Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-3357, SECTION "K"(3)
September 30, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Pride Offshore Inc. ("Pride") in which Pride contends that judgment should be granted in its favor and against David Martin ("Martin") because:
(1) Martin's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata;
(2) Martin cannot prove that his accident was proximately caused by Pride's actions or inactions; or
(3) Pride had no duty to protect Martin from the type of accident and injuries sustained.
The Court has reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, deposition testimony, exhibits and the relevant law, and finds that Pride's motion should be granted for the reasons that follow.
Background
The Accident
Martin was employed by Pride as a roustabout from September 5, 1996 until November 7, 1996. Pride was performing work pursuant to a Domestic Daywork Drilling Contract between Freeport McMoRan Resource Partners, Limited Partnership, ("Freeport") and Pride with Pride furnishing a platform drilling rig for these operations. Apparently, Martin slept on the Freeport Main Pass 229-B platform. From October 31, 1996 to November 7, 1996, Martin worked on Pride Rig No. 220, a fixed platform rig, located on the Outer Continental Shelf.
It must be noted that Pride filed a Statement of Uncontested Material Facts to which the required "separate, short and concise statement of material facts as to which there exists a genuine issue to be tried" under LR56.2E was not filed. As such, all material facts set forth in the mover's statement will be deemed admitted. Nonetheless, the Court has considered the "Factual Background" set forth in Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition in reaching its decision in this matter.
Plaintiff contends that during this seven day hitch, Martin worked 123 hours thus averaging 17.57 hours each day. Plaintiff maintains that he was required to work at least 4 consecutive 18 hour hitches immediately preceding his release from the Freeport platform on the morning of November 7, 1996. Plaintiff further represents that he may have worked literally 24 hours each day from Nov. 3, 1996 through November 6, 1996.
On November 7, 1996, plaintiff was transported via helicopter from the Pride rig to a parking lot near Venice, Louisiana, where Martin's personal vehicle had been parked during his seven-day hitch. At the end of each hitch, Martin and the crew with whom he worked were replaced by a full crew. Martin was not paid for time spent driving to and from work and was responsible for his transportation. At no time was Martin ever provided with a company vehicle. Martin was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time of this accident.
Martin contends that he attempted to drive home in an exhausted state which had been caused by the work requirements he fulfilled while on the rig. At approximately 11:00 a.m., Martin departed the dock in his personal vehicle and began his journey home to Opp, Alabama. Nearly two hours and forty minutes later and nearly 130 miles from the parking lot and dock, Martin was involved in a one-car accident on Interstate 10 in Mississippi.
The accident report concerning the incident states that Martin's vehicle was traveling east on Interstate 10 and left the road to the left, flipped twice, struck pine trees and flipped on to the driver's side. Allegedly, Martin fell asleep at the wheel. Plaintiff contends that the accident was caused by fatigue brought on by the excessive amount of hours required of him to work.
As a result of his injuries Martin was treated at Northshore Regional Hospital from November 7, through December 22, 1996. Martin then received rehabilitation treatment from December, 1996 through May, 1997. He maintains that he currently needs assistance with all activities of daily living and is in need of custodial care for the remainder of his life. He is partially paralyzed, has permanent short term memory problems, and his past medical expenses total more than $750,000.00.
The Procedural History
This case has had a long and tortured procedural history. On November 4, 1997, Martin filed suit against Pride and Freeport in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana. The suit was brought under the Jones Act, the General Maritime Law, applicable state law and the Savings to Suitors clause. The negligence alleged included, inter alia, requiring plaintiff to work 123 hours during a 7 day period immediately proceeding November 7, 1996. The case was removed to the Eastern District of Louisiana by Pride and Freeport claiming that the Jones Act and the general maritime law had been fraudulently pled. A Motion to Remand was filed and denied.
