Opinion
No. SA-04-CA-0412-RF.
May 12, 2005
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant Center for Health Care Services, Inc.'s (CHCS) Motion to Dismiss Libel and Section 1985 and 1986 Claims in Plaintiff's First Amended Petition (Docket No. 33), filed on December 1, 2004, along with Plaintiff's Response and Defendant's Reply. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ricardo Martinez filed his original petition in state court on April 2, 2004, alleging that his former employer, Defendant CHCS, wrongfully terminated him. Plaintiff contends that his termination was in violation of his state constitutional rights of free speech, right to petition for redress, and right to due process. Plaintiff also alleged state tort claims, including a claim for libel. Plaintiff also asserted numerous federal claims, including (1) deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) conspiracy to interfere with civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and (3) an action for negligence, libel, and fraudulent misrepresentation under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. In his First Amended Original Petition, Plaintiff asserts claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 to vindicate rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff also brings a libel claim under Texas law but appears to have abandoned his other state claims, save a claim for attorney's fees.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE § 73.001 (Vernon 1997).
Id. § 38.001.
In addition to the primary named Defendant, CHCS, Plaintiff's original petition also named "as a nominal defendant" Dr. Robert Jimenez, Chairman of the Board for CHCS, and provided the names and addresses of eight trustees of CHCS. Defendant answered in state court before removing to this Court, generally denying all material allegations made by Plaintiff. Plaintiff withdraws these individuals as nominal Defendants in his Amended Petition. (Docket No. 29, at 2).
The facts giving rise to Plaintiff's claims are as follows. Around August 12, 2002, while employed by Defendant CHCS, Martinez addressed the Bexar County Commissioner's Court about CHCS's operations and priorities. In July 2003, Plaintiff again addressed the Commissioner's Court, raising issues on behalf of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and members of the United Public Workers of Texas, a statewide employee union. Plaintiff raised four specific areas of concern: (1) the provision of services to children and adolescents at local treatment centers; (2) administrative overhead; (3) outreach to residents on the south side of San Antonio; and (4) continuity of care.
At some point following his remarks, Plaintiff was terminated by CHCS. Plaintiff alleges that CHCS terminated him in retaliation for making the statements and on the basis of his political views or for representing his fellow employees' interests. Plaintiff further alleges that CHCS has "since time immemorial" "engaged in a custom or policy of encouraging its officers to chastize and discipline persons who speak out." Plaintiff charges that CHCS encourages such retaliation directly and by failing to discipline officers when such retaliation occurs. Plaintiff also claims that CHCS has an unofficial policy of manipulating investigative records and destroying documents likely to expose its directors and officers to civil liability.
Plf.'s Original Complaint, at 7.
Defendant moves to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) Plaintiff's state libel claim based on sovereign immunity and to dismiss Plaintiff's Section 1985 and 1986 claims under the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine.
DISCUSSION
I. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all the facts pleaded in the complaint must be taken as true. Dismissal on this basis is a disfavored means of disposing of a case, and district courts should avoid such dismissals "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." "The question therefore is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief."
Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986); United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 2004).
Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library Bd. of Control, 224 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 2000).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Kane Enterprises v. MacGregor, Inc., 322 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2003).
Gregson v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE § 1357, at 601 (1969)).
A. Plaintiff's Texas Tort Claims Act Claims Against Leon Evans
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's state tort claim against Defendant Leon Evans. The Court notes that Texas law prohibits a plaintiff seeking relief against a government entity from joining in the suit employees of that government entity. In fact, filing a tort claim against a government entity constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff not to proceed against any individual in a claim related to the same subject matter. When such a suit is filed under this chapter against a governmental entity and one or more of its employees, the Court should immediately dismiss the employees upon the appropriate motion. Because Defendant now moves to dismiss the claims against Defendant Evans on this basis, the Court must grant the motion and dismiss Plaintiff's state tort claim — for libel — against Defendant Evans.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE § 101.106(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
Id. § 101.106(e).
Plaintiff states in response to the motion to dismiss that he no longer wishes to pursue his state libel claim against CHCS. Thus, Plaintiff waives his claim for libel against CHCS. As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff's libel claim as to Defendant CHCS must be dismissed as well.
B. Plaintiff's Section 1985 Claim
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, asserting that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against them under this statute. In general, Section 1985 prohibits conspiracies designed to interfere with civil rights and has three subcategories: (1) preventing a public officer from performing her duties; (2) obstructing justice by intimidating a party, witness, or juror; and (3) depriving persons of the right of equal protection under the laws of the United States.
