Opinion
934 C.D. 2023
08-26-2024
Gilbert M. Martinez, Appellant v. The Tax Claim Bureau for Berks County
OPINION NOT REPORTED
Submitted: July 5, 2024
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Gilbert M. Martinez (Martinez), pro se, appeals from the order dated July 24, 2023, by the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County (Common Pleas), which dismissed his "Petition for Judgment by Jury Trial" (Petition) based on technical res judicata and denied or deemed moot other collateral matters. In addition, Martinez filed a "Petition for Reargument" in this Court, challenging our per curiam orders dated January 4, 2024, and February 12, 2024, which denied his request that we "suppress" the supplemental reproduced record and strike Common Pleas' statement in response to this appeal from the supplemental reproduced record. After careful review, we affirm Common Pleas' order and deny Martinez's petition for reargument.
Martinez also represented himself throughout the proceedings before Common Pleas.
BACKGROUND
Martinez filed his Petition on January 11, 2021, requesting that Common Pleas set aside property taxes levied against him under Section 314 of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law (Law). Martinez argued he is exempt from property taxes due to his poverty and disabling rheumatoid arthritis, citing article VIII, section 2(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. VIII, § 2(b), and various provisions of The Fiscal Code and the Tax Reform Code of 1971 (TRC). He also averred the Tax Claim Bureau for Berks County (Bureau) failed to serve him with notice of the tax sale of his property. Martinez requested that Common Pleas issue a rule directing the Bureau to show cause why he was not entitled to property tax relief. Martinez repeated his request for a rule to show cause in a letter filed on February 12, 2021, and a motion filed on May 10, 2021.
Act of July 7, 1947, P.L. 1368, as amended, 72 P.S. § 5860.314.
Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 343, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 1-1805.
Act of March 4, 1971, P.L. 6, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 7101-10004.
Martinez's property was exposed to an upset sale on September 20, 2019, but did not receive any bids. In Re: Tax Claim Bureau of Berks Cnty. Upset Sale Held Sept. 20, 2019 (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 739 & 740 C.D. 2020, filed March 19, 2021), appeal denied, 272 A.3d 1284 (Pa. 2022) (Martinez III), slip op at 1 n.3. Thereafter, the Bureau filed a petition for a judicial sale. Id., slip op. at 2. Common Pleas granted the petition on June 3, 2020. Id., slip op. at 4. Martinez appears to be alleging he was not served with notice of either the upset sale or the judicial sale. See Martinez's Br. at 5. As discussed below, Common Pleas stayed the judicial sale of Martinez's property pending the outcome of the litigation.
By order dated May 20, 2021, every Common Pleas judge in Berks County recused themselves from the case, requiring the appointment of an out-of-county judge. Martinez filed an appeal from the recusal order at Commonwealth Court docket number 657 C.D. 2021. Meanwhile, Martinez filed a notice and praecipe for default judgment on August 5, 2021. Martinez argued he was entitled to default judgment because the Bureau failed to file an answer to his Petition within 30 days. The Bureau filed a motion to strike Martinez's notice and praecipe on August 16, 2021, arguing Common Pleas never issued a rule to show cause directing it to file an answer and it was not required to file an answer within 30 days. Martinez filed a response to the motion to strike on August 24, 2021.
The Honorable Richard K. Renn of York County decided the case.
On October 12, 2021, Martinez filed a motion to stay the judicial sale of his property scheduled for October 29, 2021. Martinez included the same property tax exemption and lack of notice arguments he asserted in his Petition. Martinez also repeated his argument that the Bureau failed to file a timely answer to the Petition. The Bureau filed an answer to Martinez's motion on October 19, 2021, explaining it removed Martinez's property from the sale on October 29, 2021, and did not oppose a stay of the sale pending the outcome of the litigation. By order dated October 20, 2021, Common Pleas stayed the sale of Martinez's property.
