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considering plaintiffs copies of letters denying grievance appeals as they "consist[ed] of records and reports of an administrative body" and "[t]herefore, the court takes judicial notice of these exhibits and will not convert the motion to a motion for summary judgment"
Summary of this case from McCoy v. GoordOpinion
Case No. 00 C 983.
March 28, 2002.
ORDER
Plaintiff Michael Martin is incarcerated within the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC"). He has filed suit against defendants Donald Snyder, James Page, Dwayne Clark, Christopher Hughes, Anthony Lelli, Robert Oliver, Mark Nelson, Jerome Springborn, George DeTella, Lamark Carter, and Robert Cattaneo, all employees of IDOC, in connection with his stay at the Stateville Correctional Facility in Joliet, Illinois ("Stateville") from approximately November 9, 1998 to January 24, 2001. Defendants have moved this court to dismiss Martin's complaint in its entirety pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Discussion
Martin's complaint contains five counts. In Counts I through IV, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he alleges that defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. In Count I, he claims that defendants exposed him to excessive tobacco smoke ("ETS"). Count II alleges that defendants acted with deliberate indifference in failing to provide Martin with adequate lighting. In Count III, Martin alleges that defendants violated his constitutional rights by depriving him of safe drinking water. In Count IV, Martin claims that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him after he filed grievances concerning ETS, inadequate lighting, and unsafe water. Finally, in Count V, Martin raises an Illinois state-law tort claim that defendants denied him medical treatment.
Although Martin never mentions § 1983 in his complaint, his factual allegations are sufficient to set forth violations of that section, as discussed below.
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss, relying on three general grounds. First, defendants argue that Martin has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. In addition, they claim that Martin has failed to state a cause of action for each of his Eighth Amendment, First Amendment, and state-law tort claims. (They also argue that if the court dismisses Martin's federal constitutional claims, it will have no jurisdiction over his Illinois tort claim of denial of medical treatment.) Finally, defendants argue that even if Martin has stated a cause of action, they are all entitled to qualified immunity. Martin opposes all of these arguments.
I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
It is well established that inmates are generally required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Perez v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999); Pritchett v. Page, No. 99 C 8174, 2000 WL 1129891, *3 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 9, 2000). The explicit requirement is found in the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Illinois prison system has a formal grievance procedure. An inmate's administrative remedies are exhausted upon a final determination of his grievance.
Some circuits have held that the PLRA imposes a strict pleading requirement on the prisoner with regard to exhaustion. See, e.g., Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that to satisfy the requirements of § 1997e(a) the prisoner must allege that he exhausted all available administrative remedies and should attach to his complaint the administrative decision). However, the Seventh Circuit has explicitly held that exhaustion is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional requirement. Perez, 182 F.3d at 535-36. Ordinarily, when exhaustion is an affirmative defense, "plaintiff [is] not required to plead exhaustion." Salerno v. Runyon, No. 92 C 3679, 1993 WL 311923, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 11, 1993); accord Wyatt v. Terhune, No. 00-16568, 2002 WL 206393 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2002) (holding that the PLRA does not require a prisoner to plead exhaustion in his complaint; burden is on defendants to show non-exhaustion). However, the Seventh Circuit has noted that, even though the PLRA exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, "dismissal on the pleadings is proper for failure to plead the exhaustion of all administrative remedies." Massey v. Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000).
In Massey, the district court had dismissed the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the complaint failed to allege that the plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies. However, as the Seventh Circuit observed, the plaintiff claimed only that exhaustion would have been futile and essentially conceded that he did not exhaust administrative procedures as required by the PLRA. The district court noted this, declined to convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Massey, 221 F.3d at 1034 ("[I]t seems clear from the district court's order that the complaint was found to be deficient on its face, without reference to other pleadings or exhibits, and therefore judgment under Rule 12(b)(6) was proper as to Count One.").
There is no futility exception to the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA. Perez, 182 F.3d at 536-37.
