Opinion
H032504.
1-29-2009
MANUEL Q. MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent, v. CARLOS MARTINEZ, Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Appellant.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
In 1977, respondent Manuel Q. Martinez, his wife (Adelina), and their son, appellant Carlos Martinez, took title as joint tenants to residential property located on Hitchock Road in Salinas (the property). The property was acquired for $80,000. In 2006, Manuel sued Carlos to quiet title, contending that Carloss title was held subject to a resulting trust in Manuels favor. After a two-day bench trial, the court agreed with Manuel, and judgment was entered in his favor.
Carlos contends that the court erred in multiple respects. He argues that there was no substantial evidence upon which the trial court could have concluded that Manuel rebutted the presumption under Evidence Code section 662 that Carlos held beneficial title to the property by virtue of his holding legal title. Carlos also contends that the court erred in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that his interest in the property was a gift from his parents by reason of the parent-child relationship. In addition, he argues that the court made two erroneous evidentiary rulings concerning what the lender allegedly told Manuel prior to the purchase of the property about the need to have Carlos on title. Finally, Carlos argues that the court should have found in his favor on his affirmative defense that Manuels complaint was barred by laches.
Further statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise stated.
We conclude that there was no error and will therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTS
I. Witnesses Called by Manuel Martinez
A. Manuel Martinez
Manuel—who was 84 years old at the time trial concluded—was married to Adelina, and they had five children together. He had about three months of schooling in Mexico as a child and first came to work in this country in 1944. Manuel does not speak or read English.
Manuel and Adelina applied for a loan with Great Western Bank to purchase the property by written loan application dated August 8, 1977. In a separate loan application of the same date, Carlos, then 19, was listed as a borrower. Manuel was responsible for obtaining the loan, and was in charge of what information appeared on Carloss application. Manuel withdrew $15,000 from his Wells Fargo Bank account, converted it to a cashiers check, and used it for part of the down payment; none of those funds were from Carlos. Manuel also submitted $5,000 as part of the down payment by a Crocker National Bank cashiers check payable to him. He received these funds from his brother, Jesús. There was a further deposit into escrow of $789.36, a payroll check to Manuel endorsed over to the title company. At the same time, Adelina brought in cash to the title company from savings that the couple had at home.
Manuel testified that none of the funds used as the down payment to purchase the property came from Carlos. Specifically, Manuel denied that Carlos gave him $5,000 in cash. Carlos did not pay any of the closing costs.
Manuel initially testified that Carlos was placed on title because "[he] was told at the bank that [he] needed someone who spoke English—" On cross-examination, he testified that the bank did not require that Carloss name be placed on title. On redirect examination, Manuels recollection was refreshed with his deposition testimony, wherein he stated that Carlos was included as a grantee because "`[t]he bank wanted a signature so [Manuel] could be given the house." After this deposition testimony was read, in response to the question of whether the bank wanted another signature, Manuel testified, "Yes, yes, they told me they wanted a signature." Manuel also testified that at the time of the transaction, he did not intend to place Carlos on title as a gift to him.
Carlos—and later after they married, his wife—lived with Manuel, Adelina, and two of their other children at the property. Neither Carlos nor his wife paid rent. At all times since the property was purchased in 1977, Manuel has paid the installments due for the mortgage, premiums for insurance, and property taxes. Carlos never made any of these payments. Carlos never offered to pay any expenses associated with the property and never offered to repair the property. He also never asked for any rents from the rental unit on the property.
Manuel and his wife had no contact with Carlos between 1987 and 2004. Carlos never told Manuel that he claimed to be a part owner of the property until a 2005 family meeting that concerned Manuels estate plan.
B. Other Witnesses
Charlene Mullins, an escrow officer who worked on the 1977 transaction, authenticated exhibits confirming that Manuel and Adelina brought in funds totaling $24,179.36 for the purchase of the property as follows: (1) $600 in cash brought in by Manuel on August 10, 1977; (2) $5,000 by cashiers check from Crocker National Bank and $15,000 by cashiers check from Wells Fargo Bank, both brought in by Manuel; and (3) $789.36 by check drawn on a Wells Fargo Bank account, endorsed by Manuel, and $2,790 in cash, both brought in by Adelina.
Doyle ODell testified that he, his wife, and his parents sold the property to Manuel in 1977. Manuel (without Carlos) previously approached ODell and his wife about his interest in buying the property.
Maria Martinez, Manuels daughter, takes care of Manuel, who lives in both Mexico and in Salinas. In 2005, she took her father to an estate planning attorney, Marilyn Stevenson. While Stevenson was preparing Manuels will, Maria called Carlos several times to inform him that their father was preparing a will and that "he wanted to have the house papers . . . straightened out." He initially told Maria "that he was going to sign the papers. Then after several phone calls, he said no, because it was something that didnt work for him." Later, at a meeting of the family, Carlos said that "he felt that he was an owner." (Carlos had not told Maria previously that he had an ownership interest in the property.)