Martinez filed a "Motion to Void Judgment Ab Initio," on April 20, 2022, requesting that Common Pleas declare void the June 3, 2020 order granting a judicial sale. Martinez argued he was exempt from property taxes and was not served with notice. The Bureau filed an answer on May 16, 2022. The Bureau summarized prior state and federal actions by Martinez against the Bureau, among others, challenging the property taxes levied against him. The Bureau also cited Martinez's defense in the judicial sale proceedings involving his property, which depended on his alleged tax-exempt status and lack of notice. Based on this history of litigation, the Bureau argued collateral estoppel barred Martinez's motion. Martinez filed a reply to the Bureau's answer on May 23, 2022. In addition, on February 15, 2023, Martinez filed a "Motion to Compel," requesting that Common Pleas grant default judgment and void the June 3, 2020 order. Martinez filed an amended Motion to Compel on February 21, 2023.
On May 16, 2022, Martinez began submitting filings to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seeking various forms of relief. Our Supreme Court denied Martinez's requests for relief on August 10, 2022. Martinez v. Berks Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas Judges (Pa., No. 48 MM 2022, filed Aug. 10, 2022) (per curiam order).
By order dated March 1, 2023, Common Pleas deferred action on the matter, explaining Martinez's appeal from the May 20, 2021 recusal order remained pending in the Commonwealth Court. Martinez discontinued his appeal on March 8, 2023, and filed another Motion to Void Judgment Ab Initio on March 9, 2023, requesting that Common Pleas declare its March 1, 2023 order void and rule on the pending court filings. Common Pleas denied the motion by order dated March 1, 2023, but filed March 10, 2023. Common Pleas explained it had not received an order dismissing Martinez's appeal and the record had not returned from the Commonwealth Court. After this Court issued a notice of discontinuance, Common Pleas scheduled oral argument on the pending court filings.
On June 14, 2023, Martinez filed a motion for leave to amend his "complaint." The Bureau filed preliminary objections on June 16, 2023, arguing, in relevant part, that collateral estoppel barred Martinez's Petition. Common Pleas granted Martinez leave to file an amended complaint by order dated June 20, 2023. Martinez did not, however, file an amended complaint. Martinez filed a "Reply to Strike" the Bureau's preliminary objections on June 23, 2023, to which the Bureau filed a response on June 30, 2023. On July 5, 2023, Martinez filed a motion to strike both the Bureau's pretrial memorandum and its response to his reply to strike preliminary objections.
Common Pleas heard oral argument on July 14, 2023, and issued an order and opinion dated July 24, 2023, sustaining the Bureau's preliminary objections and dismissing Martinez's Petition with prejudice. Supplemental Reproduced Record (Suppl. R.R.) at 104b. Common Pleas deemed any "remaining applications and matters not specifically addressed" moot or denied without further comment. Id. Common Pleas explained Martinez previously litigated his allegations regarding exemption from property taxes and lack of notice. Id. at 105b-08b. This included prior state and federal court actions involving exemption from property taxes and a prior state court action challenging the judicial sale of his property based on exemption from property taxes and lack of notice. Id. Common Pleas concluded technical res judicata barred Martinez from pursuing the same allegations in his Petition. Id. at 108b-09b. Although Martinez was unhappy with the results of the prior litigation, Common Pleas explained, those decisions were binding. Id. at 109b.
Common Pleas went on to discuss Martinez's assertions that he was seeking equitable relief and was entitled to a default judgment. Suppl. R.R. at 110b-12b. Common Pleas also discussed Martinez's assertion that the order dated June 3, 2020, was void ab initio. Id. at 112b.
Martinez timely filed a notice of appeal. Before this Court, Martinez argues Common Pleas and the Bureau failed to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. He accuses Common Pleas of engaging in ex parte communication with counsel for the Bureau before oral argument on July 14, 2023. Finally, Martinez challenges Common Pleas' conclusion that technical res judicata bars his claims.
Common Pleas issued a statement in response to Martinez's appeal, dated September 5, 2023, which addressed various procedural claims and Martinez's allegation that Common Pleas and counsel for the Bureau engaged in ex parte communication. Suppl. R.R. at 113b-16b.
