Opinion
No. 36435.
February 23, 1948.
1. CRIMINAL LAW.
In prosecution for assault with intent to murder, where issues and controlling principles were sufficiently set out in instructions as a whole, giving of a condemned charge on behalf of the State that "this is true regardless of every other fact and circumstance in the case" was not reversible error.
2. CRIMINAL LAW.
In prosecution for assault with intent to murder, consistent exclusion by trial judge of alleged intemperate remarks of special prosecutor during cross-examination prevented substantial prejudice.
3. CRIMINAL LAW.
In prosecution for assault with intent to murder, conduct and exclamations of prosecuting witness made shortly after the assault while fleeing from defendant after having been wounded by him and seeking refuge in a neighbor's home, and followed almost immediately by appearance of defendant still armed with weapon used, were admissible since they were closely associated with the assault.
4. WITNESSES.
In prosecution for assault with intent to commit murder, letter between witness and her husband remained privileged though husband waived his privilege, and as such ought not to have been admitted over witness' objection.
5. WITNESSES.
The privilege extended to communications between husband and wife is for their protection and the marital relationship, and must be respected whether either spouse is a party or not.
6. WITNESSES.
In a murder prosecution, a defendant may not set up for error the admission of a privileged communication between third persons.
7. CRIMINAL LAW.
In prosecution for assault with intent to murder, where a wife, on behalf of her son, the defendant, voluntarily testified as to private conversations between herself and the victim, her husband, depicting the mutual feelings between husband and son and numerous overt acts of hostility between them, admission of a privileged letter written between wife and husband, for purpose of contradicting the wife's previous statements, was harmless error, where contraditions involved were slight and additional recitals were helpful to defendant.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Bolivar County.
Alexander Feduccia, of Cleveland, for appellant.
Any communication between wife and husband which is inherently a confidential communication and which was not intended for exposure to the public in general is not admissible into evidence without the consent of both parties.
Whitehead et al. v. Kirk, 104 Miss. 776, 61 So. 737, 62 So. 432; Strauss v. Hutson et ux., 104 Miss. 637, 61 So. 594; Pearson v. State, 97 Miss. 841, 53 So. 689; Spencer v. O'Bryant, 140 Miss. 474, 106 So. 6; Finklea v. State, 94 Miss. 777, 48 So. 1; Carter et al. v. State, 167 Miss. 331, 145 So. 739; Leach et al. v. Shelby, 58 Miss. 681; State v. McMullins, 156 Miss. 663, 126 So. 662; Mask v. State, 32 Miss. 405; Davis v. State, 157 Miss. 669, 128 So. 885; Ulmer v. State, 157 Miss. 807, 128 So. 749; Motley v. State, 174 Miss. 568, 165 So. 296; Doss v. State, 156 Miss. 522, 126 So. 197; McFadden et al. v. Welch et al., 177 Miss. 451, 170 So. 903; Smith v. State, 193 Miss. 474, 10 So.2d 352; McQueen v. State, 139 Miss. 457, 104 So. 168; Mercer et al. v. State (Fla.), 24 So. 154; Kelly v. Andrews, 102 Iowa 119, 71 N.W. 251; Campbell v. Chase, 12 R.I. 333; Wilkerson v. State, 91 Ga. 729, 17 S.E. 990, 44 Am. St. Rep. 73; Scott v. Com., 94 Ky. 511, 23 S.W. 219, 42 Am. St. Rep. 371; Mahner v. Linck, 70 Mo. App. 380; Cole v. State, 48 Tex.Crim. Rep., 88 S.W. 341; Selden v. State, 74 Wis. 271, 42 N.W. 218, 17 Am. St. Rep. 144; Walker v. State, 64 Tex.Crim. 70, 141 S.W. 243; Hearne v. State, 50 Tex.Crim. 431, 97 S.W. 1050; Reg. v. Pamenter, 12 Cox C.C. (Eng.) 177; Code of 1942, Sec. 1689; 20 Am. Jur. 354, Sec. 394; 63 A.L.R. 107.
Instructions for the State in criminal cases must: (1) not charge or comment on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence or testimony; (2) not be misleading; (3) not be argumentative; (4) not give undue prominence to particular matters; (5) not invade the province of the jury; (6) not omit elements of self-defense or defense of another, in proper case; (7) not omit that offense was committed "without authority of law"; (8) not disparage or attempt to nullify instructions for defendant; (9) not ignore all of defenses of the defendant and his version of the case; (10) not assume any disputed or essential fact or facts as true; and (11) be reasonably free from harmful error where the facts are close.
