Opinion
CV166009002S
11-09-2016
Madeline Martinez v. Adrienne C. Oliphant-Hines et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #116
John F. Cronan, J.
FACTS
On April 29, 2016, the plaintiff, Madeline Martinez, filed an amended five-count complaint against two defendants, Adrienne Oliphant-Hines, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), which arose out of a car accident that took place on April 6, 2014. Count one alleges a claim for negligence against Adrienne Oliphant-Hines, the driver of the vehicle which allegedly struck the plaintiff's vehicle. The remaining four counts are against the plaintiff's insurance carrier, State Farm. Only counts four and five, alleging breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are presently at issue and allege the same facts. On April 6, 2014, the plaintiff was rear ended by Oliphant-Hines, and sustained bodily injuries to her back, neck, and shoulders. On the date of the accident, the plaintiff had an automobile liability policy with the defendant, State Farm, through which the plaintiff was owed an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Both counts allege that State Farm failed to meet this duty by failing to make medical payments provided by the insurance policy without proper cause, however, count four is for a contractual breach while count five alleges a tortious breach.
On June 29, 2016, State Farm filed a motion to strike counts four and five of the plaintiff's amended complaint, with a memorandum of law in support, on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to allege that State Farm's actions were undertaken with the requisite mindset for bad faith. On August 1, 2016, the plaintiff filed an objection and memorandum of law in support, and on August 11, 2016, State Farm filed a reply memorandum. The matter was heard at short calendar on August 29, 2016.
DISCUSSION
" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). " It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted. Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). " A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
The defendant moves to strike counts four and five of the plaintiff's amended complaint and argues that the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead facts to establish that it acted in bad faith. The plaintiff counters that both counts have been sufficiently pleaded because there is a split of authority with regards to the level of detail that is required to properly plead bad faith and that she has satisfied the less stringent standard.
The plaintiff further argues that if more specific factual allegations are required, it is State Farm's failure to comply with discovery that has prevented the plaintiff from obtaining information to plead more specifically. The discovery requests referenced by the plaintiff, however, are for additional requests outside the standard forms in the practice book. It would not be appropriate or productive to stay the motion pending any form of limited discovery given that what the plaintiff is seeking is outside the normal course of discovery. Furthermore, any arguments regarding discovery are outside the four corners of the complaint.
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied into all contractual relationships, including that between an insurer and its insured. See, e.g., De La Concha of Hartford, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 269 Conn. 424, 432, 849 A.2d 382 (2004); Verrastro v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 207 Conn. 179, 190, 540 A.2d 693 (1998). " To constitute a breach of [the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing], the acts by which the defendant allegedly impedes the plaintiff's right to receive benefits that he or she reasonably expected to receive under the contract must have been taken in bad faith . . . Bad faith in general implies both actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive . . . Bad faith means more than mere negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) De La Concha of Hartford, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra, 433.
There are three elements of a cause of action alleging a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, which are set forth in this footnote, however, because the defendant only challenges the sufficiency of the complaint as to the third element, only that element will be addressed in full in this memorandum. " [A]n action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires proof of three essential elements . . . first, that the plaintiff and the defendant were parties to a contract under which the plaintiff reasonably expected to receive certain benefits; second, that the defendant engaged in conduct that injured the plaintiff's right to receive some or all of those benefits; and third, that when committing the acts by which it injured the plaintiff's right to receive benefits it reasonably expected to receive under the contract, the defendant was acting in bad faith." Marder v. Nationwide Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-13-6038355-S (November 12, 2015, Wilson, J.) (61 Conn.L.Rptr. 269, ).