On December 9, 2023, Martinez filed a motion in this Court requesting, in relevant part, that we "suppress" the Bureau's supplemental reproduced record and strike Common Pleas' statement in response to his appeal from the supplemental reproduced record. Motion, 12/9/23, ¶¶ 5-7. We denied Martinez's motion on January 4, 2024. Martinez v. Tax Claim Bureau (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 934 C.D. 2023, filed January 4, 2024) (per curiam order). On January 9, 2024, Martinez filed a motion to vacate or strike our January 4, 2024 order. We denied the motion on February 12, 2024. Martinez v. Tax Claim Bureau (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 934 C.D. 2023, filed February 12, 2024) (per curiam order). Finally, Martinez filed a "Petition for Reargument" on February 22, 2024, requesting that we vacate our January 4, 2024, and February 12, 2024, orders. We deny Martinez's request for generally the same reasons offered in our January 4, 2024, and February 12, 2024 orders. Martinez was proceeding in forma pauperis and did not file a reproduced record. See Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure, 2151(b), Pa.R.A.P. 2151(b). Nothing prohibited the Bureau from filing a reproduced record in Martinez's stead, which included documents already found in Common Pleas' original record. In addition, Common Pleas properly issued its statement to address claims of error not previously discussed in the July 24, 2023 opinion. See Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(1), Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
In tax sale matters, we review whether Common Pleas abused its discretion, erred as a matter of law, or rendered a decision without supporting evidence. Nguyen v. Del. Cnty. Tax Claim Bureau, 244 A.3d 96, 101 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (citing Shipley v. Tax Claim Bureau of Del. Cnty., 74 A.3d 1101, 1104 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)). To the extent Martinez's arguments require us to interpret statutory law or rules of procedure, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Meyer v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty., 93 A.3d 806, 813 (Pa. 2014) (citing Dechert LLP v. Commonwealth, 998 A.2d 575, 579 (Pa. 2010)); Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48, 73 (Pa. 2014) (citing Touloumes v. E.S.C. Inc., 899 A.2d 343, 346 n.4 (Pa. 2006)). This means we do not defer to Common Pleas' decision, and we review the entire record on appeal. Mercury Trucking, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 55 A.3d 1056, 1082 (Pa. 2012) (citing Heath v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole), 860 A.2d 25, 29 n.2 (Pa. 2004)).
A. Rules of Civil Procedure
We begin by considering Martinez's arguments based on the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Martinez maintains Common Pleas and the Bureau violated the "civil action" rules governing pleadings. See Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1017-34, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1017-34. Martinez asserts the Bureau's preliminary objections were untimely filed more than 20 days after service of his "complaint," and he was therefore entitled to a default judgment. Martinez's Br. at 18-19, 22. Further, he asserts the Bureau failed to endorse its preliminary objections with a notice to plead. Id. at 23. Martinez contends the Bureau failed to file a timely answer and therefore admitted the facts alleged in his complaint. Id. at 11-14. He contends the Bureau improperly raised res judicata in preliminary objections, rather than new matter. Id. at 17.
Martinez filed his Petition under Section 314 of the Law. That section prescribes a specific procedure for the parties and Common Pleas to follow:
(a) Any claim for taxes may, prior to the time it becomes absolute, be set aside or reduced in amount by the bureau with which it is filed if the claim is found invalid in whole, or in part, by reason of the fact that the taxes for which the claim was entered were paid in whole, or in part, to a proper officer or agent of the taxing district, or is found invalid, in whole or in part, for any other reason not involving a question which could have been raised by an appeal provided for by law.
Any such claim prior to the time it becomes absolute may be set aside or reduced in amount by the court of common pleas on appeal, as hereinafter provided, for any reason which constitutes a just, sufficient and valid defense to the claim in whole, or in part, except want of notice of the return and entry of the claim by the bureau, or for any dispute in the amount of the claim which involves the amount of the assessed valuation of the property or the validity of the tax levied.
(b) Any defendant in any such claim, at any time before the day fixed for the claim to become absolute under section 311, may file with the bureau exceptions to the claim as entered, or to any part of the claim. The bureau, after giving due notice to the taxing districts interested, shall hold a hearing thereon and either disallow the exceptions or allow the exceptions in whole, or in part, and strike off or reduce the claim in accordance with the evidence produced and the powers of the bureau as hereinbefore prescribed.
