly], [and] with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.'” Id. at 629 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).
In order to satisfy the “knowing” requirement for appeal waivers, a defendant must be aware of the full consequences of the waiver. See Polanco v. United States, No. 14 Civ. 1540 (TPG), 2015 WL 4887473, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2015) (citing Ready, 82 F.3d at 557). Trial judges are not required to use “‘any particular litany' when accepting a defendant's waiver of the right to appeal.” D'Onofrio v. Annucci, No. 16 Civ. 1740 (VB) (PED), 2018 WL 6251367, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2018) (quoting People v. Ludlow, 42 A.D.3d 941, 942 (4th Dep't 2007)), adopted by 2018 WL 6250660 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018). Waivers must delineate which rights are retained, including the ability to challenge the process leading to the plea and a sentence based on constitutionally impermissible factors. United States v. Chua, 349 F.Supp.3d 214, 218-20 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
4. Fourth Amendment claims
a) A valid guilty plea and waiver of appeal preclude Fourth Amendment analysis
The Supreme Court has ruled that a guilty plea “break[s] . . . the chain of events which . . . preceded it in the criminal process.” Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Thus, guilty pleas foreclose constitutional challenges to prior proceedings. Id. at 266 (“The focus of [a] federal habeas inquiry is the nature of the advice and the voluntariness of the plea, not the existence as such of an antecedent constitutional infirmity.”); see also Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (“A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction if factual guilt is validly established.”). Accordingly, when the petitioner has pled guilty, Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas review. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 320-21 (1983).
An exception to this rule exists “when state law permits a defendant to plead guilty without forfeiting his right to judicial review of specified constitutional issues, [such that] the defendant is not foreclosed from pursuing those constitutional claims in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.” Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 293 (1975). New York law falls within this exception, as it statutorily preserves the right to appeal a suppression decision even after a guilty plea. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.70(2) (McKinney 1970). Accordingly, a Fourth Amendment claim by a New York defendant is facially cognizable notwithstanding a guilty plea. Newsome, 420 U.S. at 293. Nevertheless, a petitioner may only bring such claims if he preserved the right to appeal. See Brisco v. Ercole, 565 F.3d 80, 87 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Sanchez v. Superintendent, No. 16 Civ. 0428 (KMK) (PED), 2018 WL 3040361, at *9 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018), adopted by 2018 WL 3038495 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2018). Thus, a Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable on habeas review if the petitioner has waived his right to appeal. See Pena v. Graham, No. 08 Civ. 3828 (SHS) (THK), 2009 WL 5173819, at *12-14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009) (“[U]nder New York law, if a plea agreement provides for a waiver of the right to appeal, and if the plea and waiver are made ‘knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently,' they may be enforced.”); see also Hernandez v. Superintendent, No. 17 Civ. 2457 (WHP) (AJP), 2018 WL 2059656, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2018) (“[A]ll arguments relating to events prior to [petitioner's] plea are barred by his guilty plea and appellate waiver.”).
b) Scope of habeas review of fully-litigated Fourth Amendment claims
Even absent a guilty plea, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review Fourth Amendment claims that were “full[y] and fair[ly]” litigated in state court. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976). The Court held in Stone that “where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Id. at 482; Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that this inquiry is meant to ensure that a petitioner has “the opportunity for full and fair litigation of . . . Fourth Amendment claim[s]” in state court); see also Capellan v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[A] petitioner cannot gain federal review of a [F]ourth [A]mendment claim simply because the federal court may have reached a different result.”). Habeas petitions that simply attempt to relitigate Fourth Amendment claims must thus be dismissed. Torres v. Irvin, 33 F.Supp.2d 257, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
The Second Circuit has carved out two exceptions where Fourth Amendment claims may be cognizable in habeas challenges to state convictions: “([1]) [I]f the state has provided no corrective procedures at all to redress the alleged [F]ourth [A]mendment violations; or ([2]) if the state has provided a corrective mechanism, but the defendant was precluded from using that mechanism because of an unconscionable breakdown in the underlying process.” Capellan, 975 F.2d at 70.
New York's corrective procedures to remedy Fourth Amendment violations have been deemed facially adequate to satisfy the first Capellan exception. Capellan, 975 F.2d at 70 n.1; see also Poole v. New York, No. 08 Civ. 6236 (RMB) (MHD), 2009 WL 3009356, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2009). With respect to the second, the fact that a state appellate court's decision was brief does not constitute an “unconscionable breakdown” warranting federal habeas review. See Capellan, 975 F.2d at 72 (finding that “summary affirmance” rather than a written decision is not an unconscionable breakdown). Rather, the second Capellan exception refers to extreme events reflecting “substantial failures in the process,” Poole, 2009 WL 3009356, at *6, including “ambush[ing the defendant] by the unanticipated and unforeseeable application of a state court procedural rule at a time when it can no longer be complied with,” Gomez v. LeFerve, No. 87 Civ. 2341 (MJL), 1989 WL 63030, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 1989) (internal citations omitted), bribing a judge, employing torture, or using perjured testimony. Poole, 2009 WL 3009356, at *6.