Marias and Carloss brother, Manuel, Jr., initially contacted attorney Stevenson on behalf of their father. Manuel, Jr., told Carlos that their father planned to leave everything, including the property, to the five children equally. Carlos initially told Manuel, Jr., that "he was fine with it, and . . . he was going to go in and sign." Carlos had never told Manuel, Jr., that he had an ownership interest in the property.
José Martinez, one of Manuels and Adelinas five children, has lived on the property continuously from 1977 to present. He similarly testified that, until the family meeting in October 2005 regarding Manuels estate plan, Carlos at no time said that he was an owner of the property.
Stevenson testified that she was engaged by Manuel to prepare a will and trust in which Manuel wanted to transfer the property on his death to his five children equally. Although Carlos was on title, she understood that he was going to cooperate in order to put title to the property into the name of Manuels trust. In a telephone call, Carlos told her that he lived in Watsonville and could not come to San Jose to sign a deed she had prepared; she suggested that he could find a notary in Watsonville. The distance between his home and Stevensons office was the only reason Carlos gave for not being able to sign the deed. After she was informed by the family that Carlos would not cooperate, she prepared documents calling for Manuel to transfer his interest in the property to the other four children.
Josephine Rosales, along with her family, has been a tenant at the property for approximately 15 years. She always considered Manuel to be her landlord. Carlos had never said that he was an owner, never tried to collect rent, and never expressed any concerns about the condition of the property.
II. Witnesses Called by Carlos Martinez
A. Carlos Martinez
Carlos started working in the fields when he was 12, Manuel having gotten him his first job at the time. He dropped out of high school after the 11th grade. When the property was purchased in 1977, Carlos was 19. At the time, he was making $3.50 per hour. Carloss gross annual earnings were $3,915 (1975); $8,269 (1976); and $12,200 (1977).
In 1977, the family had to move, and Manuel and Carlos started looking for a home to buy. Carlos testified that after they located the property and talked to the owners, the two of them agreed that they would purchase it together and would be "partners." Carlos was supposed to pay one-half of the $20,000 down payment by paying $5,000 cash up-front; the remaining $5,000 would be paid later to Carloss uncle, Jesús, by Carlos saving money from work. Manuel told Carlos that they "were going to be equal partners." Carlos gave his father $5,000 in cash for the purchase sometime before the transaction closed. Manuel did not give his son a receipt. Carlos had saved more than $5,000 from working and kept the cash in a dresser in his room.
On cross-examination, Carlos was impeached on this point with his deposition testimony: "`[Q]: In 1977, [Manuel] told you you were a partner, right? `[A]: We bought the house. [¶] . . . [Q:] `But did he tell you that you were a partner? [A:] `All I know is that we bought the house together. [¶]. . . [¶] . . . [Q:] `Did [Manuel] tell you that you would be a fifty-fifty partner so that you would be fifty-fifty partners?[ A:] `I dont know. It happened 30 years ago. "
Carlos testified that he had no bank records dating back to 1977.
Manuel and Carlos applied together for a loan; Manuel was in charge of the entire loan process. His father never told Carlos that the bank needed Carlos to be a title holder because it needed an additional signature or because it needed someone who spoke English.
Sometime later, Carlos fulfilled his agreement by paying an additional $5,000 to his uncle. The money was paid to Manuel, who in turn was supposed to pay Jesús.
Carlos lived at the larger house on the property for approximately eight years, along with Manuel, José, and (after Carlos married), Carloss wife. He paid for utilities, telephone, water, and groceries. During that time, Carlos also made improvements to the property for which he received no reimbursement from his father.
Over the 30 years since the property was acquired, Manuel had collected rent from the second, smaller residence on the property to pay the mortgage, taxes, and insurance. During that entire period, Carlos did not make any payments for mortgage, taxes, or insurance.
Carlos testified that he had several conversations over the years with his father to the effect that Carlos had an ownership interest in the property. In or about 1985, Carlos told Manuel that he wanted to move with his wife and daughter into the smaller rental house on the property. Manuel would not permit this, and Carlos responded that he was an owner. Carlos moved out a few months later.
Carlos was impeached with his deposition testimony on this point. In contrast to his trial testimony that he had several conversations with his father between 1985 and 2004 in which Carlos indicated that he was an owner of the property, in his deposition, he testified that the first conversation he had with Manuel on this subject was in or about 2004, at the time that they were discussing Manuels estate plan. Carlos testified at trial that he had misunderstood the questions at his deposition.
About four years later, his father asked if Carlos wanted to move into the smaller residence, to which Carlos responded in the affirmative. Manuel said that Carlos would have "to pay for everything" Although Carlos initially questioned this because he and his father were both owners, he ultimately accepted this condition. After Carlos cleaned the residence at Manuels request, Manuel rented it to someone else.