If the defendant is aggrieved by the decision of the bureau he may, within fifteen (15) days after notice thereof, appeal by petition to the court of common pleas of the county setting forth the defense he has to
the claim, or any part thereof, and the refusal of the bureau to allow his exceptions and strike off or reduce the amount of the claim. Thereupon the court shall grant a rule on the taxing district or districts to show cause why the claim should not be set aside or reduced in amount as prayed for in the petition. The petitioners shall give notice of such proceeding to the bureau.
(c) The issues raised by the petition and the answer thereto by the taxing district or districts shall be tried by the court or a jury.
(d) The petition and the answer or answers thereto, if an issue of fact is raised, shall be endorsed with a statement signed by the party or his attorney in the following form:
"Jury trial demanded," or
"Jury trial waived."
The endorsement of "jury trial waived" on both petition and answer or answers shall be deemed a waiver of a trial by jury of every issue in the proceeding.
(e) No taxpayer shall have the right to proceed by petition to the court of common pleas to open a claim absolute under the provisions of this act, except on the ground of payment of the tax involved or failure to receive notice. The remedy provided by this section to contest a tax claim entered shall be deemed exclusive except as herein otherwise provided.
(f) After verdict by the court or the jury, the court shall, by its final order, either affirm or set the claim aside, or reduce the amount of the claim and fix the proper amount thereof in accordance with the verdict, and shall assess the costs of the proceedings as it shall determine. Upon final order of the court, or upon final disposition thereof upon appeal, if the entire claim has not been set aside, such return shall become absolute.72 P.S. § 5860.314.
Section 311 of the Law specifies when a tax claim becomes absolute:
On the first day of January next following the notice hereinbefore prescribed, if the amount of the tax claim referred to in the notice has not been paid, or no exceptions thereto filed, the claim shall become absolute. Every such claim shall bear interest as hereinbefore provided to the date of payment, or date of sale held under the provisions of this act, except in the case of claims where the owner is paying his taxes under the provisions of any law abating penalties, interests and costs, or either, in which case the claim shall bear no interest and costs, unless there is a default in payment, in which case interest shall run on the amount due on the claim at the time of default, and penalties, interest and costs abated shall be added as provided by the act of Assembly abating the same.72 P.S. § 5860.311.
Here, Common Pleas did not strictly comply with Section 314's procedural requirements. Common Pleas did not issue a rule to show cause despite the language of Section 314(b) directing that "the court shall grant a rule on the taxing district," 72 P.S. § 5860.314(b), and despite Martinez asking it to issue a rule on three occasions. In turn, the Bureau was under no obligation to file an answer. Although we do not condone this technical noncompliance with Section 314, we can discern no prejudice. See R.H.S. v. Allegheny Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 936 A.2d 1218, 1227-28 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) ("[T]o amount to reversible error, [a] procedural defect must also cause harm. . . . Absent a showing of prejudice, we discern no reversible error.") (citations omitted). Martinez contributed to the significant delay in these proceedings by appealing the May 20, 2021 recusal order. Common Pleas issued a scheduling order dated May 31, 2023, after Martinez discontinued his appeal, directing the parties to file "any additional legal authority in support of their respective positions" by June 16, 2023. Suppl. R.R. at 89b. The Bureau filed its preliminary objections by that deadline. Martinez received both notice and the opportunity to be heard, including oral argument and post-argument briefing in the form of "Supplemental Authorities" and "Amended Supplemental Authorities" he submitted on July 17, 2023, and July 21, 2023.
Martinez alleges counsel for the Bureau filed the preliminary objections on June 19, 2023, after the deadline. Martinez's Br. at 10. Common Pleas' docket sheet and the timestamp on the preliminary objections indicate a filing date of June 16, 2023, and our review of the record reveals nothing that supports Martinez's claim to the contrary.