Pride then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of Martin's claims based on his not being a seaman as a matter of law and thus without proper status to recover against Pride under the Jones Act and/or general maritime law. There was no discussion of any state law claims in that motion. In response to a sworn affidavit demonstrating that Martin had performed his duties aboard a fixed platform, not a jack-up or semi-submersible rig, Martin's counsel by letter to the court noted "that he had no objection to Pride's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of Jones Act seaman status."
The Order and Reasons entered to dispose of that motion stated in its entirety:
Defendant Pride Offshore Company moves for summary judgment. By the attached letter, plaintiff states that he does not oppose the motion.
Plaintiff worked for Pride on a fixed off-shore platform owned by defendant Freeport. His Jones Act and general maritime law claims against Pride are based on an assertion of seaman status. On an earlier motion of plaintiff to remand this action to state court, the Court determined that plaintiff is not a seaman and that his claims under the Jones act and general maritime law are without basis. Accordingly, Pride's motion for dismissal is GRANTED, and
IT IS ORDERED that all claims in this action against Pride Offshore Company be and are hereby DISMISSED.
(Doc. 25, C.A. 97-3754).
Martin then pursued his Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA") remedies. During the pendency thereof, Martin filed the instant lawsuit in the 32nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of Terrebonne against Pride based on Pride's alleged negligence for allowing and/or requiring plaintiff to work excessive hours which resulted in physical exhaustion and mental confusion; failing to maintain proper safety standards for plaintiff herein including safe work hours; and failing to take proper steps, to protect plaintiff from excessive overtime including such overtime as had been authorized by Freeport. That case, which is the one before the Court, was removed to this Court and was stayed during the pendency of the LHWCA litigation. The stay was lifted upon the Administrative Law Judge's Decision and Order finding that as a matter of law Martin's automobile accident did not occur on a covered situs under the LHWCA and that there was no jurisdiction under the LHWCA.
The stay was then lifted in this suit and the instant motion was filed by Pride.
Standard for Summary Judgment
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."Stults v. Conoco, 76 F.3d 651, 656, (5th Cir. 1996), (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1992) (quotingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (emphasis supplied);Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). Finally, the court notes that the substantive law determines materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The court now turns to the merits of Pride's arguments with these standards in mind.
Res Judicata
The preclusive effect of a prior federal court judgment is controlled by federal res judicata rules. Ellis v. Amex Life Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 2000). Res judicata is appropriate if:
1) the parties to both actions are identical (or at least in privity); 2) the judgment in the first action is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; 3) the first action concluded with a final judgment on the merits; and 4) the same claim or cause of action is involved in both suits. See United States v. Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 310 (5th Cir. 1994).Id. There is no question that the parties are the same, and the judgment in the first action was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. The other two requirements, however, are not as clearly fulfilled.
The Court has reviewed the Motion for Summary Judgment in the first filed suit against Pride and Freeport. There was absolutely no discussion or argument about the merits of the negligence claims themselves — whether arising under the Jones Act or Louisiana law. The sole focus of the adjudication was on the status of the plaintiff — that is whether he was a Jones Act seaman. As such, the true "merits" of the negligence claim were never addressed.
To qualify for preclusion, a judgment must be valid, final, and on the merits. Finality for this purpose is clearly distinct from the other requirements. A judgment dismissing an action for want of personal jurisdiction, for example, may be clearly final and preclusive on the jurisdiction issue, but it is not on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion.
18A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Edward Cooper Federal Practice and Procedure § 4432 at 52 (2d ed. 2002).
Likewise, collateral estoppel principles would not prevent plaintiff from pursuing his negligence claims in this suit. "A stipulation or admission may be binding in later stages of a continuing proceed. But issue preclusion ordinarily does not attach unless it is clearly shown that the parties intended that the issue be foreclosed in other litigation." United States v. Dorwin Aam, 670 F. Supp. 306 (W.D. Washington 1986); 18A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Edward Cooper Federal Practice and Procedure § 4443 at 252 (2d ed. 2002). Thus, the motion fails in this regard.