In 1995, after Carloss trailer was damaged by flooding, he called his father in Mexico to ask if he could move into the larger residence on the property. He spoke with his mother, who said that Manuel was ill. During the conversation, Carlos told Adelina that he was an owner; she said that she would check with her husband. During a later conversation, Adelina told Carlos that his father was too ill to be bothered with Carloss request.
In 2000, Carlos was talking to his father while they were in front of the garage. Manuel asked Carlos to move the chickens that were on the property. Carlos refused, telling his father that it was his property, too.
Again in 2004, after Carlos had been injured in an accident, he asked Manuel about moving into the small residence. "He said, `No, and he laugh[ed] at [Carlos]. [Carlos] told [Manuel he] was an owner."
Carlos testified that he recalled telling an attorney that he would sign documents. However, he thought the papers concerned his fathers will and did not understand that the papers he was being asked to sign involved him relinquishing his interest in the property. He similarly testified that when he told his sister that he would sign papers, he thought that they concerned his fathers will and not a relinquishment of his title. When he learned at the family meeting that his father wanted him to give up title to the property, he told Manuel that he was a half owner. Manuel argued with him, and Carlos left.
B. Jesús Martinez (Deposition Testimony)
Jesús, Manuels older brother, resides in Mexico. Manuel asked Jesús for money to buy a house. Although Manuel asked for $10,000, Jesús only had $5,000, and that is the amount he lent to his brother.
Carlos also presented extensive testimony from his expert, Nelson Vega, concerning issues relevant to the cross-complaint, including the condition of the property, its fair rental value, and it fair market sales value. In view of our conclusion that the court did not err in finding in favor of Manuel on the complaint, thereby rendering the issues raised in the cross-complaint moot, we need not recite the details of Vegas testimony.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 2, 2006, Manuel filed an action against Carlos to quiet title. In his first amended complaint to quiet title and to establish a resulting trust (complaint) filed thereafter, Manuel alleged that Carlos took title "solely as security for repayment by [Manuel] of the . . . purchase money deed of trust. At all times mentioned herein, it was and is the intention of the parties that [Carlos] serve merely as a co-signer on the . . . loan, so [Manuel and Adeline] could obtain the loan needed to purchase the [p]roperty." It was further alleged in the complaint that Manuel had made all of the payments for the mortgage, real estate taxes, and insurance associated with the property.
Carlos filed a first amended and supplemental cross-complaint and a third-party complaint for possession (cross-complaint). In that pleading, he sought (1) an accounting from Manuel for the income he had received from the property; (2) damages against Manuel for breach of fiduciary duty; (3) damages against Manuel resulting from his alleged ouster of Carlos from the property; and (4) concurrent possession of the property as a joint tenant.
After submission of the case following a two-day court trial that concluded on August 2, 2007, the court issued an order, entitled "Order After Submission" (Order), finding in Manuels favor, concluding that Carloss "legal title [was] held subject to a resulting trust in favor of [Manuel]." Judgment was entered on November 28, 2007, in favor of Manuel based upon the courts prior Order. The judgment indicated that, based upon the courts conclusion that Carlos had no interest in the property, he would therefore take nothing by way of his cross-complaint. Carlos filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Issues on Appeal
1. Whether the court erred in admitting Manuels testimony—and overruling Carloss evidentiary objections based upon hearsay and absence of personal knowledge—concerning what he was allegedly told by bank officials.
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the courts conclusion that Carlos held title to the property subject to a resulting trust in Manuels favor.
3. Whether the court erred in rejecting Carloss defense of laches.
II. Evidence of Alleged Statements by Bank to Manuel
A. Background and Contentions
On direct examination, Manuel was asked why Carlos was placed on title to the property. He responded, "Because I was told at the bank that I needed someone who spoke English—" Counsel for Carlos objected to the testimony on hearsay grounds. The court overruled the objection, concluding that it was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; rather, it was "to explain why this individual witness did what he did."
Manuel was asked during redirect examination whether the bank asked for an additional person to sign the loan at the time the property was purchased. After Manuel responded that he did not recall, his counsel sought to refresh his recollection with his prior deposition testimony. After an extended objection by Carloss counsel, including an objection on hearsay grounds, which was overruled, Manuels deposition testimony was read as follows: "[Q. by Carloss counsel:] `So your testimony is that you put your sons name on [the title] because the bank wanted the full $25,000[? A. by Manuel:] `The bank wanted a signature so I could be given the house." Manuel then reiterated in his trial testimony that the bank told him "they wanted a signature."
On appeal, Carlos renews his hearsay objection to this evidence. Additionally, he argues that the evidence was inadmissible because there was an absence of personal knowledge by the witness, Manuel. Manuel responds that the court correctly overruled the hearsay objection because Manuels testimony concerning what he was told by the bank was not offered for the truth of the banks statements, but rather to explain Manuels subsequent conduct in placing Carlos on title to the property. Manuel argues further that Carlos forfeited any objection to the evidence based on a lack of the witnesss personal knowledge by failing to assert it below. He argues that in any event the objection is not well taken.