In this case, however, Martin alleges that he satisfied the exhaustion requirement. In his first amended complaint, Martin alleges generally that he either satisfied the exhaustion requirements or was "wrongfully refused access to such administrative remedies." (Am. Compl. 6 17.) He also makes several specific allegations as to when he filed grievances, and alleges that he received no response from the warden. Defendants dispute that Martin satisfied the exhaustion requirement, arguing that Martin never specifically alleges that he received any responses from the ARB issuing a final determination of his grievances. There is a question as to how specifically Martin must plead exhaustion in his complaint. The Seventh Circuit held only that he must "plead the exhaustion of all administrative remedies." Massey, 221 F.d at 1034. Reading this holding broadly, this court holds that Martin has satisfied his pleading requirement. Cf. Buck v. Briley, No. 01 C 1153, 2001 WL 619523 (N.D.Ill. May 23, 2001) (holding that where it was clear that prisoner had not exhausted his remedies, on his amended complaint "he must set forth, with respect to each claim, his efforts to employ the grievance procedure and the result at each step").
Defendants dispute that Martin has satisfied the exhaustion requirement. At first glance, it would appear that this issue is inappropriate for resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because it would require a factual finding. Salerno, 1993 WL 311923 at *1 (where exhaustion is an affirmative defense, the defendant's motion to dismiss raising failure to exhaust "is not a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on which the court could resolve factual issues"). On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has held that although defendants may waive reliance on § 1997e(a), "[w]hen they assert their rights-as the defendants in this case did-then the judge must address the subject immediately." Perez, 182 F.3d at 536. Thus, this court must resolve the exhaustion issue "before turning to any other issue in the suit." Id.
In his response brief, Martin has attached three exhibits. Exhibits 1 and 3 are records of the IDOC's Administration Review Board ("ARB") regarding the determination of Martin's grievances of exposure to ETS and unsafe drinking water. Exhibit 2 contains copies of grievances as well as a letter from the assistant deputy director of District 1 of the IDOC, informing Martin that there was no evidence of any grievance regarding his complaints about inadequate lighting. Defendants argue that these exhibits cannot be considered by the court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Defendants are mistaken.
Ordinarily, if a court considers matters outside the pleadings, it should convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Hamilton v. Summers, 95 F. Supp.2d 908, 910 (N.D.Ill. 2000). However, "the district court may . . . take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment." Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation omitted). "Facts properly held the object of judicial notice in the context of a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) include, among others, records and reports of administrative bodies. . . ." Hamilton, 95 F. Supp.2d at 910 (quoting Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1258, 1261 (N.D.Cal. 1991)). In this case, Martin's Exhibits 1 and 3 consist of records and reports of an administrative body. Therefore, the court takes judicial notice of these exhibits and will not convert the motion to a motion for summary judgment. See also Snow v. Terhune, No. C 01-0942, 2002 WL 257841, *1 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 14, 2002) (when considering whether prisoner exhausted his PLRA administrative remedies, reviewing (without converting to summary judgment and without citation) plaintiff's "submissions of copies of his administrative appeals" provided in response to defendants' motion to dismiss).
In light of Martin's exhibits, defendants appear to concede that Martin has satisfied his exhaustion requirement with respect to his claims of exposure to ETS and unsafe drinking water. In their reply brief in support of their motion to dismiss, they raise an argument only with respect to Martin's complaint of inadequate lighting. "The only surviving claims should be with regard to cigarette smoke and water quality." (Defs.' Reply at 2.) There remains a question as to whether Martin has satisfied the exhaustion requirement with respect to his complaints of inadequate lighting. Martin claims in his complaint that he filed several grievances, but has never received a response from defendants. In fact, he alleges that defendants ignored or destroyed evidence of his grievances. Defendants appear to concede that Martin did, in fact, file grievances concerning inadequate lighting. Furthermore, defendants do not appear to argue that Martin's allegations that defendants ignored or destroyed his grievances are untrue (although they certainly do not concede them), but rather argue that to exhaust his remedies, Martin should have filed even more grievances about defendants' failure to respond. The court disagrees. In Pritchett, the court noted that the plaintiff had filed grievances relating to every issue raised in his complaint save one. One of the plaintiff's claims was that he received no response to his grievances and therefore was unable to appeal. "Accordingly, the court will consider the substantive merit of those claims regarding which the plaintiff allegedly filed grievances prior to bringing suit, even though there is no indication that he pursued appeals to the Administrative Review Board." Id. at *3. This court agrees with Pritchett and holds that Martin has satisfied his exhaustion requirements. For the same reasons, this court will consider the substantive merit of Martin's Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate lighting. Defendants' exhaustion argument fails. The court thus turns to the merits of Martin's claims.