Underlying Martinez's contentions is the assumption that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure regarding pleadings in civil actions apply to proceedings under Section 314. Martinez describes his petition as "the functional equivalent of a complaint" under the rules. Martinez's Br. at 20-21. This Court addressed a similar issue in Battisti v. Tax Claim Bureau of Beaver County, 76 A.3d 111 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). In Battisti, we explained that, "[g]enerally, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to statutory proceedings brought under the . . . Law." Id. at 115 (citing In re Tax Sale Held Sept. 10, 2003, by Tax Claim Bureau of Cnty. of Lackawanna, 859 A.2d 15, 18 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)). We vacated an order granting judgment on the pleadings, reasoning, in part, that proceedings challenging an upset sale under Section 607 of the Law were not "civil actions," and petitions used to commence such proceedings were not "pleadings" under the rules. See id. For the same reasons, we conclude Martinez's Petition was not "the functional equivalent of a complaint," and his arguments based on the rules governing civil actions must fail.
B. Ex parte communication
We also reject Martinez's allegation that Common Pleas engaged in improper ex parte communication. An ex parte communication is one that occurs "between counsel or a party and the court when [an] opposing counsel or party is not present." Black's Law Dictionary 348 (11th ed. 2019). Ex parte communications present due process concerns. See Picone v. Bangor Area Sch. Dist., 936 A.2d 556, 563 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); Mercy Reg'l Health Sys. (Formerly Mercy Hosp.) of Altoona v. Dep't of Health, 645 A.2d 924, 929 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).
Our review of the record does not reveal any instances of ex parte communication, and Common Pleas denies ex parte communication occurred. See Suppl. R.R. at 114b. Martinez does not point to any evidence of ex parte communication but instead makes assumptions based on a discussion during oral argument on July 14, 2023. Martinez asserts:
The facts which prove that the trial judge and counsel were engaged in confidential [ex parte] communication is that the judge brought up argument about when [Martinez's] taxes had become absolute pursuant to [Section 314(e) of the Law] that had never been raised in counsel[']s pleadings. [T]he trial court provided [Martinez] a copy of the legislation in court. The second critical fact proving that they had already planned this out is that counsel already had a printout of [Section 311 of the Law] in order to support the trial judge[']s arguments about when the taxes became absolute which he provided [Martinez] with a copy of that document in court.Martinez's Br. at 24 (citations to the record omitted).
Contrary to Martinez's argument, the Bureau included the issue of whether his property taxes were absolute in its pretrial memorandum filed June 30, 2023, two weeks before argument on July 14, 2023. Moreover, Martinez's allegation relies on a discussion between himself, Common Pleas, and counsel for the Bureau that spans less than 4 pages of a 55-page argument transcript. Common Pleas ultimately dismissed Martinez's Petition based on technical res judicata rather than a determination that his property taxes were absolute. The fact that Common Pleas and opposing counsel reviewed the Law before oral argument and came ready to discuss it may suggest preparedness and attention to legal issues relevant to the case, but it does not indicate an ex parte communication occurred. Absent concrete evidence of ex parte communication between Common Pleas and counsel for the Bureau, we discern no violation of Martinez's due process rights or other basis for reversal.
C. Res judicata
Finally, we address whether res judicata bars Martinez's claims. Martinez argues res judicata does not bar his claims because he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the merits of those claims during any prior litigation. Martinez's Br. at 11. Martinez asserts the prior court decisions did not reach the merits of his claims. Id. at 12. He also suggests res judicata does not apply because the Bureau "has not presented the trial court with any new laws in the previous or present case that terminated the right to property tax exemption." Id. at 14. Martinez specifically challenges this Court's decision at Martinez v. Tax Claims Bureau (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1615 C.D. 2018, filed August 13, 2019), reconsideration denied (Oct. 2, 2019), appeal denied, 230 A.3d 339 (Pa. 2020) (Martinez I), arguing no final valid judgment resulted from that case. Martinez's Br. at 14-15. He argues this Court's decision was "fatally defective" and should be overturned. Id. at 15-16.