Section 1985(1) applies in cases involving interference with federal officials in the performance of their official duties and is not applicable to state officials. Since Defendants here are not federal employees, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against them under Section 1985(1). Additionally, there is nothing in the pleadings before the Court to suggest that Plaintiff has a claim under Section 1985(2) and the Court finds that Plaintiff states no claim under this subsection either. Therefore, the only possible claim by Plaintiff under Section 1985 would be found in the final subsection.
Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 1998).
Id.
To state a claim under Section 1985(3), Plaintiff must allege (1) a conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy, (4) whereby a person is injured in either person or property or is deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
Hamilton v. Chaffin, 506 F.2d 904, 914 n. 23 (5th Cir. 1975) ("`The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus . . .") (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971). See also Dowsey v. Wilkins, 467 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1972).
United Brotherhood of Carpenters Joiners of America, Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1983).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under this section because they have failed to plead any facts reflecting either an agreement or meeting of the minds that was motivated by class-based animus or an act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Defendants state that, even if the Court finds a Section 1985 claim implied in the pleadings before it, the Plaintiff has alleged at most an "intra-corporate conspiracy," involving an agency and officials of the same agency conspiring together. Defendants argue correctly that such a conspiracy generally fails as a matter of law because such an agency and its employees constitute a single legal entity which cannot conspire with itself.
Benningfield, 157 F.3d at 378.
As Plaintiff points out in response, a possible exception to the failure of the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine has been recognized by the Fifth Circuit. In Benningfield v. City of Houston, the Fifth Circuit noted that one possible exception exists, "where corporate employees act for their own personal purposes." Plaintiff argues that Defendants acted for their own personal purposes in taking the actions alleged against Plaintiff because Plaintiff had criticized Defendant Evans personally, including Evans's management of Defendant CHCS and an alleged, recent salary increase. Thus, Plaintiff contends that Evans had a personal purpose in conspiring with various other employees of CHCS to terminate him.
Id. at 379.
Assuming that the allegations of a personal motive are true, Plaintiff nonetheless fails to state a claim under Section 1985(3). As noted by the Fifth Circuit in Benningfield, Plaintiff must show that the alleged conspiracy was "motivated by class-based animus." Defendants point out that Plaintiff fails to plead that the alleged conspiracy to terminate him in retaliation for his statements was motivated by any such hatred or class-based discriminatory motive. Thus, the Court finds that under the Fifth Circuit's clear holding in Benningfield and even with the explicit assumption that the allegations of personal motive are true, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Section 1985(3).
Accord Benningfield, 157 F.3d at 379.
Id. (citing Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Id.; Hilliard, 30 F.3d at 653.
The Court reaches the conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to state such a claim upon review of Plaintiff's amended pleading. Upon removal to this Court, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims or in the alternative for more definite statement. Finding the Defendant's arguments about the clarity of Plaintiff's initial pleading meritorious, the Court granted the motion for more definite statement and denied without prejudice the motion to dismiss. (Docket Nos. 21, 22). Plaintiff filed an amended pleading in this Court on October 21, 2004. Through the instant motion, Defendants again move to dismiss some of the claims asserted in the amended pleading. Having already granted a motion for more definite statement and denied without prejudice the initial motion to dismiss, the Court approaches Plaintiff's amended pleading with greater scrutiny.
The Court is conscious of the disfavor with which motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are viewed and is appropriately hesitant to grant such a motion. For this reason, the Court construes the complaint liberally in Plaintiff's favor, accepting all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true. However, when Plaintiff plainly fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it is appropriate to grant Defendants' motion to dismiss. On the facts before it, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Section 1985. As a result, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim.
Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2004).
E.g. id.; Lowrey v. Texas AM Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997).
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Priester, 354 F.3d at 418-19; Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 247.
C. Plaintiff's Section 1986 Claim
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, articulating the well-established maxim that without a viable claim under Section 1985, there can be no Section 1986 claim. Section 1986 provides a cause of action against a party with knowledge of a conspiracy in violation of Section 1985 who fails to take action to prevent the violation. When a party fails to state a claim under Section 1985, the Court must, as a matter of law, dismiss the interrelated, dependant cause of action under Section 1986. For this reason, the Court must grant Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Section 1986 claims as well.
Hamilton v. Chaffin, 506 F.2d 904, 914 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Because of this failure to state a claim cognizable under Section 1985(3), appellant may not recover under the interrelated, dependent cause of action under Section 1986, action for neglecting to prevent a known conspiracy under Section 1985."); Dowsey v. Wilkins, 467 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Because of a failure to establish any [Section] 1985 right, the interrelated, dependent cause of action under Section 1986 was also correctly dismissed.").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 33) should be GRANTED.