Opinion
2003-03395.
Decided May 17, 2004.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jacobson, J.), dated March 21, 2003, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Peters Berger Koshel Goldberg, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Marc A. Novick of counsel), for appellants.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Barry P. Schwartz and Deborah A. Brenner of counsel), for respondent.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P. SONDRA MILLER, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, SANDRA L. TOWNES, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in allowing the defendant to make a late motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court has "wide latitude" in deciding whether to allow late motions for summary judgment ( Williams v. Nicolaou, 284 A.D.2d 451). Here, the defendant filed its motion well in advance of trial, and the plaintiffs demonstrated no prejudice resulting from the consideration of the motion ( see Coumbes v. Taylor, 298 A.D.2d 351, 352).
The Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing, inter alia, that there was no evidence that the condition complained of was present for a sufficient period of time for the defendant to have discovered and remedied it in the exercise of reasonable care ( see Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836) . Absent such evidence, constructive notice may not be imputed to the defendant ( see Yearwood v. Cushman Wakefield, 294 A.D.2d 568, 569). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
SANTUCCI, J.P., S. MILLER, SCHMIDT and TOWNES, JJ., concur.