B. Analysis
1. Waiver of right to appeal
Martinez claims that his Waiver was unconstitutional because he did not realize it was separate from the rights forfeited by a guilty plea and because the trial court did not fully inquire into his understanding of the Waiver. (ECF No. 2 at 5-6). He argues that he did not understand the Waiver when he signed it, because there was no interpreter present for him. (ECF No. 16 ¶ 3). Finally, Martinez claims that the trial court's failure to specify which rights he was waiving and which he retained, and his counsel's failure to correct the court in this regard, render his Waiver invalid. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5).
The DA argues that Martinez's Waiver is valid, citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker for the proposition that the Appellate Division's decision rested on state procedural grounds and is thus unreviewable in a federal habeas action. (ECF No. 15 at 12-15). The DA, however, cites to the standard applicable to state decisions on the merits, in support of the argument that the Appellate Division's “conclusion that Petitioner validly waived his right to appeal was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of” Ylst. (Id. at 12).
In fact, Ylst precludes habeas review only if the Appellate Division rested its decision on a state procedural bar and did not reach the merits of the claim. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801. Here, the Appellate Division considered the merits of Martinez's Waiver claim, finding that the Waiver was valid because the oral colloquy “avoided conflating the right to appeal with the rights forfeited by pleading guilty,” and because the “court confirmed that [Martinez] understood the [written Waiver] and had discussed it with counsel.” Martinez, 161 A.D.3d at 593-94. Therefore, Ylst is inapplicable, and this Court must still determine whether the state court reached a decision was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harris, 489 U.S. at 266 n.13 (explaining that federal habeas review is available where a “reference to state law in the state court's opinion” was followed by a rejection of the federal claim “on the merits”); D'Onofrio, 2018 WL 6251367, at *12 (determining that an Appellate Division decision upholding an appeal waiver was a decision on the merits (citing People v. Donofrio, 123 A.D.3d 941 (2d Dep't 2014)).
The record supports the Appellate Division's conclusion that Martinez knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. Martinez, 161 A.D.3d at 493-94. At Martinez's plea allocution, prior to signing the Waiver in open court, Birnbaum confirmed that he had given Martinez's counsel a Spanish-language version of the Waiver, which Culleton reviewed with Martinez prior to the hearing. (ECF No. 12 at 3:1-12). Justice Yearwood ensured that the discussion of Martinez's Waiver was temporally distinct from the allocution, as it occurred after Martinez admitted to causing Reyes's death and after the plea was deemed satisfactory to Birnbaum. (Id. at 8:9-9:17). In addition, at the beginning of the hearing, after ensuring that Martinez's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, Justice Yearwood noted that Martinez was “also” waiving his right to appeal, implying a distinction between the guilty plea and the Waiver. (Id. at 4:8-5:18). Martinez stated that he had discussed the Waiver with Culleton prior to signing it, and that he signed it knowingly and voluntarily. (Id. at 9:1-11). Then, Justice Yearwood confirmed that Martinez understood the Waiver's implications. (Id. at 9:12-17). Martinez did not have any questions for the court or his counsel. (Id. at 10:3-7). The written Waiver that Martinez signed clearly distinguished the right to appeal from the rights forfeited upon a guilty plea, and delimited the rights relinquished and retained by signing the Waiver. (ECF No. 15 at 10 n.3). The written Waiver also stated that Martinez had the opportunity to discuss its contents with his attorney, and that Martinez was free to seek further clarification from the court or his attorney. (Id.)
“You understand that once the case is finished, you won't be able to take this case -- once you're sentenced, you won't be able to take the case to a higher court seeking to raise errors or to change the agreement or to raise other issues?” (ECF No. 12 at 9:12-16).
In relevant part (translated into English), the Waiver reads:
I understand that my right to appeal is separate and distinct from the rights automatically forfeited upon a guilty plea. I understand that the right to appeal would have allowed me, with the assistance of an attorney, to have a higher court review my conviction and sentence, particularly the excessiveness of my sentence and the resolution of any suppression motion that I may have made. I am waiving that right to appeal as a condition of this plea. I also understand that, despite this waiver, I will nevertheless retain my right to raise certain limited issues on appeal, including: constitutional speedy trial; the legality of the sentence; my competency to stand trial; the court's failure to determine whether I am eligible youth entitled to youthful offender status; the validity of my guilty plea; and the validity of this waiver.(ECF No. 15 at 10 n.3).
