Opinion
FA185106176
09-18-2018
Mirta MARTINEZ v. Arnoldo Diaz SANTIAGO
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Foley, J.T.R.
This matter first came to this court by virtue of writ, summons and complaint, which complaint was dated August 30, 2018, and in said complaint, the plaintiff petitioner sought an annulment of the marriage. The plaintiff alleged that the parties were married on July 14, 2018, in Norwich, Connecticut. Both parties appeared for an uncontested hearing on September 17, 2018.
The evidence revealed that the parties were married by a justice of the peace. Six weeks later, the plaintiff filed for an annulment claiming that her marriage is void or voidable. The reason stated: "not to consummate marriage."
The defendant, who appeared very limited, was aided by the Spanish interpreter; he could not state his own address. He finally indicated he lived with her, pointing to the plaintiff. His financial affidavit showed no earnings, but listed Social Security payments of seven hundred and fifty dollars ($750) per month. He indicated he had an injury to his arm, but could not recall what year the injury occurred.
The court indicated to the parties on two occasions that there was something suspicious about this case. Neither reacted to the court’s concern. The court gave the plaintiff an advisement regarding her testimony on the record indicating that her testimony could be used against her in any possible charges for violation of state or federal law. Asked if she wished to proceed she indicated she did. She testified only that they did not consummate the marriage. She did not offer any information about their courtship, their intentions or possible efforts at marital counseling.
In Versaggi v. Versaggi, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. FA950144557 (Harrigan, J.), the court stated "[A]s a general principle, the formation of a binding contract requires the mutual assent of the parties, as determined by their expressed or manifested intention. The court is interested in those incidents leading up to the declaration of the marriage ceremony. Consent is a necessary condition to the marriage ceremony and this consent must be mutual."
In Phillips v. Dame, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 518815 (1991) (Mihalakos, J.) (4 Conn.L.Rptr. 650), the court held that "[F]ailure to consummate the marriage does not in and of itself constitute grounds for the granting of an annulment." Here neither party testified to the incidents leading up to their marriage ceremony except to say that the ceremony was performed at the Norwich Marina by a justice of the peace.
One of several things that concerns the court is whether or not either of the parties gave the union a fair opportunity to work and become a viable marital union if, indeed, a valid marriage was at all contemplated.
General Statute § 46b-40(b) states that an annulment shall be granted if the marriage is void or voidable under the laws of this state or of the state in which the marriage was performed. "It is the well-established law of this state that no marriage performed in this state is to be held void or voidable except for some ground recognized at common law or for some ground which a statute expressly provides shall be ground for annulment." Manning v. Manning, 16 Conn.Supp. 461, 461-62 (1950).
The plaintiff, who testified that she has achieved five years of post-high school education, did not appear to be limited intellectually. She is older than the defendant and is originally from Puerto Rico. The plaintiff does not allege that the defendant, prior to marriage, ever intended to cohabit or consummate the marriage, and therefore, lacked the requisite consent required for a valid marriage. Neither does she state that it was her intention not to consummate the marriage.
In Bernstein v. Bernstein, 25 Conn.Supp. 239, 201 A.2d 660 (1964), the plaintiff was seeking an annulment of the marriage based on the ground that he was unaware that the defendant intended, prior to marriage, of not cohabiting or consummating the marriage with him. The court noted that the "fact of entry into marriage gives rise to a presumption that the parties intend to enter into a normal marital relationship. This includes cohabitation and all of the obligations, duties and responsibilities that go with a normal marriage. When a party consistently and from the beginning refuses to do or assume any of these things, without evidence of ratification, a cause for annulment exists. There must be mutual consent to the marriage, and when only one party consents to the contract, there is no marriage. Since the defendant had the intention which existed at the time of the marriage ceremony of not cohabiting or consummating the marriage with the plaintiff and the plaintiff was unaware of that intention at the time of the ceremony and would not have entered into the marriage if he had known of that intention, and the defendant continuously and wrongfully refused to carry out the purposes of the marriage, there is such legal cause as justifies the annulment of the marriage." Neither the plaintiff nor defendant testified as to their respective pre-marital intentions.
In the case of Sinojia v. Sinojia, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 113953 (Harrigan, J., 12 Conn.L.Rptr. 483, 484), the parties married solely to permit an alien to remain in the United States under an agreement between themselves that they would not live together and a divorce would be secured within six months, the court noted that mutual consent was lacking and there was not a valid marriage. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant in the present case testified that this was their intention, neither did the court directly inquire as to immigration status of either of the parties.
"The concealed intent not to assume the duties of the marital relationship is sufficient cause for an annulment. Intention at the time of the marriage is most important." Neither party testified as to their intentions.
Since failure to consummate the marriage does not in and of itself constitute grounds for the granting of an annulment, and since there was no testimony as to the intentions and circumstances of the parties in entering this union, nor as to their willingness to seek counseling to reconcile their differences, the court is unable to conclude that an annulment is proper.
The petition for an annulment is denied.