This Court has summarized the doctrine of res judicata as follows:
The doctrine of res judicata encompasses two related, yet distinct, principles: technical res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). Technical res judicata provides that when a final judgment on the merits exists, a future suit between the same parties on the same cause of action or claim is precluded. Technical res judicata applies when the following four factors are present: (1) identity in the thing sued upon or for; (2) identity of the causes of action; (3) identity of the persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or sued. This doctrine applies to claims that were actually litigated as well as those matters that could and should have been litigated. The essential inquiry is whether the ultimate and controlling issues have been decided
in a prior proceeding in which the present parties had an opportunity to appear and assert their rights.
Collateral estoppel bars re-litigation of an issue decided in a prior action. Collateral estoppel may be applied only if both cases involve the same issue, the prior action was litigated to a final judgment on the merits, the party to be estopped was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior action and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action, and resolution of the issue in the prior proceeding was essential to the judgment.Boulin v. Brandywine Senior Care, Inc. (Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd.), 307 A.3d 845, 851 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (citations, italics, and quotation marks omitted).
In its opinion, Common Pleas found technical res judicata applicable based on three prior proceedings involving Martinez. In the first proceeding, Martinez filed a complaint against the Bureau, among others, arguing he was exempt from property taxes. Martinez I, slip op. at 2-5. The Bureau filed a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, which Common Pleas sustained with prejudice. Id., slip op. at 5-6. On appeal, this Court affirmed Common Pleas' conclusion that Martinez was not entitled to a property tax exemption. Id., slip op. at 10-11, 15. We specifically discussed and rejected Martinez's claims based on the Pennsylvania Constitution and various statutory provisions. Id., slip op. at 9-12.
Other defendants included Bureau Director Stacy Phile, in her individual capacity; County Treasurer Dennis Adams, in his official and individual capacities; and the County Assessment Office.
Second, Common Pleas discussed Martinez's prior federal proceeding in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (District Court). Martinez filed a complaint "which raised essentially the same claims against the same defendants" as his prior complaint in state court. Martinez v. Tax Claims Bureau, 796 Fed.Appx. 154, 155 (3d Cir. 2020). Martinez also lodged a claim against the Berks County Department of Human Services, alleging it terminated cash assistance benefits in violation of his due process rights. Id. The District Court dismissed Martinez's claims with prejudice based on technical res judicata, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Id. at 155-56.
The third prior proceeding was Martinez's challenge to the judicial sale of his property. In that case, Martinez alleged he was exempt from property taxes and was not served with notice of the sale. Martinez III, slip op. at 2-3. Common Pleas concluded Martinez waived strict compliance with the personal service requirement because he "admitted that he saw the notice posted on the Property and that he had notice of the hearing, which [he] actually attended after filing a response to the [r]ule." Id., slip op. at 4. Common Pleas concluded res judicata barred Martinez's property tax exemption arguments because those arguments were rejected in prior litigation. Id., slip op. at 3-4.
On appeal, this Court agreed with Common Pleas' conclusion that Martinez waived compliance with the personal service requirement. Martinez III, slip op. at 7. We reasoned Martinez "admitted to recording a video of a deputy approaching his door to post the property, and that the [r]ule was posted to his door." Id. Martinez admitted he had actual knowledge of the judicial sale and hearing, filed an objection to the judicial sale, and attended the hearing. Id. Similarly, this Court agreed with Common Pleas' conclusion that Martinez's prior litigation barred his property tax exemption arguments. Id., slip op. at 8-11. We explained:
The record is clear that [Martinez's] claims in several prior litigations, and his claims in the instant matter, are one and the same. [Martinez] failed to develop his arguments in his brief to this court, however, he refers to the same constitutional and statutory authority that he asserted in his prior litigation. Specifically, [Martinez] again relies on Article VIII, Section 2(b)(ii) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. VIII, § 2(b)(ii) (granting the General Assembly the
authority to create tax exemptions for "persons who, because of age, disability, infirmity or poverty are determined to be in need of tax exemption or of special tax provisions."); and Section 304 of the TRC, 72 P.S. § 7304 (relating to special tax provisions for poverty). As discussed in our prior opinion, because the Pennsylvania Constitution does not mandate the creation of a property tax exemption, [Martinez's] claims under that provision are without merit. Similarly, because Section 304 of the TRC applies to personal income tax, it has no bearing on [Martinez's] property taxes.