There is a split of authority regarding the degree of specificity required in pleading bad faith. See Marder v. Nationwide Ins. Co., supra, 61 Conn.L.Rptr. 269, . Under the more stringent standard, a plaintiff is required to plead specific facts to show how the defendant acted in bad faith and in what manner the conduct was done with a dishonest purpose, intent to deceive or defraud, or sinister motive. See, e.g., Fowler v. Allstate Property & Casualty Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-08-5016911-S, (January 7, 2009, Bellis, J.) (granting motion to strike because plaintiff made no specific allegations establishing dishonest purpose or that conduct at issue was engaged in knowingly or wilfuly); Sullivan v. Allstate Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-05-4008548-S, (March 28, 2006, Tanzer, J.) (granting motion to strike because plaintiff did not allege facts to support sinister motive or dishonest purpose). Accordingly, " plaintiffs must plead facts that go beyond a simple breach of contract claim and enter into a realm of tortious conduct which is motivated by a dishonest or sinister purpose." Lynch v. Covenant Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-09-5027821-S, (August 11, 2009, Aurigemma, J.) (granting motion to strike because plaintiff's allegations of malicious intent or sinister motive were merely conclusory with no specific factual allegations in support).
In contrast, the less stringent standard requires only that the plaintiff " allege sufficient facts or allegations from which it may reasonably be inferred that the defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marder v. Nationwide Ins. Co., supra, 61 Conn.L.Rptr. 272, at *12. " [B]ad faith may be inferred by repetitive, knowing or deliberate conduct as such allegations are unlikely to be attributable to an honest mistake or mere negligence . . . Nevertheless, [even] where courts have used an inference analysis . . . they have looked to allegations that the conduct at issue was engaged in purposefully." Id.; see also Urban Apparel Plus, LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-13-6035293-S (October 31, 2013, Fischer, J.) (57 Conn.L.Rptr. 124, 126, ) (denying motion to strike because plaintiff's claim was legally sufficient under less stringent standard where it alleged that defendant intentionally engaged in specific behavior from which one can reasonably infer sinister motive).
In the present case, the cruxes of the plaintiff's bad faith claims are set forth in the allegations contained in paragraph twelve of counts four and five. In paragraph twelve of count four, the plaintiff alleges that the " Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, has breached its implied duty [of good faith and fair dealing] by failing to make the medical payments provided for by the above policy without proper cause." In count five, the plaintiff alleges that the " Defendant, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, tortuously failed to meet its implied duty by refusing to make the medical payments provided for by the above policy, without proper cause." The plaintiff's complaint is, however, bereft of specific factual allegations that the defendant acted with a dishonest purpose, ill will, or sinister motive. To the extent that there are any facts alleged, they do not, no matter how broadly construed, show how State Farm acted in bad faith when it allegedly failed to make the medical payments. The plaintiff alleges that State Farm failed to make medical payments " without proper cause, " but this language, without specific allegations in support, is merely conclusory and does not rise to the level of dishonest purpose or sinister motive. Similarly, alleging in count five that State Farm " tortuously" failed to meet its duty is insufficient to transform what is at best a breach of contract claim into a cause of action for bad faith. See Lynch v. Covenant Ins. Co., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-09-5027821-S (noting that nomenclature alone does not transform conclusory allegation into cause of action for bad faith).
Moreover, even under the less stringent standard, the plaintiff fails to set forth sufficient allegations from which bad faith could be reasonably inferred. Viewing the allegations in both counts in their totality and construing them broadly, a reasonable inference of ill will or dishonest purpose would be utterly attenuated. See Marder v. Nationwide Ins. Co., supra, 61 Conn.L.Rptr. 275, at *26. The plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts demonstrating a pattern of repetitive, knowing, or deliberate conduct that would amount to more than negligence. Id. The plaintiff counters in its objection to the motion to strike that she submitted medical bills to State Farm on multiple occasions, some of which were paid and some of which were not, and that State Farm failed to provide her with any reason for why it did not pay some of the bills. These allegations, however, are not contained within the plaintiff's amended complaint and, therefore, are irrelevant. See Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 240 Conn. 580 (" In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint").
In lieu of the plaintiff having failed to allege facts that establish that State Farm acted in bad faith, other than unsupported legal conclusions, the plaintiff cannot support a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Therefore, counts four and five must be stricken.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant the defendant's motion to strike in its entirety.