II. Counts I-III: Eighth Amendment Claims
The Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to inmates' health and safety. Prison officials violate the Constitution when they fail to take reasonable measures in the face of a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994). In order to establish liability under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the challenged conditions of confinement were objectively so serious as to amount to the denial of a basic human need; and (2) that the defendant official acted with deliberate indifference. Id. at 834. To satisfy the objective component, "the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, `sufficiently serious.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). To be sufficiently serious "a prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 844 (7th Cir.) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1244 (2000). Therefore, "extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim." Id. (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)).
Under the subjective component, "[t]he infliction must be deliberate or otherwise reckless in the criminal law sense, which means that the defendant must have committed an act so dangerous that his knowledge of the risk can be inferred or that the defendant actually knew of an impending harm easily preventable." Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1427 (7th Cir. 1996). "Liability under the Eighth Amendment requires punishment, and punishment requires more than negligence, whether ordinary or gross. It requires, at a minimum, that the prison officials have realized there was imminent danger and have refused-consciously refused, knowingly refused-to do anything about it." Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
A. Count I: Excessive Tobacco Smoke
Martin's complaint charges that his continuous exposure to excessive levels of second-hand smoke caused him to experience burning eyes, throat and lungs, loss of breath, and dryness of mouth. (Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Martin also alleges that he may experience significant health problems in the future as a result of being forced to breathe cancer-causing second-hand smoke. With guidance from the Seventh Circuit, the court considers these allegations as two separate claims: present injuries and future injuries. Henderson, 196 F.3d at 844-49.
Martin also claims that "[d]ue in part to these acute symptoms, Plaintiff was forced to consume large quantities of tap water offered to inmates at Stateville. Plaintiff began thereafter to suffer extreme headaches, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea." (Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) The court will address this allegation when it considers Martin's claim regarding unsafe water below.
In Henderson, the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, not a prison inmate. Therefore, he was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 196 F.3d at 844 n. 2. However, the Seventh Circuit specifically observed that "§ 1983 claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment are to be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment test." Id. Therefore, the holding in Henderson applies to Martin's Eighth Amendment claims.
1. Present Injuries
To state an Eighth Amendment claim for present injuries sustained as a result of excessive exposure to second-hand smoke, Martin must allege "that the second-hand smoke caused him to suffer `serious' existing health problems and that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his situation." Henderson, 196 F.3d at 845. "A serious injury or medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Id. at 846 (quotation omitted).
Like the plaintiff in Henderson, Martin "does not allege that a physician either diagnosed him as having a medical condition that necessitated a smoke-free environment or treated him for any condition or ailment brought about by his exposure to second-hand smoke." Id. In fact, Martin claims that despite several requests, the medical technician refused to allow Martin to see a doctor. In Henderson, on a motion to dismiss, the court considered whether a layperson would consider the plaintiff's alleged injuries resulting from exposure to second-hand smoke to be so "serious" as to require a physician's care and attention. The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff's alleged symptoms of "breathing problems, chest pains, dizziness, sinus problems, headaches and a loss of energy-are, objectively speaking, relatively minor." Id. Martin's alleged symptoms-burning eyes, throat and lungs, loss of breath, and dryness of mouth-are almost identical. "In fact, we have already determined that these sorts of injuries are not sufficiently serious to be constitutionally actionable." Id.; see also Oliver v. Deen, 77 F.3d 156, 158-61 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding at the summary judgment stage that an asthmatic prisoner failed to demonstrate that he had a serious medical need for non-smoking environment even though his exposure to second-hand smoke aggravated his asthmatic condition causing him to suffer chest pains, difficulty in breathing, dizziness, nausea and other signs of discomfort). Martin's claim of present injuries fails. Martin comes close to conceding this point, focusing almost exclusively on his future injuries claim. Therefore, the court grants defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to Martin's present injuries claim in Count I.
2. Future Injuries
Martin succeeds on his claim of future injuries. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from a prison official's deliberate indifference to both current serious health problems and "conditions posing an unreasonable risk of serious damage to the prisoner's future health." Henderson, 196 F.3d at 847 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-35 (1993)). In Helling, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment "by alleging that [prison officials] have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of ETS that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health." 509 U.S. at 35.