B. Objection Based on Hearsay
The trial court overruled Carloss hearsay objection because it viewed the evidence as being offered simply to explain Manuels subsequent conduct in including Carlos on title to the property. The court very clearly noted that it was not accepting the testimony for the truth of the matter asserted. The applicable rule has been succinctly stated by Justice Jefferson: "An out-of-court statement offered to prove that the statement imparted certain information to the hearer, and that the hearer, believing such information to be true, acted in conformity with such belief, is not hearsay. The statement is not hearsay because it is the hearers reaction to the statement that is relevant, not the truth of the matter asserted . . . . [Citations.]" (1 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2008) Hearsay and Nonhearsay Evidence, § 1.34, pp. 23-24.)
For example, in Holland v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 940 (Holland), the trial court granted the employer-defendants summary judgment motion where the plaintiff alleging employment discrimination had failed to file a timely administrative complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH). In so doing, the court sustained the defendants hearsay objection to the plaintiffs evidentiary support for his contention that his late-filing should be equitably excused because he was misled by inaccurate advice from the DFEH. (Id. at pp. 943-944.) That evidence included alleged statements by DFEH officials to the plaintiff (1) two months before the filing deadline that he need not be concerned about the deadline, and (2) that, notwithstanding its postponement of its interview with him until days before the deadline, his timely submission of a completed questionnaire would suffice in asserting a timely claim. (Id. at p. 947.) (The DFEH did not send the plaintiff a formal complaint to be completed until after the one-year claim period had expired. (Ibid.) The appellate court—citing Justice Jeffersons treatise—reversed, concluding that the evidence supporting equitable excuse was improperly excluded, because the alleged DFEH statements were not offered for their truth, but to explain that the plaintiff heard them and acted in conformity with the information contained in them. (Id. at p. 947; see also Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1, 13 [evidence that auditor was told by third party that client had breached material condition of audit engagement admissible to show reasonableness of auditors subsequent resignation].)
The alleged statements by the bank to Manuel—that it needed an English-speaking person to be on title and that it "`wanted a signature so [he] could be given the house" —were not offered for the truth that the bank, in fact, had either such requirement in this instance. Rather, they were offered for the nonhearsay purpose of establishing that the statements were made to the hearer, Manuel, and that he took action (placed Carlos on title) in conformity with what he was told.
Carlos, however, argues that permitting this evidence allowed Manuel to establish by hearsay "the ultimate fact of this case, i.e., whether or not the bank required another individual to guarantee the loan." (Original italics.) On the contrary, the "ultimate fact" pertinent to the disposition of the quiet title complaint was whether the parties intended that Carlos hold beneficial title when they included his name on legal title to the property. A significant, intermediate fact that was disputed was Manuels motivation for including his son on legal title.
The court correctly determined that Manuels testimony concerning alleged statements by the bank about the need for an English-speaker or another person to appear on title was not inadmissible hearsay, but was offered for the purpose of explaining Manuels subsequent responsive conduct. There was no error in the courts overruling of Carloss hearsay objection to this evidence.
C. Objection Based on Lack of Personal Knowledge
Carlos also contends that admission of Manuels testimony concerning what the bank allegedly told him was improper, because of the absence of the witnesss personal knowledge. We reject this argument as well.
First, as to Manuels testimony that the bank allegedly said that it needed an English-speaker on title, Carlos failed to make an absence-of-personal-knowledge objection at trial. His failure to make a specific objection on the ground now urged renders his appellate claim forfeited. (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 22 & fn. 8 [appellate court will not consider appellate claim where there was failure to make timely and specific evidentiary objection, even if an objection on a different basis was made at trial], overruled on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 233-237.)
For the reasons we discuss post concerning Manuels deposition testimony that the bank told him that it needed another person on title, Carloss lack of personal knowledge objection raised for the first time on appeal is in any event without merit.
Second, we address Manuels contention that Carlos forfeited the challenge to Manuels deposition testimony (adopted by him at trial) concerning what the bank allegedly told him should have been excluded. The objection of Carloss counsel in part was: "Any statement that [Manuel] would make stating that somebody said something, that he needed another signature, is total hearsay, and its not based on personal knowledge. Personal knowledge is something that is perceived through one of the five senses. This is only something that perhaps was said. I strenuously object on the hearsay ground." Although Manuel—apparently focusing on only the last sentence of the above-quoted objection—argues that Carloss objection was limited to a hearsay ground, we disagree. A fair reading of the record is that Carlos objected to the deposition testimony on both hearsay and lack-of-personal-knowledge grounds. (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 290 [evidentiary objection deemed "sufficient if it fairly apprises the trial court of the issue it is being called upon to decide"].)