To the extent that [Martinez] argues he is tax exempt because of the imposition of governmental action through intrinsic fraud, suppression of employment rights, suppression of [Social Security and] Welfare benefits[,] those claims were addressed in his federal litigation. The [D]istrict [C]ourt held that [Martinez] failed to state a claim under these theories because the termination of his cash assistance benefits was due to a legislative change, and not any action on the part of the Bureau. The Third Circuit further elaborated that, even if [Martinez] had named a proper party, his arguments would still fail because general economic and social welfare legislation is judged on a rational basis standard, which [Martinez] failed to meet.
Accordingly, the elements of issue preclusion are clearly met. The property taxes and property, the parties, and causes of action are all identical. [Martinez] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in his prior cases and received a final judgment on the merits. For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by invoking res judicata and denying [Martinez] a hearing on these claims.Id., slip op. at 10-11 (some citations and quotation marks omitted).
Added by Section 4 of the Act of March 13, 1974, P.L. 179.
Our review indicates, once again, that Martinez's prior litigation involved the same property taxes, property, parties, and causes of action as the appeal now before this Court. Martinez filed a petition with the Bureau as a respondent, arguing he was exempt from property taxes and was not served with notice of the tax sale of his property. Martinez received a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues in the prior cases. Our state and federal courts rejected Martinez's arguments, resulting in final judgments on the merits. See Boulin, 307 A.3d at 851; Your Towne Builders, Inc. v. Manheim Twp., 303 A.3d 1126, 1145 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (quoting Sheils as Tr. for Smith & Morris Holdings, LLC v. Bartles, 295 A.3d 302, 309 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023)) (collateral estoppel "relieves parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourages reliance on adjudication").
Although Martinez III focused on whether Martinez received notice of the judicial sale, there is no question from the prior litigation that Martinez received notice of the September 20, 2019 upset sale as well. See Martinez I, slip op. at 5 (explaining Martinez's complaint sought a stay of the upset sale); Martinez v. Tax Claims Bureau, No. 19-CV-4087 (E.D. Pa., filed September 17, 2019), slip op. at 1 ("Martinez alleges that on August 20, 2019, he received a Notice of Public Tax Sale from the . . . Bureau informing him that his property is going to be sold on September 20, 2019 without [his] consent for delinquent taxes.") (citation and quotation marks omitted).
In reaching this decision, it is important to recognize that a judgment is final for purposes of collateral estoppel even if a party disagrees with the result or if the result is, hypothetically, incorrect. A "final" judgment is merely "a prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (Am. Law. Inst. 1982). Our Supreme Court has explained that "[a] judgment is deemed final for purposes of . . . collateral estoppel unless or until it is reversed on appeal." Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872, 874 (Pa. 1996) (collecting cases, footnote omitted). Despite Martinez's appeals, the decisions against him remain in place. Accordingly, collateral estoppel bars Martinez from relitigating his alleged property tax exemption and lack of notice.
As summarized above, the Bureau relied on collateral estoppel in its preliminary objections, and Common Pleas relied on technical res judicata in its July 24, 2023 order deciding the case. We may affirm Common Pleas' decision on any basis supported by the record. In Re: A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d 1157, 1175-76 (Pa. 2018).
CONCLUSION
We discern no prejudice to Martinez due to Common Pleas' noncompliance with the technical requirements of Section 314 of the Law. Further, we discern no basis to conclude Common Pleas engaged in ex parte communication with counsel for the Bureau. Our review of Martinez's prior litigation supports the conclusion that collateral estoppel bars him from relitigating his alleged exemption from property taxes and lack of notice regarding the tax sale of his property in this matter. For these reasons, we affirm Common Pleas' order dated July 24, 2023. We also deny Martinez's petition for reargument for generally the same reasons offered in our January 4, 2024 and February 12, 2024 per curiam orders.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 26th day of August 2024, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, dated July 24, 2023, is AFFIRMED. The "Petition for Reargument" filed by Gilbert M. Martinez is DENIED.