To sustain a claim for future harm caused by exposure to second-hand smoke, a plaintiff must satisfy objective and subjective elements that are slightly different from the present injury test. For the objective component, a plaintiff "must show that he himself is being exposed to unreasonably high levels of ETS." Id. at 35. This objective inquiry requires more than just a "scientific and statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that such injury to health will actually be caused by exposure to ETS," it also requires that Martin show "that the risk of which he complains is not one that today's society chooses to tolerate." Id. With respect to the subjective factor, Martin "must prove that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his plight as a non-smoker placed in a smoking environment." Henderson, 196 F.3d at 847 (citing Helling, 509 U.S. at 35).
Martin's complaint alleges that his continuous exposure to cancer-causing second-hand smoke at Stateville posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health. He further alleges that defendants ignored his complaints about the conditions of his confinement. In fact, Martin claims that after filing several grievances relating to his exposure to ETS, prison officials replaced his current cell mate with an inmate who was a chain smoker. These allegations are sufficient to sustain a claim for future harm. Henderson, 196 F.3d at 847. Therefore, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Martin's future injuries claim in Count I.
B. Count II: Inadequate Lighting
No Seventh Circuit case has held that inadequate lighting can constitute a violation of a prison inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. At least one court in this district has rejected a similar claim on summary judgment, holding that "without an allegation of more-such as total light deprivation-we find that inadequate lighting does not so offend the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Wilson v. Schomig, 863 F. Supp. 789, 795 (N.D.Ill. 1994) (internal quotation omitted). On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has held that "[a]dequate lighting is one of the fundamental attributes of `adequate shelter' required by the Eighth Amendment." Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985)).
In Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 615 (7th Cir. 1980), the Seventh Circuit expressed concern over claims of inadequate lighting at a prison, considering whether the claims set forth a violation of the Due Process Clause. Specifically, the court was concerned about "cells which were so poorly lighted that prisoners could not read." Id. at 617. The court ultimately remanded the case with instructions for the district court to consider that issue. Id. In light of the unsettled case law, this court concludes that inadequate lighting can give rise to a constitutional violation under certain circumstances. Martin claims that for five months, he stayed in a cell with a non-functional light, and a small window "that allowed only minimal ambient light from within prison to enter." (Am. Compl. ¶ 47.) He claims that he was in "near total darkness for approximately 12-14 hours per day." (Id.) He claims that he suffered eye strain, headaches, and was unable to read or otherwise pursue normal activities. He alleges that even after filing several grievances, defendants continued to ignore his requests for adequate lighting. He claims that on October 29, 1999, he fell and injured his head because of the lack of light. He alleges that he was denied medical treatment after this incident. On January 27, 2000, Martin claims that he fell again and injured his head; he claims that defendant Cattaneo taunted him when he requested medical attention.
At this early stage of the proceedings, the court cannot grant defendants' motion. If Martin proves all of his factual allegations, he may be able to show that defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. At least the Ninth Circuit has held that the Eighth Amendment is violated where "the lighting was so poor that it was inadequate for reading and caused eyestrain and fatigue and hindered attempts to insure that basic sanitation was maintained." Hoptowit, 753 F.2d at 783. The court cannot say with certainty that Martin can prove no set of facts to support the allegations in his claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-56 (1957).
Defendants also argue that they lack personal involvement. They claim that they did not have the authority to repair Martin's light. However, Martin's complaint alleges otherwise, and this allegation must be credited at this stage in the proceedings. On the other hand, it is clear from Martin's complaint that he alleges personal involvement by only ten of the eleven defendants. They include Hughes, DeTella, Lelli, Nelson, Carter, Oliver, Springborn, Page, Snyder, and Cattaneo. Therefore, the court dismisses from Count II defendant Clark, who is mentioned nowhere in that claim. Otherwise, however, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Count II.
This is the only count in which defendants claim lack of personal involvement.
C. Count III: Unsafe Drinking Water
Martin claims that the water at Stateville is unfit to drink and that defendants are deliberately indifferent to the known risk. He claims that he has suffered headaches, long term gastric problems, and nausea. He also alleges that the conditions are a threat to his future health. Defendants argue that these allegations do not state a claim for relief.
Martin's alleged symptoms that he alleges were caused by the unsafe water-specifically, vomiting and diarrhea-if chronic, could constitute a serious injury or medical need that is "so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Henderson, 196 F.3d at 846 (quotation omitted). Furthermore, courts have previously held that an "inmate [does] not have to show present physical injury to proceed" on an unsafe drinking water claim. Ford v. Page, No. 00 C 1044, 2000 WL 960732, *2 (N.D.Ill. July 11, 2000) ("Ford I") (citing Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Helling, 509 U.S. at 33, the Supreme Court observed: "We would think that a prison inmate also could successfully complain about demonstrably unsafe drinking water without waiting for an attack of dysentery."