The objection in any event was properly overruled. "To testify, a witness must have personal knowledge of the subject of the testimony, i.e., `a present recollection of an impression derived from the exercise of the witness own senses. [Citations.]" (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 356; see also § 702, subd. (a).) Carlos argues that this requirement was not satisfied here because Manuel did not have personal knowledge that the bank required another person to be on title to the property. Carlos misses the point. All that is required under section 702, subdivision (a) is that the witness have personal knowledge on the subject of his or her testimony, based upon a recollection founded on what the witness perceived from his or her own senses. Manuels testimony as to what he was told by the bank satisfied the personal knowledge requirement because it was based on his sense of hearing; he was not required to have personal knowledge as to the truth of what the bank representative was telling him. Accordingly, the court below properly overruled Carloss absence-of-personal-knowledge objection to the admission of Manuels deposition testimony.
III. Substantial Evidence to Support Judgment
Carlos argues that it was Manuels burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a resulting trust. He asserts that section 662 establishes a presumption that one who holds legal title also holds beneficial title to property, subject to that presumption being rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Carlos contends that there was no substantial evidence to support the trial courts conclusion that Manuel had rebutted this presumption. Moreover, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the courts finding that the presumption of a gift to Carlos had been rebutted. We will first recite the relevant legal principles that inform our resolution of these claims of error.
A. Applicable Law
The parties agree that our review is governed by the substantial evidence standard. As one court has eloquently summarized this standard of review: "`Substantial evidence is evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value. [Citations.] `Substantial evidence . . . is not synonymous with "any" evidence. Instead, it is `"`substantial proof of the essentials which the law requires." [Citations.] The focus is on the quality, rather than the quantity, of the evidence. `Very little solid evidence may be "substantial," while a lot of extremely weak evidence might be "insubstantial." [Citation.] Inferences may constitute substantial evidence, but they must be the product of logic and reason. Speculation or conjecture alone is not substantial evidence. [Citations.] . . . [¶] The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record. [Citation.] `A formulation of the substantial evidence rule which stresses the importance of isolated evidence supporting the judgment, . . . risks misleading the court into abdicating its duty to appraise the whole record. . . . [¶] Substantial evidence is therefore not merely an appellate incantation designed to conjure up an affirmance. To the contrary, it is essential to the integrity of the judicial process that a judgment be supported by evidence that is at least substantial. An appellate court need not `blindly seize any evidence . . . in order to affirm the judgment. The Court of Appeal "was not created . . . merely to echo the determinations of the trial court. A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on review." [Citations.]" (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651-652.)
Although the record must be reviewed in its entirety, "all of the evidence must be examined, but it is not weighed. All of the evidence most favorable to the respondent must be accepted as true, and that unfavorable discarded as not having sufficient verity, to be accepted by the trier of fact. If the evidence so viewed is sufficient as a matter of law, the judgment must be affirmed." (In re Teels Estate (1944) 25 Cal.2d 520, 527.) It is the appellants burden to establish that the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence. (In re Adoption of Allison C. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011.)
In this instance, Manuel was required to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Carlos, who held legal title to the property, did not also hold beneficial title. (§ 662.) The legal theory upon which Manuels challenge to Carloss beneficial title was tethered was that Carlos held title subject to a resulting trust. As has been recently explained by one appellate court, "When a transfer of real property is made to one person, and the consideration therefor is paid by or for another, a trust is presumed to result in favor of the person by or for whom such payment is made. `The trust that is "presumed to result" from this situation is termed a "resulting trust"; its purpose is to enforce the intentions of the parties. It is distinguished from a constructive trust, which is typically imposed to rectify fraudulent behavior. [Citation.] `A resulting trust differs from an express trust chiefly in that (1) it arises by operation of law, without an expressed intent, and (2) the resulting trustee ordinarily has no duty other than to transfer the property to the person entitled. [Citations.] [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Ruelas (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 339, 342.)
"The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof." (§ 662.)
While Carlos here emphasizes that Manuel was required to show the existence of a resulting trust by clear and convincing evidence, he fails to acknowledge that this higher burden at the trial court level does not change our standard of review here. As the Supreme Court has explained, the clear and convincing evidence "standard was adopted . . . for the edification and guidance of the trial court, and was not intended as a standard for appellate review. `The sufficiency of evidence to establish a given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to be clear and convincing, is primarily a question for the trial court to determine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal. [Citations.]" (Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750.) "Thus, on appeal from a judgment required to be based upon clear and convincing evidence, `the clear and convincing test disappears . . . [and] the usual rule of conflicting evidence is applied, giving full effect to the respondents evidence, however slight, and disregarding the appellants evidence, however strong. [Citation.]" (Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 881; see also Marriage of Ruelas, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 345 [rejecting appellants contention that there was no clear and convincing proof under section 662 that holder of legal title was not also beneficial title holder, noting that that higher standard of proof "operates in the trial, and not the appellate court"].)