In the absence of “clear and convincing” evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that the Appellate Division was correct in determining that Martinez's Waiver was knowing and voluntary, the Court finds that the Appellate Division's decision was not an unreasonable application of, or contrary to, Supreme Court precedent, and therefore Martinez's Fourteenth Amendment claim fails. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(2), (e)(1); see also D'Onofrio, 2018 WL 6251367, at *13 (denying habeas challenge to a waiver of appeal because it was “discussed separately [from the plea agreement], . . . was not lumped into the panoply of trial rights automatically forfeited upon pleading guilty,” and because the “Petitioner further affirmed that he had fully discussed his waiver of his right to appeal with his attorney, and that he voluntarily waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence in consideration of his negotiated plea”).
2. Fourth Amendment claims
In his Petition, Martinez claims that the police failed to comply with the Fourth Amendment in obtaining the evidence that was later introduced against him at trial. (ECF No. 2 at 7). The DA argues that Martinez's Fourth Amendment claims are foreclosed by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 482, because Martinez “full[y] and fair[ly]” litigated these claims in state court and because he did not allege (1) an absence of a mechanism to correct purported Fourth Amendment violations; or (2) an “unconscionable breakdown” in the process he was afforded. (ECF No. 15 at 16-18); see Capellan, 975 F.2d at 70 (limiting habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims to these two circumstances).
a) The Waiver precludes habeas review of Martinez's Fourth Amendment claims
Martinez's guilty plea does not, by itself, bar habeas review of his Fourth Amendment claims, because New York preserves the appealability of suppression rulings despite a guilty plea. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 710.70(2); see Newsome, 420 U.S. at 293. Martinez's Waiver, however, explicitly noted that “I understand that the right to appeal would have allowed me, with the assistance of an attorney, to have a higher court review my conviction and sentence, particularly the excessiveness of my sentence and the resolution of any suppression motion that I may have made.” (ECF No. 15 at 10 n.3) (translated into English) (emphasis added). Accordingly, by validly waiving his right to appeal, see supra Section III.B.1, Martinez has foreclosed habeas review of the suppression decision, and thus, his request for relief on Fourth Amendment grounds must be denied. Pena, 2009 WL 5173819, at *12 (holding that appeal waiver precluded review of suppression decision); see also Sanchez, 2018 WL 3040361, at *9 n.12 (holding that suppression decision was cognizable despite guilty plea because petitioner preserved right to appeal).
b) Stone bars review of the Fourth Amendment claim
Even if the Waiver did not preclude review, Martinez's Fourth Amendment claims would still be unreviewable. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 482. Generally, “where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Id. at 482
The Petition attempts to re-litigate the Fourth Amendment arguments Martinez unsuccessfully presented to the Appellate Division. See Torres, 33 F.Supp.2d at 264. Furthermore, Martinez cannot satisfy either of the Capellan exceptions to the Stone rule, as he is unable to demonstrate either an absence of corrective procedures or an unconscionable breakdown in the process. Capellan, 975 F.2d at 70. Having fully litigated his suppression claim at both the trial and appellate levels, Martinez cannot conceivably argue that New York lacked sufficient corrective procedures to remedy Fourth Amendment violations. See Cotto v. Fischer, No. 09 Civ. 9813 (SAS) (MHD), 2012 WL 5500575, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 5499890 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2012); see also Capellan, 975 F.2d at 70 n.1 (finding New York's corrective procedures facially adequate). Martinez does not allege anything remotely resembling an “unconscionable breakdown” in the process. See Poole, 2009 WL 3009356, at *6 (describing “substantial failures in the process”). Further, the brevity of the Appellate Division's affirmance of the trial court's suppression decision does not render the state process unconscionable. See Pena v. New York, No. 04 Civ. 9499 (DAB) (HBP), 2008 WL 4067339, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2008) (“[I]t is of no moment that the Appellate Division's decision did not explain its rationale for affirming the Trial Court's denial of petitioner's suppression motion.”). By failing to demonstrate that the process he was afforded fell within one of the Capellan exceptions to the Stone standard, Martinez's Fourth Amendment claim is not properly before this Court on habeas review. See, e.g., Paulino v. Griffin, No. 16 Civ. 3839 (PKC) (BM), 2020 WL 1673248, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020); Vasquez v. New York, No. 17 Civ. 0697 (VEC) (OTW), 2020 WL 2859007, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2020), adopted by 2020 WL 1271363 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2020).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that the Petition be DENIED in its entirety. I further recommend that the Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), as Martinez has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to Petitioner at the below address.
NOTICE OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties shall have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d) (adding three additional days when service is made under Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D) or (F)). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Such objections, and any response to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72(b). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be addressed to Judge Abrams.
FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). If Martinez does not have access to cases cited in this Report and Recommendation that are reported on Westlaw, he may request copies from Respondent's counsel. See Local Civ. R. 7.2.