Opinion
No. 05-03-00699-CV
Opinion Filed April 20, 2004.
On Appeal from the 116th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 91-08658-F.
Dismiss.
Before Justices JAMES, WRIGHT, and BRIDGES.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Burma Jean Martin attempts to appeal the trial court's refusal to rule on her pro se "Motion for Contempt and Motion to Set Aside Certain Court Orders and Sheriff Deeds Based on Gross Irregularities and Extrinsic Fraud on the Court." We dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
On July 21, 1991, Sanford filed a suit on a sworn account against Martin for legal fees. After a default judgment, an order granting a new trial, a summary judgment in favor of Sanford on his claim against Martin, and a trial on the merits of Martin's counterclaim, a final judgment was entered on May 1, 1992 awarding Sanford $5,100.78 in damages, $852.01 in interest, and $6,000 in attorney's fees. The trial court subsequently denied Martin's motion for new trial on June 29, 1992. Over ten years later, after the trial court advised Martin the case was no longer active and that any dispute between Martin and Sanford should be settled in a new law suit or outside the court system, Martin filed the complained-of motion on April 11, 2003 and on April 22, 2003, requested the motion be set for a hearing. The trial court determined it had no jurisdiction and denied Martin's request for a hearing on the motion. This appeal followed.
A trial court may modify its judgment and impose sanctions after a judgment is entered, provided it retains plenary jurisdiction. In re T.G., 68 S.W.3d 171, 176 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). A trial court retains plenary jurisdiction for a minimum of thirty days after signing a final judgment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b. Parties may extend that time by filing an appropriate post-judgment motion within the thirty-day period. Id. Once extended by a timely-filed motion, the trial court's plenary power extends until thirty days after the motion is overruled, whether by written order or by operation of law. Faulkner v. Culver, 851 S.W.2d 187, 188 (Tex. 1993); T.G., 68 S.W.3d at 177. Judicial action taken after the trial court's plenary power has expired is void. T.G., 68 S.w.3d at 177.
A trial court may order execution of the judgment so long as the judgment has not been suspended or become dormant. Tex. R. Civ. P. 621, 622. Such orders are not appealable. See Schultz v. Fifth Judicial Court of Appeals, 810 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. 1991). Thus, although the trial court ordered a writ of execution on October 18, 1993, it is not relevant to this discussion. Moreover, even assuming the order of execution was appealable, the time for such an appeal has long expired. Similarly, Martin's bill of review filed in 1998 is inapplicable to our determination of the timeliness of Martin's April 11, 2003 motion. See Wembley Inv. Co. v. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d 925, 926-27 (Tex. 1999) (bill of review is independent suit).
The final judgment in this case was entered on May 1, 1992. Martin filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by written order on June 29, 1992. Thus, the trial court's plenary power to modify the judgment or impose sanctions in this case expired on July 29, 1992. Consequently, Martin's April 11, 2003 motion was well outside the plenary jurisdiction of the trial court. Appellate court jurisdiction over the merits of a case extends no further than that of the court from which the appeal is taken. George v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 976 S.W.2d 363, 364-65 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). Accordingly, we conclude we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.
We note this Court is authorized to award "just damages" if we determine "an appeal is frivolous" from consideration of "the record, briefs, or other papers filed in the court of appeals." See Tex.R.App.P. 45; Njuku v. Middleton, 20 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied). An appeal is frivolous if, at the time asserted, the advocate had no reasonable grounds to believe judgment would be reversed or when an appeal is pursued in bad faith. See Tate v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., 954 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.). Here, we fail to see how Martin could have a reasonable ground to believe the judgment would be reversed given Martin's repeated attempts to relitigate issues that were decided years ago. We caution Martin that any future attempts to relitigate these issues in this Court may result in monetary sanctions against her.
We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.