B. Discussion of Claim of Error
1. Evidence supporting judgment
The evidence presented by Manuel in support of his contention that Carlos held title to the property in resulting trust was largely (but not exclusively) from Manuels own testimony. He described the circumstances under which the property was acquired in 1977. It was plainly Manuels testimony that the source of all of the funds for the down payment, with the exception of a $5,000 loan from his brother, Jesús, was his own savings. He presented evidence—through his own testimony, the testimony of the escrow officer, Mullins, and in the form of receipts—that he and his wife personally deposited the funds for the down payment into escrow. Manuel testified emphatically that Carlos provided none of the funds to purchase the property. Nor did Carlos, according to Manuel, pay any of the closing costs. And two of the sellers, Doyle and Rosario ODell, testified that they had no dealings with Carlos in the 1977 transaction.
Manuel testified that he repaid Jesús with interest in October 1980 by a cashiers check for $7,000. A copy of a cashiers check in that amount with Manuel and Jesús identified as the purchaser and payee, respectively, was introduced at trial.
Manuel was responsible for all of the dealings with the bank in arranging for the purchase of the property. Carlos did not assist in the loan application process. Manuel testified that it was the banks idea that Carlos be included on title to the property. While Manuels explanation for this varied somewhat—in that he initially testified that it was because the bank wanted someone who spoke English and later testified (consistently with his deposition) that the bank wanted another person on title—it was evident from his testimony that placing Carlos on title occurred (to Manuels understanding) at the behest of the bank.
Moreover, Manuel testified that at the time of the transaction, he did not intend to place Carlos on title as a gift to him. Manuel testified that over the years, he had given each of his five children property in Mexico.
Manuel also presented evidence that he at all times paid the mortgage, taxes, and insurance for the property, and that Carlos never made any of these payments. Carlos did not dispute this evidence. Manuel also testified that Carlos never asked for any rents from the rental unit on the property.
Further, Manuel testified that Carlos never claimed to be a part owner of the property until 2005; the issue was raised at that time as a result of Manuel wanting to finalize his estate plan by leaving his assets to his five children in equal shares. Carloss siblings, Maria, Manuel, Jr., and José, similarly testified that Carlos never stated that he was an owner until 2005. Moreover, Maria and Manuel, Jr. testified that Carlos initially told each of them that he was willing to sign papers necessary to "straighten[] out" the ownership of the property to facilitate the completion of the papers for Manuels estate plan, only to change his mind later. Consistently with this testimony, attorney Stevenson, from her conversations with Carlos, was unaware of any objection he had to signing a deed to clear up title, other than Carloss concern about being unable to travel from Watsonville to San Jose to accomplish this task.
2. Carloss arguments
Based upon our review of the entire record, we readily conclude that there was substantial evidence, as highlighted in the preceding five paragraphs, to support the trial courts conclusion that Carlos held legal title to the property subject to a resulting trust in Manuels favor. As we discuss below, the specific arguments Carlos raises on appeal address the quality of the evidence supporting the trial courts decision and the appropriateness of the inferences to be drawn from that evidence. In essence, many of his arguments call for this court to reweigh the evidence, isolate certain evidentiary matters to assess their importance, and/or assess the credibility of the witnesses upon whose testimony the courts decision was based—functions that are outside the province of this court.
For instance, Carlos argues that Manuel presented little evidence explaining the reason that he was placed on title. He asserts that there was no documentary evidence supporting Manuels theory that the bank required that Carlos co-own the property for financing reasons, and that Manuels own testimony on the subject "was self-serving, contradictory and elicited from [Manuel] only after counsel read the desired answer from a deposition transcript." This is an attack on Manuels credibility. As one appellate court aptly noted some 60 years ago, "With rhythmic regularity it is necessary for us to say that where the findings are attacked for insufficiency of the evidence, our power begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence to support them; that we have no power to judge of the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to consider the credibility of the witnesses, or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. No one seems to listen." (Overton v. Vita-Food Corp. (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 367, 370, disapproved on other grounds in Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 866, fn. 2.) It is apparent here that the court found credible Manuels testimony that the bank told him at the time of the transaction that it required Carloss name to appear on title. While there was no direct evidence from the lender on this point—a circumstance that is not surprising, given the passage of time of 30 years and in light of the fact that a number of witnesses have since passed away—the absence of such evidence does not preclude a finding here that there was substantial evidence to support the trial courts conclusions. "The trial court evidently believed [Manuel]. `The testimony of a witness, even the party himself, may be sufficient. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614.)
Similarly, Carlos assails the probative value of the receipts Manuel introduced in support of his testimony that all of the funds deposited into escrow were from his savings and from a loan he received from his brother. He argues that the receipts did nothing to show that Manuel was the source of all such deposited funds. For instance, Carlos argues that a receipt showing that Wells Fargo issued a cashiers check to Manuel for $15,000 in no way established that those funds came from Manuels Wells Fargo bank account. We reject these arguments as they, again, implore us to reweigh the evidence and ignore inferences that the court may have reasonably drawn from that evidence in support of its decision. "`"In reviewing the evidence . . . all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. It is an elementary . . . principle of law, that when a verdict is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the jury. When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court." (Italics added.) . . . The rule quoted is as applicable in reviewing the findings of a judge as it is when considering a jurys verdict. . . ." (In re Teels Estate, supra, 25 Cal.2d at pp. 526-527.)