Adams v. State, 175 Miss. 868, 167 So. 59; Gordon v. State, 95 Miss. 543, 49 So. 609; Fore v. State, 75 Miss. 727, 23 So. 710; Thompson v. State (Miss.), 9 So. 298; McNeal v. State, 115 Miss. 678, 76 So. 625; Hood et al. v. State (Miss.), 27 So. 643; Bowen v. State, 164 Miss. 225, 144 So. 230; Earl v. State, 168 Miss. 124, 151 So. 172; Leverett v. State, 112 Miss. 394, 73 So. 274; Marble v. State, 194 Miss. 386, 15 So.2d 693, 694; Cartee v. State, 162 Miss. 263, 139 So. 618; Code of 1942, Sec. 1530.
Statements, not spontaneous, which are made soon after the occurrence of the incident, and which are in the form of a narrative, do not form a part of the res gestae and are inadmissible in evidence
King v. State, 65 Miss. 576, 5 So. 97; Brown v. State, 78 Miss. 637, 29 So. 519; Field v. State, 57 Miss. 474; Mayes v. State, 64 Miss. 329, 1 So. 733; 20 Am. Jur. 564, Sec. 670.
Improper and prejudicial remarks and questions of prosecuting attorney require reversal and new trial.
Clark v. State, 113 Miss. 201, 74 So. 127; Coleman v. State, 198 Miss. 519, 23 So.2d 404; 23 C.J.S. 533, Sec. 1087.
The verdict of the jury was contrary to the law, and contrary to the overwhelming evidence in the case.
Greek L. Rice, Attorney General, by John Kuykendall, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
The defense offered in this trial was based upon the theory that Cornelius Martin, in the defense of his mother, Ora, while she was in danger of bodily harm, fired two shots which struck Lee. The verdict of the jury finding the defendant guilty of the offense charged indicates the jury did not accept this defense. The question of intent, the gist of this offense, was for the jury.
Blakely v. State, 165 Miss. 503, 144 So. 864.
The admission of the letter from Ora Martin to her husband, Lee, in this case did not prejudice any rights of the defendant which would entitle him to a reversal of the judgment of the trial court.
White v. State, 52 Miss. 216, 225; Davenport v. State, 143 Miss. 121, 108 So. 433, 45 A.L.R. 1348; Newcomb v. State, 37 Miss. 383; Jenkins v. State, 146 Miss. 339, 111 So. 433; Maddox v. State, 173 Miss. 799, 163 So. 449; Vance v. State, 182 Miss. 840, 183 So. 280; 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3 Ed.), Secs. 2196, 2259, 2270, 2276.
It was not error for the instruction on behalf of the State to conclude, "and this is true regardless of any other fact and circumstance in this case."
Adams v. State, 175 Miss. 868, 167 So. 59; Kilgore v. State, 198 Miss. 816, 23 So.2d 690.
Appellant appeals from a conviction of assault with intent to murder his father. The record presents a substantial issue of fact for the jury.
We have considered the assignment relating to the State's only instruction. Its concluding clause "and this is true regardless of every other fact and circumstance in this case" has been condemned many times. Cole v. State, 172 Miss. 19, 159 So. 296, 298; Earl v. State, 168 Miss. 124, 151 So. 172. We are of the opinion, however, that the issues and controlling principles were sufficiently set out in the instructions as a whole and that no reversible error was committed.
Complaint is made of the allegedly intemperate remarks of the special prosecutor during cross-examination. We conclude that the consistent exclusion thereof by the trial judge denied to these over-zealous comments any substantial prejudice to the defendant.
The conduct and exclamations of the prosecuting witness made shortly after the assault are made the basis of an assignment of error. The witness was allegedly fleeing from the defendant after having been wounded by him, and was seeking refuge in a neighbor's home. We are of the opinion that this testimony concerned verbal acts and was closely associated with the assault, and were followed almost immediately by the appearance of the defendant who was still armed with the weapon theretofore used, and were not objectionable.
The most serious assignment relates to the introduction of a letter written by the wife to the prosecuting witness who was then in a hospital under treatment for the wounds caused by the defendant. The husband sought to waive the privilege as such, but counsel for the defendant objected to its introduction, on behalf of the wife and the defendant.