Causation Remains a Question of Fact
As to the issue of whether fatigue caused Martin's automobile accident, it is clear to the Court that the facts presented are such that there is a legitimate question of fact for the jury. The number of hours Martin was required to work prior to his returning from his hitch and the conditions under which they were performed creates a question of fact, if there is a such a cause of action.
Louisiana Does Not Recognize the Duty Upon Which Martin Relies
As this Court's jurisdiction is based on diversity, the Court is constrained to apply the law of the State of Louisiana. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822 (1938); Mozeke v. International Paper Co., 856 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1988). Martin posits that "Pride negligently created the fatigue, had knowledge of his fatigue and yet failed to take steps to protect one of its own employees." Based on these allegations, Martin contends that a cause of action in negligence against Pride exists. This analysis ignores the actual holding in Baggett v. Brumfield, 768 So.2d 332 (La.App. 3d Cir. 2000).
In Baggett the wife of a driver killed in a car accident filed suit against the employer of the employee who allegedly fell asleep on his way home from a twenty-one hour shift. The employee fell asleep at the wheel, resulting in his vehicle drifting in the opposite lane of traffic, hitting the decedent head-on. The trial court found the employer negligent for failing to prevent its employee from driving home after working a twenty-one-hour shift or for failing to keep its employee from working twenty-one-hour shifts and assessing the employer forty percent at fault.
While describing Faverty v. McDonald's, 133 Or. App. 514, 892 P.2d 703 (1995) (jury could reasonably conclude employer knew or should have known that working high school employee who had worked 3 consecutive shifts during a 17 hour period would impair ability to drive home safely) andRobertson v. Le Master, 171 W. Va. 607, 301 S.E.2d 563 (1983) (question of material fact existed as to whether employer who had required the employee to work 25 hour shift or he would be fired had duty to guard against a foreseeable risk of harm) as persuasive, the Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was "unimpressed."
The Court noted the countervailing jurisprudence that rejects that kind of duty. Pilgrim v. Fortune Drilling Co., Inc., 653 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1981); Jenkins v. Kemlon Prod., 923 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.App. 1996), Lesser v. Nordstrom, 1998 WL 480832 (E.D.Pa. 1998). The Court specifically founds as a matter of law, that the employer did not owe a duty to public highway users. The court stated unequivocally:
[T]his court believes that only Mr. Brumfield had the ability to determine whether he could safely drive home after his uncle requested that he leave. BIC did not require that he work for such an extended period of time, and it had no control over his acts once he exited the plant. To find BIC liable for Mr. Brumfield's act, under these circumstances, would result in diluting the principle of individual responsibility to which we adhere in this court and in our state.Bagett, 758 So.2d at 337. Thus, while the argument that the "requirement" of work might distinguish the facts of this case from that of Baggett, the Louisiana courts reliance on the duty of the employee to recognize his own individual responsibility requires this Court to grant Pride's motion for summary judgment as apparently Louisiana would not recognize the duty upon which Martin relies for recovery. Indeed, the Court has found no Louisiana case supporting plaintiff's position that would extend vicarious liability to this extent.
In addition, the Court finds the analysis in Pilgrim, 653 F.2d 982, in line with Louisiana's general approach to tort liability. Under La. Civ. Code art. 2315, in order for a party to be liable to another who has been injured, there first must exist a duty to prevent the injury. The same holds true in Texas. Id. at 984. The Pilgrim court noted that under Texas law, where the negligence alleged is the nonfeasance of a duty, there must be such a duty and a person of ordinary prudence would have acted to prevent the injury. The court found that there was no duty to the users of the public highway to prevent an exhausted employee from driving home. Furthermore, this Court would note that it is questionable what power Pride would have had to prevent Martin from returning home in his "fatigued" state. With all of this in mind, the Court finds the motion for summary judgment meritorious. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Pride Offshore Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and judgment shall be entered dismissing David Martin's claims.