We also reject Carloss argument that the courts conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence because Manuel failed to present documentary evidence that he possessed all of the money—save the $5,000 that he borrowed from his brother—that comprised the deposits into escrow. Manuel—who admittedly did not have any relevant bank records—testified at different moments of the trial that in 1977, he had savings of "[m]ore than $5,000," $13,000, and $15,000. He also testified that in 1977, he would only keep "`a little" money in savings left over from his pay check at his house. However, in Manuels loan application, he listed an amount of $5,000 as "cash at home." And his son, Manuel, Jr., testified that his mother took care of the finances and that she had a habit of saving money at home. Although one might conclude that the evidence is less than completely clear on the issue, any weakness in the evidence establishing the amount of funds Manuel had available at the time of the 1977 transaction does not mean that there was no substantial evidence to support the trial courts conclusions. Again, we will not be tempted by Carloss urgings that we reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses.
Carlos argues that the evidence was uncontroverted that while he lived at the property, he made certain improvements at his own expense, i.e., a three-car carport, a fence, and planting trees and roses. While this may be true, the point has no impact on our conclusion. The fact that an appellant may point to some evidence that supports his or her position—whether controverted or uncontroverted—does not of itself mean that the appellant meets his or her burden of showing that there was no substantial evidence to support the trial courts conclusions. The isolated fact here that Carlos made certain improvements to the property does not mean that there was no substantial evidence supporting the courts conclusion that Carlos held legal title subject to a resulting trust in favor of Manuel.
Further, Carlos contends that there was no substantial evidence to rebut the presumption that the 1977 conveyance of an interest in the property was a gift. In support of his argument, he cites Estate of Schechtman (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 365, 369.
Manuel does not dispute that there is a rebuttable presumption of a gift where the property transfer occurs from parent to child. (See Rest.3d Law Trusts, § 9(2), p. 124: "Where a transfer of property is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by another and the transferee is a spouse, descendant, or other natural object of the bounty of the person by whom the purchase price is paid, a resulting trust does not arise unless the latter manifests an intention that the transferee should not have the beneficial interest in the property.") Manuel argues that in this instance, however, the presumption was rebutted. We agree.
Manuel testified that he did not intend in 1977 to place Carlos on title as a gift to him. There was also evidence that Manuel treated his five children equally in that he gave property in Mexico to each of them. Further, Manuels subsequent actions—based on the testimony of Carlos himself—are supportive of the conclusion that no gift was intended. According to Carlos, on at least three occasions subsequent to his moving out of the property in 1985, Carlos asked his father for permission to move back to the property, which requests were refused. Moreover, the notion that Manuel placed Carlos on title as a gift is inconsistent with Carloss own testimony that he and his father purchased the property under an arrangement in which they were to be equal partners. We therefore conclude that there was substantial evidence supporting the trial courts conclusion that the gift presumption had been rebutted.
Lastly, Carlos takes issue with the courts statement in its Order that "[t]he primary factual issue is whether Carlos contributed any funds towards the purchase of the property." He argues that the court "mistakenly identifie[d] the primary factual issue . . . . But this is not the primary issue in a resulting trust case, but rather what is important is the intent of the parties." Carlos contends that as a result of the alleged misidentification of the central issue, the court improperly shifted the burden of proof to Carlos to show that he, in fact, contributed money to buy the property. We reject this challenge as well.
We observe that the courts Order was not a substitute for a statement of decision. "In a nonjury trial the appellant preserves the record by requesting and obtaining from the trial court a statement of decision pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 632 [and rule 3.1590 of the California Rules of Court]. The statement of decision provides the trial courts reasoning on disputed issues and is our touchstone to determine whether or not the trial courts decision is supported by the facts and the law." (Slavin v. Borinstein (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 713, 718.) "A memorandum opinion is not a decision. Although it may purport to decide issues in the case, it is merely an informal statement of the views of the trial judge. It does not constitute findings of fact." (Taormino v. Denny (1970) 1 Cal.3d 679, 684; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(b) [courts "tentative decision does not constitute a judgment and is not binding on the court"].) Thus, oral or written opinions of the trial judge antecedent to the judgment may not be utilized on appeal to impeach the judgment. (De Cou v. Howell (1923) 190 Cal. 741, 751. Without a statement of decision, a reviewing court looks only to the judgment to determine error. (In re Marriage of Ditto (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 643, 648.)
Here, the record does not disclose that either party requested a statement of decision in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 632. The parties therefore waived such statement of decision. (In re Marriage of Jeffries (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 548, 554, fn. 4.) Accordingly, we reject Carloss challenge based upon specific language in the Order as being an improper attempt to impeach the judgment. (Taormino v. Denny, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 684.)