We hold that the letter was a privileged communication and ought not to have been admitted. The basic inquiry, however, is whether the defendant may assign the error upon appeal. The privilege is for the protection of the husband and wife and the marital relationship. As such it ought to be respected whether either spouse is a party or not. Carter v. State, 167 Miss. 331, 145 So. 739. The error in its admission, however, is one against the wife who was a witness. The defendant is in no position to complain of the error on appeal unless of course the letter is otherwise inadmissible. Upon the latter point, appellant stresses only its inherent privilege stating that the "letter was prejudicial to the rights of the defendant, the same being incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial."
It is stated in Wigmore on Evidence, Section 2196: ". . . The party against whom the testimony is brought has no right to claim or to urge the exemption on his own behalf; and, on the witness' behalf, the Court is to be left to accord the protection if it is a proper one.
"(2) (a) An improper ruling by the Court, upon a question of privilege, cannot be excepted to by the party as an error justifying an appeal and a new trial, if the ruling denies the privilege and compels the witness to testify. By hypothesis, the privilege does not exist for the benefit of the party nor for the sake of the better ascertainment of the truth of his cause. The offered testimony is relevant, and is, in all other respects than the privilege, admissible. The admission of it, by denying the privilege, has not introduced material which in any way renders less trustworthy the finding of the verdict; on the contrary, only the exclusion of it could have been an obstacle to the ascertainment of the truth. The only interest injured is that of the witness himself, who has been forced to comply with a supposed duty, which as between himself and the State did not exist; his remedy was to refuse to obey, and to appeal for vindication if the Court had attempted improperly to use compulsory process for contempt. . . ."
This principle is supported by many authorities, among which are State v. Deslovers, 40 R.I. 89, 100 A. 64; Matthews v. McNeill, 98 Kan. 5, 157 P. 387; Thrasher v. State, 92 Neb. 110, 138 N.W. 120, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 882; Vickers v. State, 92 Tex.Crim. 182, 242 S.W. 1032; Victor v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 350, 298 S.W. 936; White v. White, 101 Minn. 451, 112 N.W. 627; Coles v. Harsch, 129 Or. 11, 276 P. 248; Underhill, Criminal Evidence, Section 349; 70 C.J., Witnesses, Section 619, p. 456. In line with these decisions are those of this Court which have held that in a murder case a defendant may not set up for error the admission of a privileged communication between third persons. Davenport v. State, 143 Miss. 121, 108 So. 433, 45 A.L.R. 1348; Maddox v. State, 173 Miss. 799, 163 So. 449. The former case is cited with approval in Cabe v. State, 182 Ark. 49, 30 S.W.2d 855, and is annotated in 45 A.L.R. 1348. See also McBride v. State, 188 Miss. 620, 196 So. 633.
In many cases absence of error is predicated upon the fact that the contents of the communication are in themselves without prejudice. Among these are Carter v. State, supra, where special emphasis upon the sacred character of such communications did not prevent examining the contents with a view to adjudging whether they were prejudicial to the defendant.
In addition, it may be noted that this witness voluntarily took the stand in behalf of the defendant, her son, and in her direct testimony, in response to questions by counsel for defendant, she testified at great length detailing private conversations between herself and her husband, occurring over a period of time, depicting the mutual feelings between the husband and son and wife-mother, and numerous overt acts of hostility between the father and son. All of this was admitted without objection as hearsay or privilege communications between husband and wife. The letter was introduced for the purpose of contradicting the foregoing testimony of this witness. The direct contradictions between the contents of the letter and her statements were slight, and, in our opinion, did the defendant no harm. The letter did contain some recitals additional to the related conversations, but such additional statements were helpful rather than prejudicial to the defendant.
Affirmed.
SPECIALLY CONCURRING OPINION.
Communications between husband and wife made under the sanctity of the marital relation are protected from disclosure in any court of law or equity without the consent of both of them — this upon profound principles of public policy, in order that they may communicate with each other freely without apprehension that such confidence can at any time and in any event be violated. It equally applies when one only of them is a party and when neither is a party, and solely by force of the statute is withdrawn only when they are adversary parties. The reason for the rule is all the stronger when neither is a party, and, as intimated in Carter v. State, 167 Miss. 331, 145 So. 739, it would be the duty of the court to exclude of its own motion, for in such a case, without the intervention by the court, the husband or wife would be helpless to preserve the rule whatever the unlawful intrusion.
It is, therefore, only by what is said in the concluding paragraph of the main opinion that this conviction may properly be saved from a reversal. Here the husband furnished the letter in question to the prosecuting officers, thereby consenting to the disclosure, and the wife on her part took the witness stand and testified about what was substantially the same matters dealt with in the letter, thereby lifting it from its confidential character so far as she was concerned.