Like the court in Ford I, this court concludes that Martin's complaint has set forth an arguable claim for relief. "Plaintiff charges, and the court must accept as true at this stage of the proceedings, that the water at Stateville is unsafe to drink." 2000 WL 960732, at *2. If Martin can prove that defendants have subjected him either to his alleged physical ailments or to an unreasonable risk of harm, then he may succeed on his Eighth Amendment claim. Id. For these reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Count III.
Defendants rely on Carroll v. DeTella, 255 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2001), and Ford v. Page, No. 00 C 1044, 2001 WL 477149 (N.D.Ill. 2001) ("Ford II"), for the proposition that radium contamination in water is not cruel and unusual punishment. However, each of these cases was decided on a motion for summary judgment, complete with a factual record. In this case, by contrast, Martin has alleged that the water was unsafe and that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the unreasonable risk of harm. That is all he needs to survive on a motion to dismiss. Ford I, 2000 WL 960732, at *2.
III. Count IV: First Amendment Retaliation
Invoking the First Amendment, Martin claims that defendants retaliated against him in various ways because he filed several grievances about the conditions at Stateville. The Seventh Circuit has addressed such a claim:
An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right violates the Constitution. Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts that, by necessity, includes the right to pursue the administrative remedies that must be exhausted before a prisoner can seek relief in court. Thus, a prison official may not retaliate against a prisoner because that prisoner filed a grievance. This is so even if the adverse action does not independently violate the Constitution.
To state a cause of action for retaliatory treatment, a complaint need only allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may be inferred.
DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2000).
Martin alleges that he was placed in a cell with a non-functional light for more than five months, intentionally subjected to chain smoking cellmates, and denied medical treatment, all in response to his many grievances about the conditions at Stateville. He also alleges that defendants Hughes and Cattaneo, who were responsible for cell assignment and medical care, respectively, made remarks that suggest their retaliatory intent. Specifically, Martin claims that in response to his complaints about poor lighting, Hughes warned Martin that he "would find out what happens to guys who file grievances." (Am. Compl. ¶ 51.) Martin alleges that Hughes also told him that he could "stay in the dark until hell freezes over" if he "wanted to keep filing grievances." (Am. Compl. ¶ 57.) In addition, Martin claims that when he sought medical attention for his alleged injuries caused by the poor lighting, Cattaneo taunted him by saying, "just file another grievance, Michael." (Id. ¶ 61.) Although "allegations of verbal abuse" do not constitute an independent constitutional violation, Young v. Breeding, 929 F. Supp. 1103, 1106 (1996), they bolster Martin's allegation that the conduct here was retaliatory. Martin has alleged a chronology of events from which retaliation can be inferred. These allegations are sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Therefore, defendants' motion is denied with respect to Count IV.
IV. Count V: Illinois Denial of Medical Treatment
Martin claims that defendants denied him medical care in violation of Illinois state tort law. However, he cites no such Illinois law, and provides no cases that recognize such a tort. Essentially, both parties have addressed Count V as if it were another claim of an Eighth Amendment violation. After independent research, this court has found that "[t]he State does owe a duty to prison inmates to provide reasonable medical care." Russell v. Illinois, 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 295 (Ill. Ct. Cl. 1989). However, it is unclear whether Martin has sufficiently alleged that defendants violated this duty. Nevertheless, the court need not resolve this issue, because Martin's alleged facts sufficiently state a claim for denial of medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
"To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of medical treatment, a prisoner must allege deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Isaac v. Jones, 529 F. Supp. 175, 180 (N.D.Ill. 1981) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). "An intentional denial or delay of access to medical care by prison guards is one manner in which the required deliberate indifference may be manifested." Id.