"In superior courts, upon the trial of a question of fact by the court, written findings of fact and conclusions of law shall not be required. The court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial upon the request of any party appearing at the trial. The request must be made within 10 days after the court announces a tentative decision unless the trial is concluded within one calendar day or in less than eight hours over more than one day in which event the request must be made prior to the submission of the matter for decision. The request for a statement of decision shall specify those controverted issues as to which the party is requesting a statement of decision. After a party has requested the statement, any party may make proposals as to the content of the statement of decision. [¶] The statement of decision shall be in writing, unless the parties appearing at trial agree otherwise; however, when the trial is concluded within one calendar day or in less than 8 hours over more than one day, the statement of decision may be made orally on the record in the presence of the parties." (Code Civ. Proc., § 632.)
We acknowledge that the court may on its own deem its tentative decision a formal statement of decision, even absent a formal statutory request for statement of decision, provided that the record discloses the courts clear intention in that regard. (Slavin v. Borinstein, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 718-719.) Although the courts judgment included a copy of the Order as an exhibit with the language that the Orders "findings are incorporated herein by reference," we do not conclude from the courts doing so that it clearly intended to convert the Order into a formal statement of decision. (Cf. In re Marriage of Rising (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 472, 477, fn. 7 [finding that "trial court clearly intended that this written decision be a statement of decision"].) However, even were we to find that the Order, through its incorporation into the judgment, constituted a statement of decision, the record does not disclose that Carlos lodged objections to any language contained in the Order. To the contrary, Carloss counsel signed the judgment that incorporated the Order, approving it "as to form and content." Therefore, Carlos waived the right to claim on appeal that the Order—assuming, arguendo, its elevated status as a statement of decision—contained any omissions or ambiguities as now claimed here. (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42: "[I]f a party fails to bring omissions or ambiguities in the statement of decisions factual findings to the trial courts attention, then `that party waives the right to claim on appeal that the statement was deficient in these regards, and the appellate court will infer the trial court made implied factual findings to support the judgment.")
Moreover, even were we to consider the merits of Carloss argument, we do not agree that the court erroneously identified the central factual issues and/or shifted the burden of proof to Carlos. While the overall issue concerning Manuels resulting trust claim may have been whether the parties intended that Carlos receive beneficial title to the property, there is no doubt that a significant amount of evidence was presented on the issue of who contributed funds to purchase the property, and, more specifically, whether Carlos paid part of the down payment as he claimed. The resolution of this factual issue was obviously significant, in the trial courts view, in determining whether a resulting trust should be imposed, and we do not agree that its identification of the issue in the informal Order constituted error.
As is evident from our lengthy discussion of the facts, ante, there was conflicting evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding the 1977 purchase of the property and the subsequent conduct of Manuel and Carlos as it related to the question of whether the parties intended that Carlos receive beneficial title to the property. It is also evident that the court resolved those conflicts, including significant issues of witness credibility, in Manuels favor. Our review does not and cannot involve a reweighing of that evidence or assessing the credibility of the witnesses. It suffices for us to say that we find from a review of the entire record that there was substantial evidence supporting the trial courts conclusion that Carlos held title to the property subject to a resulting trust in favor of Manuel.
IV. Laches
Carlos asserted as an affirmative defense in his answer that Manuels claims were barred by laches. In its Order, the court held that the "action is not barred by laches . . . ." Carlos contends that this was error. We reject that challenge.
"Laches is an unreasonable delay in asserting an equitable right, causing prejudice to an adverse party such as to render the granting of relief to the other party inequitable." (Wells Fargo Bank v. Bank of America (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 424, 439.) The burden of proving the facts supporting the application of the doctrine of laches lies with the party asserting the defense (i.e., Carlos). (People v. Totari (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1208, citing People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 203-204.) "`The question of laches must be determined in each case upon the basis of its facts and in the absence of a palpable abuse of discretion the trial courts finding on that issue will not be disturbed on appeal. [Citation.]" (Marriage v. Keener (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 186, 190.)
Here, there was conflicting evidence as to whether Manuel unreasonably delayed in asserting his equitable right to quiet title to the property. On the one hand, there was Manuels testimony—supported by the testimony of Maria, Manuel, Jr., José, and Stevenson—that Carlos never claimed that he was an owner of the property until the family meeting held in October 2005 to discuss Manuels estate plan. On the other, there was Carloss testimony that he told Manuel several times before 2005—in 1985, 1989, 1995, 2000, and 2004—that he was a co-owner of the property. It is apparent that the court resolved this conflicting evidence in Manuels favor. The action—filed approximately seven months after Carlos first told Manuel that he was a co-owner of the property—was not barred by laches as a matter of law. Based upon the record, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the action was not barred by laches. (Marriage v. Keener, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 190.)
Carlos complains that the courts ruling that the action was not barred by laches was conclusory and was unsupported by any reasoning. This argument is without merit. Carlos neither requested a statement of decision, nor objected to the language of the Order. (See fn. 10, ante.) Under the doctrine of implied findings, we are required to "infer [that] the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment. [Citation.]" (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 58.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
Mihara, Acting P.J.
McAdams, J.