In this case, Martin has alleged that "[d]efendants willfully, wantonly, and with deliberate indifference denied Plaintiff medical treatment although Plaintiff described symptoms that would warrant further physical examination under reasonable medical practice." (Am. Compl. ¶ 88.) In a specific example, Martin claims that on January 27, 2000, he fell and injured his head. When he requested medical attention from defendant Cattaneo, the defendant responded, "just file another grievance, Michael." (Am. Compl. ¶ 61.) This is all he needs to do to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
V. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. State officials performing discretionary acts enjoy qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known at the time the incident occurred. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In evaluating defendants' claim of qualified immunity, this court must engage in a two-step analysis. First, the court must determine whether Martin's claim states a violation of his constitutional rights. As discussed above, the court has found that Martin succeeds with this requirement, with the exception of his present injury ETS claims. Second, this court must determine whether Martin's rights were clearly established at the time the alleged violation occurred. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
A clearly established right is one where "[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see also Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001) ("The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted."). "Because there is an almost infinite variety of factual scenarios that may be brought into the courtroom, a plaintiff need not point to cases that are identical to the presently alleged constitutional violation." Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2000). However, "the contours of the right must have been established so that the unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct would have been apparent in light of existing law." Id. (citing Cleveland-Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 1989)).
Defendants have provided no case law to suggest that any of Martin's allegations are not clearly established constitutional violations. On the contrary, "longstanding case law has `clearly established' that prison officials may not subject prisoners to conditions of confinement that violate the Constitution." Pritchett, 2000 WL 1129891, at *9. Specifically, at the time of defendants' alleged violations, it was clearly established that prison officials may not subject prisoners to ETS that creates a serious risk to their future health. Helling, 509 U.S. at 33-35 (recognizing that ETS exposure and unsafe drinking water can be Eighth Amendment violations); Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Given the decision in Helling, the right of a prisoner to not be subjected to a serious risk of his future health resulting from ETS was clearly established in 1998-99."); Warren v. Keane, 196 F.3d 330, 333 (2d Cir. 1999) ("We hold that after Helling it was clearly established that prison officials could violate the Eighth Amendment through deliberate indifference to an inmate's exposure to levels of ETS that posed an unreasonable risk of future harm to the inmate's health.").
There is a question as to whether it was clearly established that inadequate lighting constituted a constitutional violation at the time of the alleged violations. There was no controlling precedent either in the Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit on this issue. In such a situation, "we broaden our survey to include all relevant caselaw in order to determine `whether there was such a clear trend in the caselaw that we can say with fair assurance that the recognition of the right by a controlling precedent was merely a question of time.'" Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 767 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Cleveland-Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427, 431 (7th Cir. 1989)).
At the time of the alleged violations in this case, there was definitely case law in other circuits that clearly established a prohibition against inadequate lighting. Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1090 ("Adequate lighting is one of the fundamental attributes of `adequate shelter' required by the Eighth Amendment.") (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1054-55 (8th Cir. 1989) (unsanitary conditions, inadequate lighting held to be violations of pretrial detainee's clearly established rights). In addition, there was precedent in the Seventh Circuit suggesting that inadequate lighting could violate the constitution. Bono, 620 F.2d 609 (expressing Due Process concern over inadequate lighting). The question is whether it would have been clear to a reasonable prison official that subjecting Martin to near total darkness for fourteen hours a day and refusing to repair the lighting malfunction, even after Martin fell and injured his head, was unlawful. In light of the clear trend in the caselaw, the court concludes that a prohibition against such treatment in controlling precedent was merely a question of time and therefore holds that the rule against inadequate lighting was clearly established.
It was also clearly established at the time of the alleged violations that prisoners may not be given only unsafe drinking water. Helling, 509 U.S. at 33-35; Ford I, 2000 WL 960732, at *4 (suggesting that it was clearly established that prison officials may not "knowingly and unreasonably expose prisoners to an intolerable risk of harm . . . by not taking any action to address the problem of unsafe drinking water") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Plaintiff has a long-established right to food [and by extension, water] that `does not present an immediate danger to the health and well being of the inmates who consume it.'" Id. (quoting French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir. 1985)).
Furthermore, it was clearly established that prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for the exercise of their First Amendment rights. Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 229 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[I]t is well established that an act in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under Section 1983."); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing retaliation as a violation of the First Amendment). Finally, at the time of the alleged violations, it was clearly established that prison officials may not be deliberately indifferent to prisoners' health. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Defendants also argue that they have not violated any constitutional rights. However, as the court must accept all of Martin's allegations as true, defendants cannot rely on qualified immunity for that reason. Defendants' reliance on qualified immunity fails.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss Martin's complaint is granted in part and denied in part. Martin's claim of present injuries in Count I is dismissed and defendant Clark is dismissed from Count II. In all other respects, the motion is denied.